

SUICIDE INSURGENCY AND BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CHALLENGES OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Over the years Nigerians have happily celebrated live with every meagre resource at their disposal. Suicide was viewed by all cultures in Nigeria as a sacrilege. This very happy and contented disposition completely devoid of suicide insurgency was shattered on the 16th of June 2011 in the suicide mission in Abuja. There were concerted peace enforcement operations which culminated into the declaration by President Muhammadu Buhari, on 24 December 2016 that Boko Haram had been technically defeated. Nevertheless, the much-expected peace is still an illusion because suicide insurgency intensified and was far higher than the previous months and years. The objectives of the study are: (1) To examine the activities of Boko Haram in the light of terrorism and insurgency (2) To evaluate the nature and causes of the suicide attacks of Boko Haram (3) To assess the actions of multinational peace enforcement operations against Boko Haram. The study is guided by a blend of the theoretical framework of the Clash of Civilization and Marxist Conflict Theory. The qualitative research method was adopted with graphs to critically illustrate and analyse the data. The research found out that suicide attacks by Boko Haram radically increased after the peace enforcement operations destroyed their base and sources of sophisticated weapons for direct insurgency attacks thereby driving them to use unconventional methods. The article concludes that suicide insurgency increased because of the technical defeat of Boko Haram and that winning an unconventional war is a herculean task by peace enforcement operations. The article recommends that the peace enforcement operations of the multinational joint task force should be sustained and improved upon to contain suicide attacks.

INTRODUCTION

Boko Haram armed rebellion against the government of Nigeria earnestly commenced on the 26th of July 2009 after their spiritual and political leader Mohammad Yusuf was slain in a crackdown by the Nigerian military. They became stronger by the day and in 2014 extended their armed rebellion against the governments of Cameroon, Chad and Niger thereby making the conflict international in dimension. The group's six-year insurgency has killed more than 21,400 people and internally displaced more than 1.4 million people thereby causing major refugee crisis [Campbell 2017]. Boko Haram offensive were so comprehensive and disastrous that it was labelled the world's deadliest terrorist group, in terms of casualties by the Global Terrorism Index of 2015. Peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which is a coalition of the armed forces of Nigeria, Benin, Chad and Cameroon with support by France, US and UK eventually succeeded in suppressing the armed rebellion as most of the insurgents fled to Sambisa Forest.

President Muhammadu Buhari, on 24 December 2016 declared that Boko Haram had been technically defeated and ousted from Camp Zero which was the most invincible fortress of Boko Haram located deep in the bastion of the Sambisa Forest. Despite this "technical defeat" the much-expected peace, security, stability and development in the region is still a mirage because suicide terrorism intensified and was far higher than the previous months and years. The objectives of the study are: (1) To examine the activities of Boko Haram in the

light of terrorism and insurgency (2) To evaluate the nature and causes of the suicide attacks of Boko Haram (3) To assess the actions of multinational peace enforcement operations against Boko Haram.

The study is guided by a blend of the theoretical framework of the Clash of Civilization and Marxist Conflict Theory. The Clash of Civilization Theory propounded by Samuel Huntington is of the view that the fault lines between civilizations would be the battle lines of the future as religion would be a determining factor for most war. (Huntington 1997) The Marxist Conflict Theory propounded by Karl Marx is of the view that the real foundation of society is the economic structure and it is from this foundation, that legal and political superstructures arise and definite forms of social consciousness correspond. (Ghosh 2009) Materialism (wealth or poverty) propels vast and varied actions in the society and poverty is a major trigger of conflict especially when blended with religion.

The qualitative research methodology was adopted for the study. It consists of content and documentary analysis whereby data was gathered mainly through secondary sources and reviewed. Data gathered from think tanks like the Nigeria Social Violence Dataset, Nigeria Security Tracker, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, Global Terrorism Index, BBC Records, and highly reputable media like CNN, AP etc. were critically analysed and presented in graphs.

