NATIONAL SECURITY AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: A FOCUS ON THE NIGERIAN GENERAL ELECTION OF 2019

DR. DAN MOU
Executive Chairman
Centre for Poverty Eradication,
Development and Equal Opportunity (CEPEDEO), Abuja, Nigeria.
e-mail: danmou2001@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the question of national security and electoral integrity, with a focus on the forthcoming Nigerian General Elections of 2019. It argues that without good governance that will guarantee security and electoral integrity, liberal democracy in Nigeria as elsewhere, will be in danger. This is because these are the minimum requirements for creating a favourable environment for the citizens of any country to elect the effective, competent and visionary leaders that could provide good governance, development and prosperity for their nations. It concludes with some policy recommendations that need to be put in place to guarantee the success of the impending Nigerian General Elections of 2019.

KEY WORDS: National Security, electoral integrity, good governance, liberal democracy, Nigerian General Elections of 2019, Minimum Environment for credible elections, Independent National Electoral Commission, Security Agencies.

I INTRODUCTION

Prevailing political and governance research paradigms and political or governance practice in post-independence African societies, including Nigeria, have given the mistaken impression that politics, especially governance, is only about, as David Easton puts it, the "authoritative allocation of values" (Easton, 1965); or as we say it in Nigeria, the "sharing of democratic dividends". The evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case. Pertinent to politics or governance, is also the need for the legitimization of the extant social order. (Edelman, 1977; Mou, 1986). This is where national security, electoral integrity, good governance and nation building come in.

That the legitimization aspects of politics have not received much attention in public policy analysis literature and governmental practice is no testimony to the fact that they are not important for the survival and sustainability of political systems and nations, especially democratic ones. As Murray Edelman states it cogently:

Political systems allocate values, and they also legitimize themselves. The two functions can be independent of each other because governmental value allocations are always markedly unequal, requiring that the great majority who get the least of whatever is valued, receive psychological attentions, promises, and re-assurances which, together with some coercion, maintain their loyalty, docility and services (Edelman, 1984).

Whether one is concerned with value allocations or political system legitimization, how effective and efficient national security, electoral integrity, good governance and nation building are carried out in any society, have serious implications for the policing and prosperity of that society. It also determines the extent of the peace, democratic rules, security and sustainable development such a nation will experience (Seseer P Mou, Dan Mou, 2017 and Mou, 2018). The failure to appreciate and handle these issues carefully, especially of National Security and electoral integrity, have created several problems for many nations in the world today and is still doing so. In fact, some have already become "failed states" or are about to do so, as a consequence of this fatal negligence (Mou, 2018).

We are now living witnesses to the collapse of despotic and unpopular regimes the world over, including those on the African continent. Subordinate groups, classes and other social cleavages have sprang up with agitations for participation in the affairs of their nations and societies (Mou, 2016, 2017). This has, no doubt, confirmed Almond and Verba's declaration that: "If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world; it is what might be called the participation revolution" (Almond and Verba, 1963). This participation becomes more effective in situations where national security and electoral integrity are guaranteed.

There is no doubting the fact that this "participation revolution", has engulfed African societies, including Nigeria as well (Ake, 1996; Meredith, 2006; Mou, 2016, 2017). What still remains in doubt, and this study hopes to clarify, is the particular forms this "participation revolution" has assumed within the different African societies", where there are severe challenges to national security and electoral integrity. Particularly limited, it seems, is our knowledge of how this "participation revolution" has come to affect and is affecting national security, electoral integrity, good governance and nation building in African nations. Besides, these developments have brought about severe political, socio-economic consequences, security and electoral challenges to these African nations, governments and their citizens that need to be properly investigated. Here, we examine in particular, the Nigerian situation.

What has been the impact of the quest for democratization and mass participation; or as Almond and Verba put it, the "participation revolution" on national security, electoral integrity, good governance and nation building in Nigeria? What other consequences and security challenges have arisen within Nigeria with respect to the different social cleavages and citizens? By social cleavages here, we mean those divisions in the Nigerian society that are based on ethnicity, classes, region, religion, gender, language, race and even caste (Parkins, 1971; Mou, 2017). What lessons can African nations learn from the Nigerian experience? What are the policy recommendations that can be put forward to address all of these issues, especially national security and electoral integrity? These are the questions that this paper attempts to answer.

More specifically on the Nigerian situation, we propose to demonstrate that national security, electoral integrity and good governance under a democratic setting, are opposite sides of the same coin. As good governance under a democratic setting goes up or improves, national security and electoral integrity also goes up in that challenges to national security and electoral integrity become lesser and lesser in such a society. Whenever the other side suffers, the opposite side is inevitably bound to suffer as well (Mou, 2017). Managing the State apparatus to bring about nation building and development, or exercising political power, becomes always striking a favourable balance between the imperatives of national security, electoral integrity and good governance in a democratic social order. In all societies, when national security, electoral integrity and good governance go up, these are favourable conditions for nation building and development. However, when the reverse is the case, it also affects negatively nation building and development as well.

Under such severe economic hardships resulting from natural or other causes, there tend to be more challenges to national security, electoral integrity, good governance and nation building. This is because deepening economic crises tend to generate more societal conflicts based on social cleavages. As we said above, by these social cleavages here is meant divisions in the society that are based on ethnicity, region, language, religion, gender, classes and even caste. Each one or a set of them attempts to capture and hijack the State and State policies for their exclusive interests. This tends to affect the autonomy of the State, the emerging policies and their impacts (Mou, 2018). National security and electoral integrity also suffer.

As the economic fortunes of a society shrink, these class and cultural pluralist cleavages tend to increase. The struggle for the scarce economic resources becomes more intense. All social cleavages or factions therefore, attempt to hijack the public policies or even the state for their exclusive use. Corruption also increases as office holders engage in primitive individual accumulation of capital for their private benefits. These developments, greatly challenge the national security system, good governance and nation building. They also put undue pressures on electoral integrity or even democracy as a whole.

Further, the nature of the national security system or architecture in place, tends to affect both electoral integrity, good governance, nation building and the ease with which the society can be effectively and efficiently policed (Mou, 2018).

In addition, the security, economic, political and social problems challenging national security, electoral integrity, good governance and nation building currently in Nigeria, would get better or worse, depending on what happens to the seventy-one percent (71%) of Nigeria's population, still living below the poverty line of one dollar a day according to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Unfortunately, this has come to be so despite the billions of petro-dollars that Nigeria garnered as revenue over the past few decades.

In effect, one does not need to be a "political prophet", to predict that if these challenges are not successfully and effectively addressed through good governance and series of nation building efforts, such as inclusive growth, socio-political justice and equal opportunities for all the social cleavages and citizens, Nigeria will witness worse challenges to national security, electoral integrity, civil disobedience, violence, revolts, militancy, breakdown of law and order, increased kidnappings and more of her citizens trying to "check-out" of the country to other parts of the world in future.

As we shall see below, Nigeria has experienced all these trends and phenomena. Nigeria is an excellent case study because what she has gone through, particularly during this time period, is symptomatic of other African Nations. Lessons learnt in this case study can therefore, have some remarkable comparative import for most of the other African countries; systemic variations across the various nations in the continent, not withstanding.

II   NATIONAL SECURITY AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

It is certainly not our intention to bore you here, with too much theoretical issues surrounding the question of national security and electoral integrity in Nigeria. However, some of the theoretical debate is absolutely necessary for a clear conceptualization and understanding of the issues at stake. Their brief discussion, therefore, will ensure that we are all on the same page as you listen or read this paper.

A traditional definition of the State, often attributed to Max Weber, requires as a necessary condition, the effective monopoly of the use of violence within a given territory. The security of State was, therefore, threatened by any change that might threaten that monopoly of violence, whether it was through external invasion or internal rebellion. National Security was therefore, viewed purely from the military perspective. Consequently, National Security was, in the past, narrowly understood and insufficiently conceptualised. From most of the literature available, adopting this narrow view, National Security concept is given an essentially strategic meaning by equating military defence with national security as a whole.

This insufficient, essentially strategic, understanding of the concept is evident in the definition provided by Michael Louw. According to him, National Security can be defined as the condition of freedom from external physical attack (Louw, 1985). The same conclusion is advanced by Amos Jordan and William Taylor who see National Security as a term that signifies protection of the Nation's people and territories against physical attack (Jordan and Taylor, 1985). Similarly, Weifrarn Horrieder and Larry Bud in their book, Words and Arms, defined National Security as the protection of the nation from all types of external aggression, espionage, hostile reconnaissance, sabotage, subversion, annoyance and other inimical influences (Horrieder and Bud, 1984). These are all military-centered definitions of National Security.

It can be seen that the above strategic definitions of National Security are largely concerned with the protection of a nation-state from external aggression. This overwhelmingly military approach to national security is based on the erroneous assumption that the principal threat to a nation's security comes from other nations or external attacks. Little attention is paid to the fact that the greatest threat to security of a nation could be internal, particularly when one is considering, as we are, an emerging democracy. It is sometimes such internal threats that make states susceptible to external attacks.

Avner Yenor, a Russian military scholar, was thus right when he stated that the ability of a nation to survive in conflict or even to win a war hinges not only on its military capabilities, but also on economic potential for war and the level of social mobilisation. Over emphasizing one of these elements of national security while disregarding the others may be natural in the course of a brief crises, but it could be disastrous in the long term (Yenor, 1985, p.25).