The article is divided into seven sections. We are already in the first section which is the introduction. The second section would discuss terrorism and insurgency in Boko Haram while the third section would discuss the origin, ideology and objective of Boko Haram. Section four deals with the profile of Boko Haram attacks while section five is on the suicide insurgency of Boko Haram. Section six is on the challenges of peace enforcement operations and finally, section seven is the conclusion and recommendation.

TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN BOKO HARAM

This section defines some of the terms commonly used in this paper for conceptual clarification. The clarifications are geared towards operationalising the usage of “suicide-insurgency” within the context of this study. It will also illuminate the disparity and similarity between insurgency and terrorism and delve extensively into the unconventional warfare of suicide-insurgency.

From the perspective of this study, the highly sophisticated and coordinated military formations, operations, aggression, offensive actions and even objectives of Boko Haram depicts insurgency more than terrorism. This is buttressed by the captions of most of the referenced materials in this article. Most scholars use the terms insurgency and terrorism interchangeably for the case of Boko Haram for reason that would be explained in the subsequent paragraphs of this section. Venda (2018) asserted that “Since 2009, Boko Haram has waged a brutal insurgency in north eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Both (Boko Haram) and the Nigerian government’s and militias’ counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts have led to the deaths of tens of thousands of people....” Antigha (2017-12-31) talked of the “resurgence of Boko Haram Insurgency and the progress or lack of progress in the efforts of the Armed Forces of Nigeria” Also, Omeni Akali recently published a book with Routledge, titled “Counter-insurgency in Nigeria: the military operations against Boko Haram, 2011-2017”. This book, described Boko Haram as insurgents carrying out atrocious terrorist activities which requires a coordinated and effective counter-insurgency (Omeni 2018).

The link between insurgency and terrorism was subtly captured in the Encyclopaedia Britannica as it says that “insurgents use terror tactics primarily and other guerrilla operations such as sabotage, ambushes and raids”. In politics according to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the term insurgency refers to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized

revolution such as armed uprising, typically guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country. Insurgency tactics is normally used when resources of belligerents are not powerful enough to allow outright conquest or take-over of the government's centre of power. (Encyclopaedia Britannica) Insurgency is "an attempt by a group of people to take control of their government using force and violence" (Bullon 2008).

In a similar vein terrorism is said to be "the use of violence such as bombing, shooting, or kidnapping to obtain political demands such as making a government do something". (Bullon 2008) Terrorism is the systematic use of violence or threat of violence to generate fear for purposes of achieving a political goal. Terrorism was first used in the 1790s to refer to the atrocious acts of the French Revolution by the belligerents against their opponents (Jenkins 2018).

Terrorism and Insurgency are rebellious activities aimed at forcefully obtaining political demands but terrorism is more inclined towards instilling fear in stealthy operations. Most groups that are labelled as terrorist organisations are actually insurgents but the declaration of war against terrorism by the United States of America in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist operation brought terrorism to the fore and makes a lot of groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Boko Haram etc. to be narrowly classified as such. A major distinction is that insurgency is selective while terrorism is indiscriminate. This is as portrayed in the 9/11 attack which claimed the lives of devout Muslims, some supporters of fundamentalist Islam and many foreigners that had nothing to do with the mission (Dasgupta 2002).

According to Steward (2014), the trend in the mass media is to refer to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) as a terrorist group. ISIS obviously does have cadres with sophisticated terrorist skills, but they are much more than a terrorist group because the group has displayed the ability to fight intricate insurgency in wide expanse of geographical space and has also engaged in military battles against the Syrian and Iraqi government. For this reason, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, al Shabaab and al Qaeda should be more accurately referred to as a militant group instead of a terrorist group (Steward 2014).

This is evidently the case with Boko Haram because their tactics is not just terrorism but direct fight with the Nigerian Military forces and President Goodluck Jonathan in May 2013 declared that "the actions of Boko Haram amount to a declaration war. [Agbibo 2013] It was not only declaration of war but victories in some of the major wars leading to the control of some Nigerian territory and people. According to Onuoha and Oyewole (2018-4-22) At the height of the insurgency in January 2015, the insurgents controlled territories in Nigeria that was the equivalent of 20,000 square miles - an area the size of Belgium.