For the public to be mobilised to defend the Nation, they must also be allowed access to the public interest at stake.

National Security as Avner Yenor stated above, does not therefore, have to do with military defence alone. The concept of National Security must be located where it rightly belongs by attaching to it a broader meaning that emphasizes not only development in the military or defence sense; but also political, economic and social development of the society. This encompasses good governance, electoral integrity and nation building as well. Development is thus a central concept in our understanding of National Security. There is, in fact, a dialectical relationship between the concept of development (which depicts both quantitative and qualitative improvements in the conditions of existence of a nation and its nationals) and national security. This includes improvement in the political, economic and social conditions (Mou, 2016; 2017).

According to Robert McNamara, a one-time President of the World Bank,

> as development progresses, security progresses, and when the people of a nation- state have organised their own human and natural resources to provide themselves with what they use and expect out of life, and have learnt to compromise peacefully among competing

demands in the larger national interest, then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase (McNamara, 1968, p.12).

 As a matter of fact, no country, no matter the level of military development, can be regarded as secure, if its economy continues to be described as a predicament, if unemployment, poverty, hunger and inequality continue to exacerbate.

National Security has also been seen by Dan Mou (2017, 2018) as protecting the interest of the dominant group/elite, who controls the commanding heights of the economy, including the security apparatuses of the State. It is again seen by him as all efforts aimed at protecting the strategic interest and way of life of the people in a given society, by defending the territorial integrity, cultural values and norms of the society (Mou, 2017; 2018). Mou has further postulated that National Security Systems or Architectures are of different types or varieties. Their efficacies also differ greatly as we shall see below (Mou, 2017; 2018).

The purpose of national security is to guarantee good governance and democratic rule. For nations that are regarded as emerging democracies, such as Nigeria, the premium placed on good governance and liberal democracy, where leaders and political parties take over control of government through elections is quite high. This is because they have experienced years of dictatorial military rule. Besides, it is within the context of good governance and liberal democracy that a discussion of electoral integrity makes sense. Countries under military rule, as Nigeria used to be, of course, do not hold elections and therefore, discussions of electoral integrity would be out of place, since power was being taken by the military regimes by force through the process of coup d'état. Thus, a discussion of good governance and liberal democracy is necessary in any consideration of national security and electoral integrity. We undertake this assignment briefly below.

(i) Nature of Good Governance

The concept of "good governance" is equally contentious. It is both a juridical, ideological and public policy concept (Mou, 2015). From the juridical or legal perspective, good governance can be defined as governing in accordance with the rule of law and providing the public good for the general public by the leaders in a given society; or by the government or the State in accordance with their rights and entitlements. This means that the operations of national security agencies and electoral processes are supposed to be governed by these same concerns.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 (1) as adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of December, 1948, defines good governance from this legal or juridical perspective. According to the United Nations Declaration just cited above, citizens of every nation and indeed all human beings, have basic needs and human rights. Once the leaders or government or the State caters well for these basic needs and protects these human rights; then there is good governance in that society.

As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 (1) 10th December, 1948 states it:

> Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

The basic needs of man and the protection of economic rights are therefore the basis, under this definition, for determining whether there is good governance in a given society or not. Most African

countries, including Nigeria, do not have these economic rights stated in their Constitutions under the juridical sections where they can be held accountable. As we shall see, in the case of Nigeria later, they are only stated as "Directive Principles of State Policy". Thus, no citizen can have the legal basis to sue regarding what particular Economic Rights he is insisting upon.

There is no question that the concept of fundamental human rights is truly fundamental. At the heart of it all, is the recognition and acceptance that man, as a superior animal, should of necessity distinguish himself from other living things, such as animals and beasts. The driving motive behind the idea of fundamental human rights is therefore, essentially human brotherhood, irrespective of individual differences. This is also the foundation for universal sufferage and the principle of one man one vote!

The problem, however, is that central as these rights are in defining good governance, and electoral integrity, there is no consensus on them among nations. There is also no consensus amongst scholars and policy makers, regarding these fundamental human rights that others consider the minimum condition for rating a leader or government as engaged in good governance" or considering the elections conducted by such governments as conforming to standards of electoral integrity. This fundamental divide is between the "naturalists" and the "positivists".

The naturalist conception understands law and human rights as handed down by providence or human reason. Thus, writing within the naturalist viewpoint, Canston defines human rights to be "something of which no one may be deprived of without a great affront to justice. These are certain deeds which should never be done, certain freedoms which should never be invaded, some things which are supremely scared" (Canston, 1984). This conception, however, can be seen as largely idealistic. It also does not recognise the variations of human rights practices across cultures and societies. We know as of fact that "justice" as a value may vary from society to society and that the law does not often recognise what ought to be. Rule of law meaning simply operating under the existing laws.

It is partly these limitations with the naturalistic view of good governance and human rights that gave birth to the "positivists" type definitions. Within this realm, Osita Eze has maintained correctly that:

human rights represent demands or claims which individuals or groups make on society, some of which are protected by law and have become part of ex lata while others remain aspirations to be attained in future. In strict legal terminology, only a right recognised and protected by the legal system can be considered as right (Osita, p.13).

The question of legal recognition of human rights is very important. This is because no right can be presumed to exist which is not recognised within the legal infrastructures of that particular society. Hence, it is meaningless for one to claim a right when others do not agree that such an individual does in fact have such a legitimate claim. For decades, Americans of African decent could not even vote in elections in America. This is because such rights had not yet been extended to them. Human rights are therefore, those claims which the prevailing legal infrastructures of a given society do allow individuals, groups or organizations to enjoy.

In the specific Nigerian society, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has clearly outlined those fundamental human rights to which Nigerians are entitled. Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for instance, recognises the following fundamental human rights for Nigerians; even though the economic rights are not recognized. They are only listed as Directive Principles of State Policy. The rights recognized are as follows:-

Right to life;
Right to dignity of human person;
Right to personal liberty;
Right to fair hearing;
Right to private and family life;
Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
Right to freedom of expression and the press;
Right to freedom of assembly and association;
Right to freedom of movement; and
Right to freedom from discrimination.

In addition to the Constitution, Nigeria is also a member of international organizations, such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To the extent that Nigeria is a subscriber to the Charter of such organizations; it becomes obligatory on Nigeria to abide by them as well. Consequently, by the dint of her membership of and signatory to the UNO and AU Charters on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nigeria automatically has to accept the provisions of human rights as provided therein. In the light of this, any government in Nigeria is supposed to shoulder the responsibility of protecting such rights as enunciated by these international organizations. It is in this context that the poor people in Nigeria have a case which must be carefully addressed.

In his book on Africa, titled Ideology and Development in Africa, Crawford Young has argued that there are no universal standards for measuring good governance, even though there may be some for measuring development. He argues that the ideology of nations, especially in Africa, affects what they consider as ingredients for good governance. Good governance in Africa should therefore, be seen in moral or ideological terms (Young, 1980).

Incidentally, Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, also agrees that economic rights in Africa are to be considered as a moral, rather than juridical matters. As he puts it in his message to the 2006 International Day for the Eradication of Poverty:

The campaign to make poverty history, a central moral challenge of our age-cannot remain a task for the few, it must become a calling for the many. On this International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, I urge everyone to join this struggle. Together, we can make real and sufficient progress towards the end of poverty (Annan, 2006)

From a public policy perspective, it is usually possible to come out with indices to measure good governance. These indices are then used to judge leaders and governments. From this point of view, two methods are usually adopted. First, the relevant legal documents, policy statements by the leaders or Governments and party manifestos are used to develop criteria for good governance. Second, analysts can also come up with their own, deductively, based on their review of the literature on good governance.

Whatever the approach, it is clear that issues such as eradication of poverty, satisfaction of basic needs, free press, protection of human rights, provision of basic infrastructures, creation of conducive environment for economic activities, rule of law and laws on social development and so forth, are usually included. Also, income indicators, levels of unemployment, gender issues, and youth development tend to be included. The tendency usually is to include on the list general economic

indicators such as income per capita, gross domestic product, capital utilization and foreign exchange stability.

Since national security is very important as Mou has suggested, "law and order, security of lives and property and freedom from external aggression etc. are also usually included. Thus, we can say that indices of good-governance must have political, economic, social, institutional, security, rule of law, and international dimensions" (Mou, 2018, p.7).

To the extent that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policies, there is always the need to include a foreign dimension in the assessment of good governance. It is indeed a combination of some of these indices of good governance, using both the juridical, moral and policy analysis criteria, that we hope to apply to our case study, Nigeria, in the next section. Before that, however, we need to first settle the theoretical issues regarding the concept of democracy.

(ii)   Concept of Democratic Rule

Democracy is also of various kinds: liberal democracy; social democracy, consociational democracy and so forth. Most of what is operational on the African continent is multi-party liberal democracy. This is also the model of democracy that is practiced in Nigeria. Consequently, the discussion that follows focuses mainly on multi party liberal democracy.

In common palace, democracy is seen following Abraham Lincoln as "government of the people, for the people and by the people". It is also seen generally by the public as the best form of political organisation that would promote good governance, national security and electoral integrity.