As a matter of fact, the Nigerian Military Forces could not contain the fight or insurgencies of Boko Haram and had to appeal for international support that gave rise to the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Stewart (2014) noted that terrorism is just one tool used by groups to wage unconventional warfare against a superior adversary but it gravitates towards insurgency and conventional warfare when a group directly and consistently takes up arms against a stronger opponent or state institution. This explains the interchangeable use of insurgency and terrorism by scholars in the descriptions of the armed rebellion of Boko Haram against the government of Nigeria.

Suicide Insurgency are the attacks on the state and its institutions using people who would die in the attack for purposes of achieving a political goal which is an independent caliphate in the case of Boko Haram. It is for this reason that terrorism and insurgency is used interchangeably but the pendulum swings more for insurgency. Suicide insurgency is an attack intended to kill targeted adversaries and inflict great damage in which the attacker expects or intends to die in the process. It is an unconventional warfare tactics adopted for conflicts by over 40 countries. Between 1981 thru 2015, a total of 4,814 suicide attacks

occurred for which 90% took place in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestinian territories, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and recently Nigeria (Hassan 2009).

Habitually, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is line with their ideological, religious, political and economic goals (Gompert & Gordon 2008). This is in tandem with suicide insurgency which is an unconventional rebellious approach adopted as an act of desperation and last resort tactic sequel to conventional defeat in a battlefield. Suicide fighters should be understood within the context of the subjectivity that overwhelming powers have circumscribed on them by virtue of confrontation with an adversary that wields formidable and terrific weaponry. When the level of sophistication and complexity for oppression is too wide, opponents with insignificant power resort to suicide insurgency as a tactic to resist and dismantle the objectives of the oppressor (Pape 2004).

Despite the fact that suicide insurgency is common in Islamic countries not all modern suicide insurgencies are Moslems. A typical example is the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. Pape. (2004:45) Resistance by Iraq sequel to the invasion and occupation of the United States of America perfectly buttresses this assertion. It is on record that there were no significant cases of suicide terrorism in Iraq before 2003. However, with the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, suicide insurgency gradually commenced and by 2008; Iraq was indisputably the world's leader in suicide bombings (Altran 2006:8).

Groups which have tremendous power and military might have no need to resort to insurgency in actualization of their objectives. This is the reason why suicide fighting is conspicuously used by weak and oppressed groups. A common feature of suicide insurgency is the motivation they receive from the religious doctrine of martyrdom. Assailants and their supporters encourage themselves by believing that their actions will yield them a place in paradise. Consequently, suicide fighters are of the impression that their actions are in consonance with religious and social precepts of fighting a just war Esposito (2002).

THE ORIGIN, IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVE OF BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram which literally means western education is forbidden is a fundamentalist Islamic movement which actively commenced operation in 2002 under the auspices of Malam Mohammed Yusuf. At the formative stages, the movement was very hospitable, showing care and charity to people in Maiduguri, Borno State. Their focus was preaching and projecting compliance to Islamic rules and regulations without violence. However, some scholars trace the origins of Boko Haram to the Maitatsine Islamic uprisings of the 1970s and early 1980s, in Bauchi, led by Mohammed Marwa. The principal objective of Boko Haram is the building of an Islamic state or caliphate in Nigeria and to institute the Sharia Law (Cook 2011).

The activities of Boko Haram drastically changed and became very violent after their spiritual and political leader Mohammad Yusuf was slain in 2009 by a crackdown of the Nigerian military following reports that the group were arming themselves and militarizing (Cook 2011). The Nigerian security forces invaded their camps and arrested members of the sect and this sparked deadly clashes whereby Boko Haram fighters violently attacked a police station with poisoned bows and arrows and fuel-laden motorcycles [Nossiter 2009]. The crackdown which lasted for five days also claimed the lives of more than 700 people and momentarily suppressed the group. Abubakar Shekau emerged as leader of the group after Mohammed Yusuf was killed (Bartolotta 2011).


PROFILE OF BOKO HARAM ATTACKS

The activities of Boko Haram became very violent from 2009 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. According to Onuoha and Oyewole (2018, 4, 22), "Under Shekau's brutal leadership, Boko Harm has sustained a deadly insurgency that overwhelmingly targeted civilians involving assassinations, assaults, bombings, abductions, invasion of border communities, and seizures and control of territory in Nigeria." It is estimated by the

government of Bornu State that the armed rebellion of Boko Haram claimed the lives of at least 100,000 people, displaced more than 2.6 million people, caused pain to over 52, 311 orphans and 54,911 widows, and led to about \$9 billion worth of damage (Sani 2017, Onuoha and Oyewole 2018).

Records from the Global Terrorism Database indicate that the armed rebellion of Boko in Nigeria Haram was responsible for 1639 attacks, with 14,436 fatalities, 6051 wounded and 2063 kidnap cases. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) have been tracking the profile of Boko Haram attacks and their data base reveal that Boko Haram was responsible for 2445 that led to the killing of 28,168 deaths between 2009 through 2017.

Figure 4.1



Graph Plotted with Data of Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) and Nigeria Security Tracker of the Council of Foreign Relations

The aggression initially commenced with improvised explosive devices (IED) and gradual acquisition and use of sophisticated modern weapons. A combination of their dexterity and sophistication was at a stage a major national security challenge and threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria because they declared an independent Caliphate over the large areas they seized in the north-east. There attacks were very brutal and comprehensive affecting Christians and Moslems alike.

There were brutal attacks on top governmental establishments, security agents and their formations, churches, mosques, schools and the general populace. School children were also not spared in the violent bombings, raids and high spate of kidnapping as the group kidnapped 250 schoolgirls in Chibok in April 2014 (Salisu 2015). In 2014, the armed rebellion escalated radically and claimed the lives of 10,849 people, according to the Nigeria Security Tracker and spread to neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon, thereby making it a major regional conflict that became the world's deadliest terrorist group in 2015. (Pisa and Hume 2015) In 2016, the United Nations warned that 5.1 million people are in danger of starvation in northeast Nigeria and this includes areas too perilous to reach because of Boko Haram ambushes (AP 24-Dec-2016).

The profile of Boko Haram Armed conflicts has been a tale of highly disastrous tragedy and woe which negatively impacted on Nigerians and beyond. In a nutshell, the impact of the Boko Haram Rebellion can be summarized as: Unprecedented insecurity, Wanton destruction of lives and properties, Internal Displacement of Persons, Socio-political and economic destabilization. At the height of the insurgency in the month of May 2013 President Goodluck Jonathan declared that the actions of Boko Haram amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state and threaten its territorial integrity which a responsible government will not tolerate (Agbiboa 2013).

THE SUICIDE INSURGENCY OF BOKO HARAM

Over the years Nigerians have enjoyed their lives maximally despite undulating socio-political and economic challenges. Nigerians were happy and contented to be alive and celebrated live with every meagre resource at their disposal. The exceedingly happy and joyful disposition of Nigerians have made Nigeria to be awarded the country with the world happiest people in the year 2003 (BBC 2003-10-2). Suicide was viewed by all cultures in Nigeria as a taboo and sacrilege. Going for a suicide mission was an unthinkable anathema. It baffled the minds of Nigerians when they read or hear about people going for suicide mission in other countries and considered it too strange.

This very happy and contented disposition completely devoid of suicide insurgency was shattered on the 16th of June 2011 in the suicide attack on the Police headquarters which left a couple of people severely injured and killed. Two months later, precisely 27th August, 2011 Boko Haram conducted another suicide attack on United Nations Headquarters in Abuja that led to twenty fatalities and more than sixty were injured. (Salisu 2015) Since then suicide insurgency has become a regular occurrence in Nigeria leading to the untimely death of scores of Nigerians and turning Nigeria into the seventh most terrorised country in the world according to the 2016 ranking of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI).