It is mainly associated with more than one political party and periodic elections. It is also believed that democracy involves the participation of more citizens in politics. This is not just for the purpose of electing their leaders and representatives. It is even in the area of citizen participation in the formulation and making of public policies. As Watson states, "democracy involves not only the process for making public policies but also the results of the process. Democratic government by definition produces policies that foster certain basic democratic values, such as liberty, equality, and justice" (Watson, 1973, p.7).

The word democracy itself comes from two Greek words: demos which means people and kratia, which refers to the English word, rule. It is in this sense that democracy means "rule by the people". Whether in its current practice, especially in Africa, the people are actually ruling, is a different matter, as we shall see in the case of Nigeria later.

Watson articulates clearly, what must be in place, before a society can be seen as democratic, at least in a liberal sense. He states:

> For a society to be democratic, then, a large number of its people must enjoy the right to have some say over important decisions that seriously affect their lives. To express it another way, democratic government is based on the consent of the governed (Watson, 1973, p.7).

The greatest attraction of democracy then, is citizen or political participation, understood as the involvement of citizens in the affairs of their society. This includes, of course, the election of which leaders and political parties are to govern them per an electoral cycle. This enables them to be involved and have a say on issues that affect their lives. Even though political participation has for long been a subject of analyses by students of politics and public policy, the literature, as will be

demonstrated below, exhibits some gaps. In short, the general tendency on the part of most researchers and policy makers, has been to assume that political participation in a democracy is somehow positively related to national development and self-reliance. This study, drawing from the Nigerian experience, suggests that this is not necessarily and always the case. It argues instead that the question of citizen participation in elections and in public policy making process are highly problematic ones. While certain forms of political participation do in fact promote development and self-reliance; a majority of other forms are notable for producing the opposite effects. They do foster mass conformity and acceptance of established inequalities, underdevelopment and material dependency of the citizenry on the state and the dominant classes (Edelman, 1980, p.22).

Political participation is understood, as noted above, to be the ability of citizens or some collectivities of citizens to influence electoral results and governmental policies in favour of what they stand for. It is one of the major ways by which liberal democracies attempt to convince their citizens that "the success of some groups was facilitated by the 'apathy' of others with opposing interests" in the context where all had "equal opportunities" to "make themselves heard" (Dahl, 1981, p.10).

One of the myths of public policy in a democracy, viewed as what the government chooses to do or not to do, is that it is usually made in the "public interests" (Dye, 1978). It is also erroneously assumed by the public that all individuals, groups and classes would benefit equally. The differential inequalities from the benefits of the policy and electoral victories, stemming only from the differential involvement of citizens or some collectivities of citizens at the time the policy was being made and implemented. This is clearly a myth since rarely do electoral victories and public policies have equal impacts on all groups and classes in society. As Lorwin points out, there is always the possibility that "some individuals, groups, or classes benefit unjustly or unfairly from the labour of, or at the expense of, others" 1963, p.16).

Nonetheless, to classical liberal democratic theorists such as Mill (Mill, 1946) and Rousseau (Rousseau, 1941), democracy was thought inconceivable without citizen participation. Since then, revisionist theorists have debated what forms of participation, how transparent and to what degree should citizens be involved. Some have maintained that electoral participation where there is electoral integrity, is sufficient (Dahl, 2001). Others favour continued public representation on an issue-to-issue basis (Pitkin, 1964). Yet, for some others what seems more crucial is agenda-setting, citizen participation viewed simply as complementary (Cobb and Elder, 1980).

It is not that all students of democratic politics favour citizen -participation. There are those who argue that citizen-participation is not necessary in the context of "responsible government". The critical thing is to be careful at the electoral (or appointment) stage ensure electoral integrity and choose "responsible" state managers. For one thing, they argue, it tends to hinder the efficient running of government, causes "political decay" and delays policy-making (Huntington, 1986; Lijphart, 1977 and Cupps, 1977). For another, not all citizens are politically informed; especially since electoral policies and policymaking have become more complex and requires some measures of expertise to understand. In general, however, as Gormley observes, citizen—participation "is thought to improve the fairness of the decision—making process, the quality of decisions, and the legitimacy of political authorities" (Gormley, 1983).

These conceptions of political participation are however inadequate. For instance, most students of electoral politics and public policy are by now aware that elections are not good predictor of state policies. Thus, elections cannot be regarded as efficacious mechanisms for ensuring even the "will" of the majority beyond leadership selection (Hayward, 1976; Mou, 2001). As Dahl acknowledges,

"neither elections nor inter-election activity provide much insurance that decisions will accord with the preferences of a majority of adults or voters" (Dahl, 1981, p.132).

There are also those who claim that political participation itself is a function of power (Lukes, 1974). In which case, in a non-egalitarian society, such as in, the more powerful are also the winners by definition. Public policies, therefore, end up serving the most powerful groups and classes in society. Yet, others reject the idea that citizen participation on an issue-to-issue basis does affect the final decisions that later emerge. According to this view, all forms of "legitimate" or conventional participation, regardless of levels of integrity, are legitimation processes that do not produce any concrete social, political or material results. At best, they may provide symbolic rewards that, together with some coercion, help to maintain social order (Edelman, 1977; Garenta, 1980).

Furthermore, it is argued that the contemporary state, contrary to pluralist formulation, probably determines which demands the citizens or collectivities of citizens can make. Other demands on the state not "approved" are "silenced" or not put on the agenda for consideration. The manner of political communication or language used helps to accomplish this goal. Hence, it is only unconventional participation such as riots, demonstrations and mass uprisings that are seen as effective in determining policy outcomes (Edelman, 1977; Garenta, 1980).

In this study, however, the discussion is limited to conventional forms of participation — i.e. those generally seen as "legitimate" in a democracy by the ruling classes. Edelman distinguishes two forms of conventional political participation that have some relevance to our discussion here (Edelman, 1977). The first is what he calls "instrumental political participation." This is the form that he argued, tends to have direct effect on the decisions that are finally made whether it involves electing leaders, locating a project or providing subsidy for fertilizer.

The second is what he calls "symbolic political participation." Symbolic political participation is the one that he says does not make any difference to the electoral results, when announced, policy outcomes or decisions when they are finally made. This is the kind of political participation that promotes mostly mass conformity and acceptance of glaring inequalities, poverty and dependency on the state and the dominant classes (Edelman, 1977).

There is also a growing debate as to whether the type of election, (Federal, State or Local) or of public policy, the issues involved (whether complex or not, highly technical or not, very salient or not) affect the nature of citizen involvement. Beginning perhaps with Lowi, there has been a tendency to view elections and public policies as different in several aspects, depending on the types of election or policy arena one chooses to consider. The difference over policy arena also calls for different types of citizen participation (Edelman, 1977).

Of recent, it is argued that even within a particular policy area, say rural development – there are still variations in political participation depending on the particular policy proposal one looks at or the issue area in question. Wilson tell us, for instance, that whether costs and benefits appear concentrated and/or diffused in a policy proposal has different implications for the nature of political participation that will evolve (Wilson, 1973).

Certainly then, the conceptual issues surrounding good governance, national security and electoral integrity, are wide and diverse. The key task, however, is to see how all these have played out within the context of electoral integrity, in the various countries in Africa, especially Nigeria.

(iii)   Concept of Electoral Integrity

No national political event ever involves so many people participating to exercise their political power, than general elections. Elections truly show that "power belongs to the people". However, this view assumes that such elections actually reflect the wishes of the voters. It is concern for this that gave birth to national and global interests in electoral integrity. It is also this concern for electoral integrity that led experts to devise a measure to test the validity and transparency of elections, known as the Perception of Election Index (PEI).

Elections are the mechanisms by which the voters periodically in accordance with the electoral cycle, choose the leaders to rule over them for a defined period of time. Democracies, especially liberal democracy, relies on elections both for selecting leaders and holding them accountable. The whole business of the various legislations in Electoral Acts for recall, represents the concern that voters should be able to hire and fire ("Zoning Regulations: Who Needs Them?" by Richard T. Ashe. https://cecb.com/zoning-regulations-who-needs-them/).

Electoral integrity refers to a situation where the choice by the voters were made freely and in contexts where nothing interfered with their ability to freely make their choices. When done with high electoral integrity, elections serve many purposes and not just leadership selection. As Pippa Norris, Thomas Wynter and Sarah Cameron have pointed out correctly,

> Elections provide the opportunities for citizens to participate in politics, and hold leaders to account. When they work well, elections can deepen civic engagement, inform public debate, stimulate party competition, strengthen government responsiveness, and allow the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Norris, Wynter and Cameron, 2018).

The importance of an election tends to be terribly undermined when electoral frauds are committed in the process. Election fraud can be defined, following Max Gromping and Ferran Martinez, as any

> illegal interference with process of an election, either by increasing the vote share of the favoured candidate, depressing the vote share of the rival candidate, or both. What exactly constitutes electoral fraud varies from country to country. In real life, what constitutes an illegal electoral act or electoral fraud is defined by the electoral law as well as what has generally been encoded in the laws of the land as criminal activities (Gromping and Martinez, 2014).

To ascertain whether an electoral fraud has been committed, one has to examine the entire electoral cycle. This is quite extensive and include electoral stages such as the formulation and passage of electoral Acts, recruitment and training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the registration of political parties, nomination of parties and candidates, electoral campaigns, polling, counting, tabulation of results, the declaration of results, reporting, auditing the results, and archiving (Gromping and Martinez, 2014).

In Nigeria, as in other countries, attention tend to be paid mainly to the last stages of voting, counting and declaration of results. This is not enough. This is because electoral fraud can occur at any of the stages in the electoral cycle. To ascertain the Perception of Election Index (PEI) or determine the level of electoral integrity of an election, one has to carefully and meticulously investigate the transparency and integrity of all the activities within the electoral cycle, as we listed above.

But as the discussion of national security and electoral integrity above has shown, there is a high correlation between good governance, national security and electoral integrity. Where directives are

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

given for votes to be allocated to candidates by the leaders, this is an open fraud. In short, to be able to conduct elections with integrity, Election Commissions must be given autonomy and independence from political control and manipulation from any quarters. This is what is lacking, especially in Africa.

III. NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS OR ARCHITECTURES AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

In his recent book National Security, Democracy and Good Governance in Post-Military Rule Nigeria, Volumes one and two (2017), Dan Mou has demonstrated that there are basically two broad approaches for classifying the different varieties of national security systems or architectures. They also have different implications or effects on electoral integrity. These are: First, is what Mou (2017, 2018) calls the Dominant Ideology Classification of varieties of National Security Systems or Architectures. This approach categorizes national security systems or architectures as follows:

a.   **Captured National Security System (CNSS) or Architecture:** Under this situation, Mou argues that the dominant interests of a given social cleavage or a set of them in that society, have taken control of the State security apparatuses, so that the national security policy and objectives are influenced by the elite group. This group uses the nation's security apparatuses as the oppressive tool for their economic and political exploitation of others (Mou, 2018). The interests of the public, defined as whatever in the society that is for the common good of all, will not be a priority under this system or architecture of national security. The information for public consumption will also be distorted to suit the interests of that particular social cleavage elite. Opposition political parties and media houses tend to be oppressed with government machinery (Mou, 2018).

A classical example of the captured national security system is apartheid period in South Africa, where the government security apparatuses were used for the interest of the minority white people. It was also practiced in Germany during the rule of the Nazis, led by Adolf Hitler (Mou, 2018). In fact, it is a common security architecture or system that operates in most nations in Africa, in different degrees, including in Nigeria, as we shall see below.

Under this system or national security architecture, electoral integrity is totally consigned to the dustbin. No matter how votes are cast, the electoral body and security agencies normally collude to announce whatever electoral results the dominant social cleavages or group of social cleavages that have captured them want.

b. **Autonomous National Security System (ANSS) or Architecture:** This, according to Mou (2018), exists where the state security apparatuses are operating independently of the dominant elites or classes in that society. National Security policy and its apparatuses, are more rational and objective in carrying out state policy, implementation and security policies that concern/cater for all its citizens. Security information management therefore, is easier since public interest and national security become similar (Mou, 2017). This type of security architecture currently operates mainly in industrialised nations, such as the USA, USSR, China, Germany and Britain. In Africa, electoral integrity is highly correlated to the degree of autonomy or as it is usually known, independence, the security agencies and the electoral bodies or even the governments have viz-a-viz, the dominant social cleavages, be they of ethnic, class, regional, religious and so forth.

It is certainly not by accident that in their comparative study of "Electoral Integrity in Africa", Max Gromping and Ferrant Martiney reported that "the degree of threats to electoral integrity is more

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

severe in Africa when compared to the rest of the world" (See their Electoral Integrity Project Report, titled "Electoral Integrity in Africa", 2014).

These findings that the autonomy or independence of the Electoral Commissions and National Security Agencies matter, have also been replicated in the Electoral Integrity Project undertaken by Pippa Norris, Thomas Wynter and Sarah Cameron in their report titled Electoral Integrity and Campaign Media dated August, 2018. Their findings that the lack of autonomy of the Security Agencies and Electoral Bodies does remarkably affect negatively the electoral integrity of Nations is particularly interesting, because their focus was not even on the African Countries. They studied electoral integrity in Italy, Russia and Venezuela. Yet, they came to this same conclusion. This confirms that the nature of the national security system or architecture dramatically affects the Electoral Performance Index (EPI) of Nations across the board. It is not simply an African phenomenon.

For example, Norris, Wynter and Cameron concluded with reference to the electoral integrity of Venezuela as follows and we quote them here at length:

> The Venezuelan Presidential election held on the 20th May, 2018 was widely denounced as a 'farce' and a 'show election', with the Organization of American States stating that in the electoral process, 'the dictator Maduro tried – without success – to give a democratic, veneer to his totalitarian regime'. The legitimacy of the contest, which Maduro won easily with more than two thirds of the valid vote total, was further undermined by an opposition boycott and record low turnout. Incumbent President Maduro inherited and expanded upon Chevez's mechanisms of political control; which empowered him to suppress political opposition and critical press.

It was, of course, the fact that the Venezuela Nation operates a classic case of a captured national security architecture. This gave the wide room for the control of not just military and other security agencies. They went further to also control the electoral bodies to accomplish the task they did, by simply "awarding" the "votes" they wanted to the President of Venezuela, Maduro, and declaring him and his party the winner. Under such situation, any talk of electoral integrity or the Electoral Performance Index (EPI), is a waste of time, to say the least. This is the predominant fate of electoral integrity in Africa, as already stated above.

c. Relatively Autonomous National Security System (RANSS) or Architecture: This position presupposes that the national security apparatus is neither captured nor autonomous (Mou, 2018). In most advanced democracies, national security is relatively autonomous because they cater to some extent, for the common good of all citizens. The state operates a policy of freedom of information as the media have access and are empowered to seek for information. However, laws of secrecy exist and not all information is available at all times to the public (Mou, 2017). Within the electoral integrity context, such countries where the national security architecture is relatively autonomous, will certainly score higher than the ones in which the national security systems are totally captured. It should not come as a surprise therefore, that in the Electoral Integrity Project undertaken on twenty eight (28) African countries by Gromping and Martinez (2014), different African countries performed differently in their overall rating on Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) score. They found that the average PEI score in Africa is fifty four (54); while the global average is seventy one (71).

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

Yet, even within Africa, countries where the national security system is relatively autonomous have higher PEI scores than others. That explains why Mauritius, Ghana and South Africa had better overall PEI index compared with others such as Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti and Mozambique. The national security systems and electoral commissions in Mauritius, South Africa and Ghana are relatively autonomous, whereas the ones in Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique are fully captured by the powers that be in those countries.   In the later countries, electoral results are therefore given based on the directives of the leadership rather than actual voting patterns in the field during elections.

The second broad approach, Mou (2018) postulates, is the Organizational Determinant Categorization of National Security Systems or Architectures. This second approach also categorizes National Security System or Architectures into three types. These are: (a) the Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture; (b) the Coordinated National Security System (CNSS) or Architecture; and (c) the Integrated National Security System (INSS) or Architecture (Mou, 2017, 2018). The three key distinguishing words are: Segmentary, Coordinated and Integrated. Each of these National Security Systems or Architectures has its advantages and disadvantages, and different effects on electoral integrity as well, which are considered briefly below.

(a)   Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture

The Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture tries to apply the principle of federalism or even Confederalism to the security of a country. Under this arrangement, the country's security arrangement is left to the individual military or security services or their special units (Mou, 2018). In the event of security threats, each Service adopts its own strategy in repelling the threat. Individual Service Chiefs or Heads of Security Agencies therefore, mobilise their men and weaponry in the defence or securing of whatever target is threatened. There is little or no harmonization of efforts by the various Services or Agencies and no coordination of their attack/reaction to the enemy or enemies.

There is usually little or no communication and reporting across Services or Agencies during the operations (Mou, 2016; 2017). With the exception of South Africa and Libya (during President Gadhafi), all other African countries (including Nigeria) have adopted the Segmentary Security System or Architecture at one time or the other, even though the degree of application varied from one country to the other.

Because this approach is not effective, it allows room for internal security threats and creates fertile ground for the emergence of insurgencies.   These internal crises and insurgencies become serious obstacles to the conduct of elections and diminishes electoral integrity and good governance, as a whole. This is the current situation in Nigeria right now. Hence, several insurgencies have emerged, as we shall see below, which affected the conduct of the 2015 national elections in Nigeria negatively. It will in fact create even more serious problems for the forthcoming 2019 national elections in Nigeria as well, if they are not stopped or curtailed before February, 2019, when the general elections are scheduled to commence.

In Nigeria, for instance, under the administrations of former Presidents Shehu Shagari and Goodluck Jonathan, the Military and other security Agencies all operated separately, with little coordination and integration between them and other Security Agencies. The same appears to be the case now even with the present President Muhammadu Buhari Administration (Mou, 2018). This became more visible in their different strategies and operations regarding the control of the Herdsmen and

Farmers conflicts and clashes all over the Nation, but especially in the North Central Zone of Nigeria (Mou, 2018). In the event of any security threat, as is the case with the Herdsmen and Farmers clashes, therefore, these Services reacted differently, with little coordination and integration of their efforts.