There was the high speculation that the attacks were targeted at pulling down the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan because he was a Christian and a southerner. There was even the illusion that Boko Haram was the military arm of the opposition and that they were being sponsored. The prevalent incessant attacks on lives and property in the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari (the incumbent president – a Muslim and Northerner) debunks the speculation (Olukayode 2016). This is because the spate of unconventional warfare in general and suicide insurgency in particular has tremendously increased.

Suicide insurgency is presently the major offensive weapon by Boko Haram but the very high rate of children and women involvement calls to question the level of commitment or coercion. According to Obi (2016-4-19) “women have strapped explosives to their bodies in other recent conflicts – from Chechnya to Iraq, from Pakistan to Palestine, from Syria to Sri Lanka – but never at such a rate as in the Boko Haram insurgency.” Also according to Elizabeth Pearson and Jacob Zenn, more than 200 women suicide bombers have blown themselves up since June 2014, killing more than 1,000 people in Nigeria, and increasingly in neighbouring Cameroon. The female suicide bombers have become the signature weapon of the Nigerian jihadist group, Boko Haram (Obi 2016).

There were no cases of suicide insurgency in 2012, 2013 and the 1st quarter of 2014. As is the case with suicide insurgency the world over, the suicide insurgency of Boko Haram is apparently triggered as an act of desperation and last resort tactic sequel to conventional defeat in a battlefield. It is motivated by either conviction or coercion although reports from some scholars indicate that the pendulum swings more towards coercion. According to Obi (2016) “young girls, too young to have an informed decision, have been dragooned into martyrdom. There have also been reports that some have been remotely detonated by their male accomplices” (Obi 2016).

Also, Maclean (2017) gives an insightful report of how captured women are prepared and coerced to go for suicide missions. The report is based on the account of Nadia – a 17-year-old who survived the preparation and coercion. She was drugged, strapped with explosive and dropped on motorbikes with two other girls near Gamboro a town in Borno State. They were charged with the mission of blowing themselves up in a big crowd. The saving grace was that they gave themselves up in a checkpoint run by the Civilian Joint Task Force by shouting to notify them of the looming danger and how they were compelled to carry the suicide bombs. Many do not survive this rigour according to figures collated by the Long War Journal. This is because they are sometimes remotely detonated, some other time there

is accidental explosion by the victims on their way to carry out the coerced mission. In most cases they are shot death from a distance because of the impression that they are committed to the suicide mission or can be remotely detonated (Doug 2017).


The use of children and teenagers also buttresses this point. According to UNICEF Report “Boko Haram has used more than 100 children for the purposes of blowing themselves up in an attack since 2014 and eighty percent were young girls.” Marie-Pierre (UNICEF Regional Director for West and Central Africa) in a 23-page report noted that children who are the obvious victims of the conflict are now used in an insurgent that “underscores an increasingly familiar pattern of terrorist organizations using young children to save adult operatives from having to give their own lives to advance their jihadist agenda”. The scenario of forcing or deceiving children to go for suicide missions is highly reprehensible from the perspective of UNICEF and Boko Haram is guilty of being “the worst possible use of children in conflict”. The report noted that this is “enabled by the militants’ systemic kidnapping of thousands of children, most famously the more than 270 schoolgirls taken from the town of Chibok, Nigeria, three years ago” (Doug 2017).

Other cases of suicide insurgency are actually influenced by the conviction of the perpetrators hinged on the belief that “who fights and dies – either by suicide bombing in the process of establishing a sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government institutions or by other means would automatically go to Aljana – Paradise or heaven” (Obi 2016).