This same SNSS is what was applied under former President Jonathan that is apparently being utilised under President Buhari in the war against Boko Haram. Hence, despite President Buhari's personal commitment, political will and allocation of a lot of resources, Boko Haram is still to be wiped out. The limit of the segmentary national security system or architecture, the SNSS, in our view, is also mainly what is hindering the successful conclusions of the military/national security operations throughout the country, including the failure to address decisively the Herdsmen and Farmers conflicts, all over the nation. As stated above, these insurgencies will definitely affect negatively the conduct of the forthcoming 2019 general elections in Nigeria.

For instance, instead of the Armed Forces Coordinating efforts, with the Nigeria Police Force and other security Agencies, they always order the Nigerian Police Force, even the Police Special Terrorist Units, to withdraw before they start their own operations, as it was the case with the "Cat Race" operation "Ayem a Kpatuma" in the North Central, particularly Benue State.

(b)   Coordinated National Security System (CNSS) or Architecture

The CNSS ensures that all Services, Agencies and Units assigned with the responsibility of national Security are closely monitored and supervised. This is close to the INSS approach, except that in this case, the Agencies and Units are not brought under one top command umbrella. The closest example of coordinated national security system in operation in Nigeria, was during the Governments of General I.B. Babangida at the time of Alhaji Muhammadu Gambo Jimeta as the National Security Adviser (NSA) (Mou, 2017). This system is certainly more effective than the segmentary one. However, it is not as effective as an integrated national security architecture. Because this too does not and cannot effectively deal with security challenges to the nation, especially insurgencies, this ends up affecting electoral integrity and good governance as well.

Just like the segmentary system discussed above, it gives room for electoral malpractices and fraud. First, it disenfranchises a lot of people who have been displaced in their villages and towns because of the continued internal security crises. Second, the expected violence or potential violence that will result from attacks on polling places, keeps voters away. Most polling booths become empty on electoral days giving room for frauds of ballot box stuffing and other forms of electoral frauds.

(c)   The Integrated National Security System (INSS) or Architecture

The INSS or Architecture is the most comprehensive approach to National Security yet devised. It has also proved, in practice, more effective than the rest discussed here so far. It is variously referred to by security and strategic studies experts as the "multi-services" or "multi-faceted national" security system. In Nigeria, this approach had been adopted only by General Yakubu Gowon, during the Civil (Biafra War) of 1967-1970; General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau when he was the National Security Adviser under the regimes of General I.B. Babangida, Chief Ernest Shonekan and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. It was also adopted by Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, during General Sani Abacha's regime. This INSS or Architecture stated above, is a comprehensive and demanding approach to National Security. It is also the most effective and efficient one ever devised so far (Mou, 2018). Because General Yakubu Gowon adopted this integrated national security architecture, he was able to

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

complete the Nigerian Civil War and re-integrate the Ibos (Biafrans), who were fighting to be independent from Nigeria in thirty months.

Similarly, using this integrated security system, General Ibrahim Babangida was able to crush the then "Boko Haram", insurgency, Maitatsine Uprising, which was spreading like fire, within three months during his Administration. Compare it with the Segmentary security architecture President Goodluck Jonathan used for five years, and could not conquer Boko Haram. Instead, the insurgency, Boko Haram, captured seventeen (17) Local Government Areas within Nigeria, mounted their flag and declared it an independent caliphate within the territory of Nigeria.

The ineffectiveness of the segmentary approach to national security can also be seen in the failure of Nigerian soldiers and other security agencies, to tackle and end the Boko Haram insurgency that was President Buhari's major campaign promise, when he was canvassing for votes to be Nigerian President. Three and a half years into his Administration, Boko Haram is still to be crushed.

Instead, they are still causing untold death, destruction of property and displacing not just the civilian population in the North East. They are also killing soldiers, capturing their barracks and capturing weapons, including armored vehicles. This shows quite clearly the drawbacks of the segmentary national security system. Yet, it is not changed or modified, despite over eight years of its operation by the Nigeria Government. It is clear that this will drastically affect the conduct of the 2019 general elections.

In addition, there are several other insurgencies going on simultaneously in different parts of the country. This has forced the military to be engaged in internal security operations in all the thirty six States of Nigeria. We cover this subject below in more details. Thus, the failure to deal with these insurgencies is preventing good governance and will definitely affect quite negatively the conduct of the 2019 general election and along with the electoral integrity of the elections.

The Integrated National Security System, according to Mou (2018),

> demands for the appointment of Deputy National Security Advisers, since you cannot expect a Director in the Office of the NSA to preside over the meetings of Service Chiefs and Heads of Security Agencies, in the absence of the NSA himself or in Special Committees that have to be formed for regular consultations on operations and strategies, that are needed under the INSS or Architecture to be carried out. It is like saying the Inspector-General of Police should "sack" or not allow the President to appoint the Deputy Inspectors-General and Assistant Inspectors-General of Police and operate instead only with Commissioners of Police. Of course, if that happens, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigerian Police Force will go down dramatically. This will affect effective policing across the whole country (Mou, 2018, p.9).

Yet, as Mou (2018) further points out:

> This is exactly what Col. Sambo Dasuki did with the Office of the NSA when he was the NSA during President Jonathan's Administration and the present NSA, Gen. Babagana Mongunu has done in the Office of the NSA currently under President Buhari Administration. This is because they have adopted the Segmentary National Security System or Architecture. We have already discussed the characteristics, implications and consequences of adopting this kind of Security Architecture for the nation above (Mou, 2018, p.9).

We have also explained why and how it will affect the 2019 general elections and consequently, the electoral integrity of the whole electoral processes as well. Mou's position is that:

> National Security Policy expert will most likely conclude that the National Security Policy and implementation will suffer greatly under the SNSS model. They will also predict long term or medium term failure of any Nation that is operating this Segmentary National Security System. That was why the French and American Security Policy Organisations, predicted that Nigeria will collapse in 2013 and 2015 respectively. This is because democracy and nation building suffer the most under the SNSS, and new security challenges continue to come, that are not anticipated or attended to in time. Also, old ones cannot be effectively and efficiently dealt with under this model. Soon, the Military and Security Agencies become overwhelmed by the multiplication of security threats to the Nation (Mou, 2018, p.9).

This is usually the root cause of what makes a Nation to become a "failed State" (Mou, 2017, 2018). This is exactly what is happening in Nigeria at the moment (Mou, 2018). Hence, the Military is now directly involved in Internal Security Operations in the thirty-six States of Nigeria. They are trying desperately to prevent Nigeria from becoming a "failed State". Without these direct involvements of the military in internal security operations, Nigeria would have since become a "failed state"! Hence, the terrible danger this will pose to the 2019 elections.

As Mou shows clearly,

> to operate the Integrated National Security System or Architecture under the Gen. Babangida regime, Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, the then NSA, had to appoint in the Office of the NSA, three (3) Deputy National Security Advisers, viz: Alhaji Zakari Ibrahim as DNSA (Admin. & Finance); Ambassador Adamu Mohammed as DNSA (International and Liaison); Engr. David Awoniyi as DNSA (Technical) and Chief (Mrs.) Ayo as Permanent Secretary (National Security) and Dr. Dan Mou as Special Adviser (National Security Matters) to the NSA.

This is exactly what the National Security Adviser under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, Muhammadu Gambo did. Hence, "Boko Haram" – Maitatsine Militant Islamic Religious sect within three months and the very serious security consequences of the dramatic economic and political policies that Gen. Babangida was operating, which earned him the nick name of "Maradona."

It was the Integrated National Security System and staff that Gen. Gusau put in place that Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo inherited, including Dr. Dan Mou as his Special Adviser (National Security Affairs). It was Alhaji Gwarzo who took over from Gen. Mohammed Guzau as the NSA under Gen. Abacha regime. This was how Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo also operated an Integrated National Security System or Architecture during Abacha's regime.

Basically, according to Mou (2018), an INSS seeks to integrate the Armed Forces and the various Security Agencies and Units into a singular National Security Strategy. This involves the full participation of those concerned in National Security Policy making and implementation. It calls not just for coordination of all the Armed Forces Services and the Security Agencies and Units concerned with, and engaged in, any form of National Security matter, but their full integration under the Office of the NSA.

More than any other period in the history of Nigeria, the Military and other Security Agencies are now (2018) simultaneously engaged in major internal security operations. As we write, they are engaged in these operations in the six geo-political zones of the country, in all of the thirty six States of Nigeria.

These major internal security operations, as Mou (2018) had stated, included the Boko Haram war, the deadly herdsmen/farmers clashes, cattle rustling, kidnapping, oil theft and pipeline vandalism. Other joint interventions which also cover the whole nation include: the joint police/military security outfits against criminal activities, such as armed robbery in the thirty six States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Thus, military personnel are now deployed all over the country in operations that should normally be police and other Security Agencies' operations. This is because political, social and economic integration in the country is currently at its lowest state. The consequences of all these negative developments on the 2019 general elections and electoral integrity will be quite severe.

IV INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENCY AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

To give a sense of what we are discussing here, it is perhaps necessary to state some of these military involvements in internal security operations, with the other Security Agencies. These various operations involve huge deployment of military assets and manpower. They are also being prosecuted simultaneously at a period of dwindling national revenue and protracted war against terrorism and insurgency that has lasted over eight years, thereby stretching the military too thin. Yet, without them, Nigeria can easily slip into a "failed State" (Mou, 2018).