CHALLENGES OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

This section would deal with the attempts by the military forces of Nigeria and the coalition of the military forces of supportive countries in the efforts to combat the Boko Haram armed rebellion and the challenges facing the peace enforcement operations. President Muhammadu Buhari, on 24 December 2016 declared that Boko Haram had been technically defeated and ousted from their last stronghold in Sambisa Forest (BBC 24-Dec-2016) The President commended Nigerian troops “finally entering and crushing the remnants of the Boko Haram insurgents at Camp Zero” (AP 24-Dec-2016). Camp Zero was the most invincible fortress of Boko Haram located deep in the bastion of the Sambisa Forest. In sharp contrast to the high hopes and expectations of Nigerians for peace, stability and development in the region sequel to the declaration; suicide insurgency intensified and was far higher than the previous months and years.

Fig 6.1: Cases of Suicide Insurgency



Graph Plotted from approximated summaries of think tanks I as indicated in the methodology

According to Olaleye (2017-8-2) “Boko Haram terrorists have so far used more than 145 girls in suicide bombing missions between January and July 2017, a Sunday Punch investigation has shown”. The report went further to state that the figure could be higher because some of the missions may have happened without the knowledge of the appropriate authorities like the National Emergency Management Agency, Anti-insurgency Operation, Operation Lafiya Dole and the Borno State Police Command which were the sources of the data for the investigation (Olaleye 2017).

The peace enforcement arrangements and operations to counter Boko Haram is adequate but the unconventional warfare of suicide insurgency is a tactics that is very complex and difficult to combat the world over. Jennifer Cooke (Center for Strategic and International Studies Africa Program) is of the view that it is very difficult to mount a response to assaults on soft target places like churches, mosques, schools and tiny villages scattered in vast and varied areas [Jason 2016]. The peace enforcement operations are formidable and earnestly began when President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency on May 15, 2013 on three northern states – Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, where Boko Haram was most active and ordered the deployment of 8,000 soldiers – the largest military deployment since Nigeria’s Civil War, to the affected areas for a direct military offensive against Boko Haram armed rebellion. As part of the arrangement a massive and highly sophisticated Joint Task Force Operation to Restore Order (JTORO) was formed in an attempt to restore order and reclaim control of the territories (Agbibo 2013).

This peace enforcement arrangement was complimented by the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) sequel to the Paris Summit of May 2014, which brought together the heads of state of Nigeria, France, Cameroon, Benin, Chad and Niger. Also in the Paris Summit were representatives of the US, UK and EU. The summit focused on the provision and enhancement of regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram by means of pooling intelligence and border surveillance, coordinated patrols and exchanging relevant information. As a follow-up to the May 2014 Summit, members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) comprising Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria plus Benin in October 2014 had a security conference to strengthen the peace enforcement arrangement. The LCBC pledged mutual cooperation and provision of troops to the MNJTF. They also agreed to seek the assistance of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) in the establishment of prerequisite legal framework for cross-border military operations (Ionel 2015).

In response to the appeal, African Union responded through Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is the standing decision-making body of the AU, competent for peace and security issues. In their meeting of 29 January 2015, at the level of heads of state and government – the PSC authorised the deployment of a troops comprising 7,500 military and non-military staff to assist the MNJTF. The focal objective of the mission is to facilitate humanitarian assistance, restore state authority and create a secure environment in the affected areas. In specificity, the highlight of the 7,500 military force approved by the AU was to assist the MNJTF in the task of conducting military operations, conducting border patrols, stopping flows of arms, finding abducted persons, achieving coordination at inter-state level, bringing those responsible for crimes to justice and reintegrating insurgents into society. The PCS through the Chairperson of the AU also requested that the UN Security Council should adopt a resolution authorising the peace enforcement operation and solicited financial and international support for the operation (Ionel 2015). Boko Haram was still very strong with all the arrangement on ground.

Highly industrialized and technological advanced countries like France, Britain, United States and Israel are committed to supporting the peace enforcement operations against Boko Haram and have pledged support in vast and varied ways including training, supplies of arms and ammunition (Nariah 2014). Also, as at March 2015 the New York Times reported


that hundreds of private military contractors from South Africa and other countries are actively engaged in the peace enforcement operations against Boko Haram by operating attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers as well as general logistics and planning of operations (Nossiter 2015).