At the moment, there are different types of insurgencies that Nigerian Military and the other security agencies are actively engaged in battle with. These include:

(i) The religious insurgency, especially in the North East zone of Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency. This is already spreading its tentacles to other parts of Northern Nigeria. This insurgency is targeted at taking over Northern Nigeria, and subsequently, the whole country and imposing sharia law on the Nation. It is basically a terrorist group carrying out a Jihad to convert by conquest all other worshipers of other religions, which they see as "infidels" – that is non-believers.

Understandably, religious insurgencies are the most difficult to deal with. This is because those engaged in these types of terrorist acts believe that they are on divine assignment. In which case their "god" or "gods" will reward them handsomely, even when they die in the process. Hence, this is a terrible threat to national security and electoral integrity which has to be dealt with, with all seriousness and commitment by the Federal Government. The State Government where these insurgencies are taking place are totally powerless. This is because State Governments in Nigeria, are prevented by the 1999 Constitution, even from having a Police Force. This needs to be looked into. Hence, it is left only to the Federal Government to defeat these terrorists and restore peace and order in the affected States and regions.

(ii) The Economic Conquest Insurgency. This type of insurgency is aimed at conquering valued resources, especially lands, from their native owners. It employs a heartless extermination policy targeted at killing off the original inhabitants on the lands, (children, women, men) and taking the lands over permanently. This is what the herdsmen killing all over the country, but most especially in the North Central (Middle Belt States), were and are aimed at achieving. Hence, the local inhabitants are forced to move to other areas or into Internally Displace Camps (IDPs) set up for

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

them, or be massacred and their properties completely destroyed to give room for the insurgents to take over their lands and properties.

Once again, the Segmentary National Security Architecture being currently used by the Nigerian military and other security agencies, has proved ineffective. Hence, the killings by these herdsmen of defenseless villagers, burning of their houses and destruction of their farms and other properties, are still going on as we write. Once again, these developments, if not tackled early, will definitely affect the 2019 general elections and electoral integrity, when held in such dangerous conditions.

(iii)   Political insurgency. This type of insurgency aims at declaring the area of interest into a separate State from existing Nations. It is basically a separatist movement.

At the moment, the most politically active insurgents or separatist movements are those by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the O'dua Peoples Congress (OPC). The former aims to create the "Independent nation" to be known as the Republic of Biafra, in the South Eastern Zone of Nigeria; while the later is targeted at creating "The Oduduwa Peoples' Republic in the South Western Region of Nigeria. In fact, they are threatening that they will disrupt the 2019 general elections, especially the IPOB insurgency group. Needless to say that this will affect the general elections negatively, undermine electoral integrity and national security as well as good governance of Nigeria, as a whole.

(iv) Economic Protectionist Insurgency.   Nigeria also is being challenged with economic protectionist insurgency in the South-South Zone. This is being pursued by the people of the Niger Delta.   There are very different groups, including the Niger Delta Volunteer Force. But their overriding goal is "Resource Control". Their main target is to stop the exploitation of the resources within their zone, by other Zones in Nigeria and by the Federal Government.

Their target is basically to control their resources and use them to develop exclusively their zone. These resources are mainly crude oil, gas and related products. The insurgency by the Niger Delta people is one of the oldest in Nigeria, even though new groups or splitter groups keep coming out or being formed, now and again.

There is no question that all these insurgency groups, if not stopped or curtained, will very adversely affect not just the 2019 general elections, and electoral integrity, but also national security and good governance in Nigeria, as a whole.

When classified by Zones in Nigeria, some of the military and other security agencies involvement in internal security operations are as follows:

1.   North-East Zone:

(i)   Operation Lafiya Dole: This operation handles the overall counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations with expanded scope, scale and depth comprising three divisions and more than five States.

(ii)   Operation Crackdown: This is a specialized operation to wind down the war against insurgents and clear the remnants of the Boko Haram Sect in the Sambisa Forest.

(iii)   Operation Gama Aiki: This operation serves the same purpose as the Operation Crackdown, in the northern part of Borno State.

(iv)   Operation Safe Corridor: This operation was set up for the de-radicalism and rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram terrorists.

2.   North Central Zone

(i)   Operation Save Haven: This operation headquartered at Jos, Plateau State, covers a wide area, which extends to Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa and Kwara State. What the public and the media have had a field day debating is the name of the Operation, "Save Haven for who?" Many have concluded that its main target was to create "Safe Haven" for the herdsmen and their cattle. In other words, it was an operation to establish what became known as the "Cattle Colony Policy" of the Federal Government of Nigeria by force of arms.

The Military and other Security Agencies, have however explained the purpose and objectives of the operation differently. They argued that it is designed to quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal activities in the Middle Belt of Nigeria.

(ii)   Operation "Ayem Akpatuma", a Tiv language phrase translated as "Operation Cat Race": This operation was launched after the repeated massive killings by herdsmen in the North Central, especially in Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba and Plateau States. This reckless killings of the natives in these States resulted in the massive killings of 1st January, 2018, in Benue State, that terminated the lives of seventy-three (73) indigenes of the State that were given mass burial recently. This incident generated a lot of uproar, both at home in Nigeria and abroad. This then gave birth to the Operation "Ayem Akpatuma".

3.   North West Zone

(i)   Operation Sara Daji: This operation was commenced with President Buhari himself, in his capacity as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces in full Military camouflage regalia. Its main purpose was to deal with cattle rustlers and armed bandits that were operating particularly in Zamfara, Kaduna, Kebbi, Sokoto, Kano and Katsina States.

(ii)   Operation Harbin Kunama: This operation was launched to complement the Operation Sara Deji and they shared the same purpose, objectives and operational areas.

4.   South-South Zone

(i)   Operation Delta Safe: This operation was to secure the oil wells, pipelines and all the activities involved in the strategic petroleum activities that takes place in the Zone. It covers all the oil producing States. It was also aimed at crushing the Niger Delta Militants.

(ii)   Operation Pulo Shield: This was also launched in the South-South Zone and it shared the same purpose, objective and operation areas as the Operation Delta Safe. These include crushing the resurgent Niger Delta Militancy and other acts of criminality, like oil theft, vandalism, and bunkering in the region.

5.   South West Zone

(i)   Operation Awase: This operation Awase covers the whole of the South West. It brief was to contain the criminal operations around Ogun-Lagos axis, particularly in the Arepo where illegal bunkering and pipeline vandalism are regular occurrences.

6.   South East Zone

(i)   Operation Iron Fence: The purpose of this operation was to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers.

(ii)   Operation Python Dance I and II: The major aim of these operations were to quell the growing agitations for the separatist movement led by Mr. Nnamdi Kanu to create a "new Nation of Biafra".

(iii) Operation Mesa: Operation Mesa, unlike the others that were mainly conducted by the Military, was a Joint Task Force (JTF). It was targeted against all forms of criminal activities in all the States of the Federation.

V.   NATIONAL SECURITY AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY CHALLENGES: DIAGNOSIS OF THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

It is not surprising, that any mention of Constitutional Review and Restructuring tend to generate several reactions from the different sectors and social groups in the society. This is because the Constitution is the basic legal document that stipulates the power relationships between individuals, groups, corporate bodies and Governments. That Constitutions provide the basic framework for the conduct of affairs in modern societies is already well-known. Any review or restructuring, therefore, is seen by the various ethnic groups, sub-national units, and social classes as an opportunity to tilt the legal document in their favour (Mou and Watanabe, 1986). Basically then, it can be seen that Constitutions are as much the harvest of the political and economic experiences of modern societies as well as anticipations of future ones. Constitutional Review and Restructuring, therefore, become arena for power struggle for the subordination, emancipation or dislodgement by the previously subordinate or dominant ethnic groups and classes, real or imagined.

There are many who believe that the national security and electoral integrity challenges can be better tackled peacefully through restructuring the Nigerian polity. Most of these grievances that various terrorists, separatist and insurgency groups have emerged to champion can be resolved peacefully and less costly through some form of restructuring, rather than through force of arms. That Nigerins need to sit down at the table to dialogue and find solutions to their problems. Once this is done, a new or revised Constitution would be released, which will anticipate or address these contentious and conflictual issues in Nigeria among the different social cleavages.

The anticipatory role of any Constitution, though probably the most problematic, has scarcely received much attention by public commentators, scholars, and politicians alike, comparable to its static sections and clauses, for instance (Hon, 2016). In countries such as France, China and Nigeria, the anticipatory roles of their 'old' Constitutions, have been clearly unsatisfactory. This is manifest in the fact that they have repeatedly undergone substantial revisions, total abolition or have remarkably been amended or restructured.

In contemplating any Constitutional review or restructuring in Nigeria therefore, the Government has to avoid the temptation of being constrained by the prevailing public temperaments, if Nigeria is to produce a document that will stand the test of time and protect her present and long-term national interests. This cannot be possible if the Government in power, pretends to be completely neutral to the form, character, proceedings and outcome of a Constitutional review or restructuring. Perhaps, the Nigerian Government can call for all these insurgent groups to lay down their arms and come to the table to discuss their grievances peacefully and resolve them.

As Managers of the State, holders of State power, whether at the Executive, Legislative or Judicial Arms, have the wanton responsibility of ensuring that the National Security and long-term interests of the nation over which they preside are not allowed to be undermined or even sacrificed at the altar of any Constitutional Review or Restructuring. This section of the paper analysis the various ethnic, regional and other sectional agenda that are being advocated by the different insurgent groups, for inclusion for consideration in the constitutional review and socio-political restructuring, that are the hottest issues in Nigeria at the moment. It also discusses what should constitute the Government's stand vis-à-vis the various sectional interests. It is obvious that the purely military approach is not working.

There are prevailing public temperaments that currently inform the public opinion in Nigeria. These obviously have beclouded the views of different ethnic groups, regions, and States over the proposed Constitutional Restructuring. It is true that certain terrorist and insurgent groups, and the radical and human rights movements, have been advocating for one form of National Restructuring or the other, to deal with what they consider as the "National Question". This they believe is causing the security challenges to the nation, our nascent democracy and electoral integrity. These agitations have become highly magnified to the extent that other regional and ethnic groups have also joined. These have to be addressed so as to place into proper perspective the limitations and modalities needed to be placed on the extent of the restructuring, if it is to be done, by the Government in power. We believe this is a better option than the numerous operations.

For ease of analytical convenience, the Nigerian political, social, economic and security conditions which will invariably affect the Constitutional Restructuring, will be discussed here under the following headings:

(i)   The Political Integration Dimension;
(ii)   The Economic Integration Dimension;
(iii)   The Social Integration Dimension;
(iv)   The Institutional/Legal Integration Dimension; and
(v)   The Security Integration Dimension.

(i)   The Political Integration Dimension

Politics is about power and the game of power sharing. Mainstream social science research sees politics essentially as the authoritative allocation of valued resources in the society (Easton, 1963). These "valued resources" could either be material or status in nature. It could be for a nation, region, an ethnic group, or some other form of socio-political configuration or even an individual.

But we do know that politics is also about the legitimation of the prevailing social system, as we stated above. This is because, inherent in human society, such authoritative allocations tend to be unequal in the perception of those who compose such a society, whether real or imagined. Thus, legitimation becomes necessary to prevent such a society from falling apart or disintegrating. If the army continues with internal security operations in each of the thirty six (36) States in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for almost a decade and the problems germinating these terrorist and insurgency groups have not improved, perhaps another better and peaceful approach needs to be employed in place of trying to solve these socio-economic problems through the barrel of the gun.

We believe that the option of restructuring, which all of these groups and even eminent Nigerians and statesmen are calling for, should be given a trial. However, it should be handled in a way it will

not result in the balkanization of the country. We discuss below, how we feel this can be conveniently done.

The debate over political power in Nigeria recently, has elevated the issue of power sharing into what has popularly become known as the "National Question". National Question deals with the forms and patterns of power sharing within a nation-state among the social cleavages that exist in that society. By social cleavages here we mean, as stated above already, those divisions in a society that are based on class, gender, ethnicity, regionalism, language, religion, caste, race, and even statism.

Another way of ensuring that the Constitutional Restructuring does not degenerate into an avenue for precipitating the disintegration of Nigeria is by insisting, as the Government has already done, that the unity of Nigeria is NOT contestable. This is very important because, already, certain radical, regional and ethnic groups or even eminent personalities, are advocating for a National restructuring through a Sovereign Conference. Basically, a Constitutional Conference is one in which selected and/or elected eminent citizens meet to debate and suggest revisions to an existing Constitution of their country, which they forward to the regime in power and the existing legislature for consideration and passing them into law, if agreed by the regime, or the National Assembly accordingly. In this case, Constitutional Conferences are by nature advisory.

A Sovereign National Conference on the other hand, is one in which eminent citizens are elected and/or chosen and assembled to debate the state of the Nation, including, of course, its Constitution; the outcome of which will not be referred to the Government in power or even the National Assembly for approval, before their implementations become obligatory on the regime in power. The outcomes are sometimes not even subjected to a National Referendum, before they become law and subject to implementation at all cost by the Government in power.

It is our suggestion, that the sovereignty of these debates and conclusions should be limited. Whatever decisions they arrive at should be subjected to the approval of the National Assembly. In this way, Government would be able to forestall the promulgation into law of certain decisions that may be arrived at out of these deliberations which might be antithetical to our national interest, electoral integrity and development. There is even no need for any Constitutional Conference. The National Assembly should be mandated or allowed to handle it.

(ii) The Economic Integration Dimension

Part of the Nigerian public sentiments that might have some negative impacts on the deliberations on restructuring, when it is convened by the National Assembly, relates to the economic situation in the nation. Inherent in the capitalist developmental approach, which Nigeria adopted at independence, are regional inequalities. These are at the forefront of current challenges to national security and electoral integrity. Capitalism, by its very logic, does not promote even-development. In the Nigerian case, Governments over the years, have attempted to arrest this unfortunate consequence through the instrumentality of National Planning. But the goals of even-development and inclusive growth are still far from being attained.

It is true that structural inequalities exist, both in resources endowment and location of industries, in Nigeria. Some of these uneven-development date back to the pre-colonial days. Others are as a result of nature. But there are some that could be regarded as man-made, that is, the quality of the leadership Nigeria has had at the various levels of government. Whatever the sources of such uneven development or economic inequalities in Nigeria, the truth is that it would affect the form and manner of contributions that the different regions, states, or even ethnic groups would make regarding the

Constitutional review or restructuring. Some of these are already manifested in the various paid publications that have appeared in Magazines and Newspapers since the Government made public its intention to consider a Constitutional review or restructuring.

There is abundant historical evidence in Nigeria to suggest that under severe economic hardships, as have now been occasioned, it becomes difficult for social cleavages to appreciate Nigeria's unity and the benefits of a united country. This is because deepening economic crises tend to generate more societal conflicts and anxieties, based on social cleavages that are quite detrimental to national unity and cohesion. They also negatively affect national security and electoral integrity as well. The fact is that as the economic fortunes of the society shrink as a result of the deepening economic hardships, these classes and cultural pluralist conflicts tend to increase. The struggle for resources or as Nigerians love to put it, the "National Cake", becomes more intense.

All social cleavages or factions thereof, attempt to hijack the national cake for their exclusive use, particularly if it is located within their territorial area or soil. Corruption also increases as office holders engage in favouritism and primitive accumulation of capital for their personal, ethnic, or regional benefits. These developments make it very difficult for those who would want to continue to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the whole nation-state. Sub-national agitations by ethnic or regional groups from those areas from which the central and subordinate governments are getting most of their resources or revenue, tend to want to secede from the nation with the selfish motive of commandeering these resources for their exclusive benefits.

No region in Nigeria can claim to be innocent from these selfish manoeuvres. For instance, when groundnut and other agricultural produce such as beniseed that are based in the Northern part of Nigeria were yielding a lot of foreign exchange, the North capitalized on that to agitate for the Northern Region to become a separate country in 1953.

Similarly, when cocoa and palm produce exports derivable mainly from the Western Region of Nigeria were yielding a lot of foreign exchange for the nation, the West, led by the Yorubas, canvassed severely for their autonomy as a separate nation. They sought autonomy from the rest of Nigeria, first in 1954 and again in 1964 – ten years after. It is the same selfish sentiments and the desire to hijack resources of a region for the exclusive use by that region, that made the Eastern Region to declare their secession from the rest of Nigeria in 1967 and plunged this country into a devastating civil war, the "Biafran War". The resources at stake here were the oil, petroleum, and its allied products, which were discovered massively in the area and for which commercial exploitation had begun yielding extensive foreign exchange for the nation.

It should not come to us as a surprise, therefore, that during debate on the need to constitute a Constitutional review and restructuring in Nigeria, oil has again surfaced as a motivating factor for the Southern minorities, even when they are as small in population as the Ogonis, to still want to be an independent nation of their own so as to have total monopoly over the oil revenue from their land.

The present development too has arisen because of the prevailing economic conditions which now force all the component parts of Nigeria and their fortunes to be dependent on the oil industry. This is because exports from all other sectors combined are still less than 10% of the Nigerian national foreign exchange. The remaining 90% is from the oil sector alone. Thus, the oil sector brings the greatest part of the oil revenue coming into the Federation Account from which the Federal Government makes routine allocations to itself as well as to the other tiers of government (States and Local Governments). It is because of this basic fact that the oil producing areas have now constituted

themselves into a serious threat to Nigeria's unity by agitating for their independence from Nigeria or Confederalism.

One must carefully note the fact that, when these oil producing States, for instance, are not threatening secession; they are still calling for a re-negotiation of the minimum new terms that will favour them mostly, if Nigeria must continue to exist as one entity with them as an integral part. The clarion call by them now is for some form of Confederation, if not for their total independence. Oil has really become an instrument for regional and ethnic chauvinism and agitations of disunity for Nigeria today.