On assuming office as on 29 May 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari intensified the peace enforcement operations against Boko Haram by sourcing for greater support and international collaboration. He appealed to France and other friendly nations to assist in supplying arms and ammunitions, effective intelligence and surveillance, security strategies and training to strengthen the Joint Multi-national Task-Force deployed to the region. To invigorate Operation Zaman Lafiya and ensure decisive victory President Buhari relocated the Military Command Centre to Maiduguri and an alternate command centre in Yola (The Punch 9-Jun-2015).

These concerted efforts eventually gave rise to the capture of Camp Zero in Sambisa Forest which is the last stronghold of Boko Haram and their technical defeat. It was a significant headway because before 2015 operation by Nigeria, Niger and Chad, bolstered by South African mercenaries which culminated in the December 2016 capture of Camp Zero, Boko Haram “occupied territories equivalent in size to Belgium, or the US state of Maryland. Certainly, it controls far less now, maybe none” [Jason 2016]. As part of the success story more than 1,000 women were rescued from Boko Haram in January 2016 after the capture of Camp Zero. Early in the month of March 2017, seventy-six members of Boko Haram surrendered apparently due to food shortages which is an indication that the peace enforcement operations is achieving its targets. A week after this incidence the peace enforcement operations successfully rescued 701 people held captive (Jason 2016).

There are however major **challenges** to the peace enforcement operation and top in the list is the coerced suicide insurgency perpetrated by children and young girls. A recent UNICEF Report indicates that Boko Haram militants used 27 children to commit suicide bombing attacks in the first quarter of 2017. This marks a major increase within the past four years because 56 children were used for suicide mission in the twelve months of 2014, 56 in 2015 and 30 in 2016 (Doug 2017).

Fig 6.2: Child Suicide Missions in Quarterly Bases for 4 Years



Graph Plotted from approximated summaries of think tanks as indicated in the methodology

The above figure shows that the combined quarterly child suicide missions for 2014, 2015 and 2016 is less than the child suicide mission for the first quarter of 2017. This is an indication that the group have re-strategized and not completely defeated. Also as reported by BBC's Abdullahi Kaura Abubakar “while the militants may be unable to carry out major attacks on military targets, they seem to have no difficulty using young women to enter heavily guarded camps for the displaced” (Abdullahi 2016)

Nigerian Government is at the moment taking some proactive measures like the deployment of 3,000 policemen to Maiduguri and other areas liberated from Boko Haram. The Police Public Relations Officer (PPRO) of Maiduguri State disclosed to the News Agency of Nigeria that the measures are vital to enhance security network in Maiduguri and other communities liberated from the insurgents. These measures are geared towards combating security threats and protecting lives and property in the state (Agbiboa 2017). Also in line with sustaining the peace the Nigerian Army launched Operation Deep Punch.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Contrary to the high hopes and expectations of Nigerians for peace, stability and development in the region sequel to the declaration of President Muhammadu Buhari, on 24 December 2016 that Boko Haram had been technically defeated and ousted from their last stronghold in Sambisa Forest – suicide insurgency intensified and was far higher than the previous months and years. This is because of the challenges and limitation of tackling unconventional warfare by peace enforcement operations. The unconventional warfare of suicide insurgency is a tactics that is very complex and difficult to combat the world over and is always used as a rebellious tactics sequel to conventional defeat in a battlefield.

The article **recommends** that the peace enforcement operations of the multinational joint task force should be sustained and improved upon to contain the unconventional warfare of suicide attacks and other soft targets. The multinational joint task force should have a branch for community policing to enhance intelligence gathering about impending attacks by suicide bombers and other forms of insurgency. The whistle blowing techniques should be adopted and promoted with highly lucrative incentives to enhance security for the soft sports.

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