It is now a matter for history - that has to be quickly redressed - to note that Nigeria oil reserves are not concentrated only on the soils of the Southern minorities. Records show clearly that, in the early days of independence when Nigeria was busy prospecting for oil, large quantities were also found in the Benue Valley, the Niger Valley and stretching all the way through Katsina and Borno States to the Lake Chat Valley. It is now a matter for mere regret that no national resources were committed, to the same degree as was done within the lands of the Southern minorities, to exploit these oil reserves in the North. It is again the uneven-development in the oil industry across the country, even though oil reserves were discovered in commercial quantities also in the North, that has now become a weapon of blackmail of the rest of Nigeria by the Southern minorities.

The importance of the forgoing discussion is that no reasonable regime can allow selfish agitations, based on the contemporary economic conditions in the country, to destroy the unity of this great nation for which a lot of blood was spilt to keep as one. While individual regions, states, and even ethnic groups may fail to see the long-term benefits of remaining together because of their myopic economic considerations; it is the responsibility of the central Government to look ahead and prevent the disintegration of Nigeria under the current threats of oil politics by the Southern minorities. This, we believe, can be done in two ways: First, the Federal Government must insist that the unity of this country is not open to debate and therefore, completely disregard the agitations by the oil producing or other States that are targeted at dismembering the country. While they should be allowed to table their case for fair treatment; they should be prevented from raising extra-territorial matters that border on separatist ambitions. Second, the Federal Government must quickly institute action to develop oil industries in the North where petroleum resources have already been discovered. This will bring a new twist to oil politics in Nigeria thereby promoting our national unity and cohesion. It will also promote national security and electoral integrity as well.

(iii)   The Social Integration Dimension

Public temperaments having to do with the social integration dimension in our society can be divided into two broad and distinct categories. The first set are those that relate to the nature of our social structure. This is what we have referred to above as the social cleavages exiting in Nigeria.

The second set have to do with what is generally referred to in Nigeria as social services. These include the performance of government agencies that are responsible for the provision of social services in Nigeria. Some of these agencies include National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) now known as Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), Nigerian Postal Services (NIPOST), Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), etc. The critical social problems here hinge on poor performance and massive corruption, as we shall show below.

Within the social problems, a few will be discussed simply as illustrations of the kinds of problems they pose for the Constitutional review and restructuring, in particular, and Nigerian unity in general.

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

They also undermine national security and electoral integrity as well as can be seen from the discussion below. Those to be discussed here are ethnic chauvinism and religious bigotry.

(a) Ethnic Chauvinism

It is already a known fact that with the approach of independence and the talk of introduction of a British model of liberal democracy, there came avenues for the display of ethnic sentiments. Nigerians who had made their fame in their strong nationalist agitations, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Tafawa Balewa, to name only a few, saw an opportunity in the emerging politics of numbers to seek ways of taking over from the colonial administrators. In their desire for political power, they evoked ethnic and regional symbols in order to appeal to the majority of people who were, largely, politically unsophisticated. The truth is that Nigeria's problems, since independence, have derived in large measure from the tensions, anxieties, and fears which have arisen between the various ethnic groups. Yet, the hostilities between them came about not from the ethnic differences themselves; but from the utilization of ethnic symbols and myths by a few ethnic chauvinistic leaders. These leaders, in their search for wealth and political power, evoke ethnicity and regionalism when they fail to accomplish their aims on other platforms.

In the on-going debate on efforts at organizing a Constitutional review or restructuring, some ethnic and regional leaders have started to advocate strongly for a Confederal System. Confederalism is an arrangement which calls for the down-grading of the powers of the centre and re-enforcing those of the sub-national units. These sub-national units could be ethnic groups, Regions, States, or Local Governments. The aim here is to create for themselves very powerful regions over which they hope to preside. It is in this light that we have seen the emergence of regional leaders and associations, such as the Northern Elders Forum, the Yoruba Forum, the Ibo Forum, the Middle Belt Forum, Committee for the Defence of the Southern Minority Rights, etc.

As it is to be expected, four types of autonomy are currently being agitated for by some of these regional groupings. First, is the economic or financial autonomy of the sub-national units. Here, it is argued that the resources of a particular region, state or even ethnic group should be left primarily for the exclusive benefits of the region, state or ethnic group from which they are derived.

Second, the security or monopoly of force autonomy. Here, regions, such as the South-South and the West, are now advocating for a separate Police Force and a regional Army. But we do know that such demands, even when they occur under the guise of Confederalism, are nothing but steps towards separatism.

The third category of autonomy such regional and ethnic champions are looking for is the institutional or administrative autonomy. Here, they argue, perhaps erroneously, that the membership of their ethnic groups in the Federal Civil Service is less than what it should have been. It is, therefore, better for them to seek to establish their powerful regional governments where their educated youths would also get greater opportunities to actualize themselves rather than be bugged down under the ''yoke'' of Federal Character as enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thus, the Federal Character principle, which was supposed to be a mechanism for promoting unity, fairness and equal representation throughout the Federation is now misunderstood and misrepresented as a "regional tool" for the Northern part of Nigeria to "dominate" the Federal Civil Service.

The fourth kind of autonomy some of these regional leaders are seeking for is legal autonomy. Here, they believe strongly that if allowed the autonomy to operate in their regions without too much

control from the central government, they would be able to formulate those laws that will better cater for their interests. But, we do know that regionalization, which prompted such disintegrative policies, such as "Northernisation Policy" for the North, "the East for the Easterners Policy" in the then Eastern Region, and "the West is Yoruba and Yoruba is West Policy" for the Western Region, served to perpetuate disunity which invariably led to the civil war, beginning 1967.

Part of the reasons for the resurgence of interests in Confederalism and regional autonomy, perhaps, relate to the fact that the intervention of the military in our polity, reinforced unitary tendencies. These, in turn, undermined the federalism principles which allowed for the sharing of power and responsibilities between the Federal, States and Local Governments, with the Federal Government having more powers and responsibilities than the rest, thereby acting as a senior partner in a mutual relationship.

An assessment of the Nigerian ethnic condition leads us to several conclusions. First, that the Nigerian Government should not allow the establishment of armies along regional lines since this will promote disunity and likely balkanization of the country in future. Having one central army for the country should also be considered as a settled issue that should not be open to debate in any Constitutional review or restructuring considerations to be held in Nigeria. However, the possibility of allowing the partial localization of the Police Force could be discussed. State Police, therefore, could be allowed for states that can afford it.

Second, we believe that the principle of federalism should also be regarded by the Nigerian Government as a settled issue, not open to debate at any such discussions. At best, delegates could be allowed to discuss only how to make the Federal System in Nigeria to wok even better. Even this, should better be conducted under the auspices of the National Assembly.

Third, it is our view that the Federal character clause in the Nigerian Constitution was designed to promote social justice, unity and fair representation of the diverse social cleavages in Nigeria. It should, therefore, be regarded by the Nigerian Government as a "no go area" for the delegates at any Constitutional review or restructuring fora in Nigeria, now or in future.

In fact, we believe that the principle of Federal Character should be more closely enforced, not just in the Public Service, but also in political appointments, the mass media, admission to Government schools, the economy, and in the nomination of Ambassadors to be sent to foreign countries.

(b)   Religious Bigotry and Fundamentalism

As we have just seen, in the 1960s, it used to be believed that the greatest challenge to nation-building and political co-existence in Nigeria was ethnicity. This is partially correct, given that ethnicity was at the heart of the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970. In present day Nigeria, however, it is difficult to talk of a Constitutional review or restructuring that will lead to political stability and greater unity, without making reference to the phenomena of religion and religious bigotry.

Since the end of the civil war, religious conflicts appear to be the greatest threat to the internal peace and harmony in Nigeria. Many well-meaning Nigerians now earnestly fear that the ghost of religious bigotry, if not prevented by government, will rear its ugly head again beyond the current war with Boko Haram in the North East.

Three basic propositions characterize the relationship between the State (Government) and Religion. It is important for us to briefly discuss these options so as to conclude on which one the Nigerian Government should continue to adopt towards its major religious groups. These are:-

(i)   The atheistic option;
(ii)   The totalitarian or assimilationist option; and
(iii)   The State neutrality option.

The atheistic option requires that secularly based ideology be adopted by the State. The important point is that under this arrangement, the State does not recognize religion as a basic unit for sharing power, wealth or social amenities.

In the case of totalitarian or assimilationist option, there is usually one particular religion taken and elevated over and above others. In the totalitarian case, other religions are then prevented by force. This, we do not recommend for Nigeria. In the assimilationist case, however, followers of other religions are persuaded or co-opted, through incentives, to join the preferred religion.

The third option – the State neutrality option, is where all religions are allowed to prosper and are considered as equals by the State. The State tries to stay out of religious matters, acting simply as a neutral agent. In this case, State's secularity and impartiality to religions are the norm. This is the model we will recommend to continue to exist in Nigeria. This is because we strongly believe that it is more suited for a multi-religious society such as ours. In this case, our opinion is that religion too should be considered as a "no go area" for the delegates to any Constitutional review or restructuring fora. In Nigeria, religious secularity and impartiality are already sufficiently enshrined in our 1999 Constitution.

(iv)   The Good Governance Dimension

In their speeches on assumption of power, in post-military rule Nigeria, all Nigerian Presidents dwelt extensively on the conditions of Nigeria's public enterprises and social services. These have also assumed a major dimension in public sentiments and perceptions which have already been expressed in some of the paid advertisements in the country's newspapers and magazines. Three aspects of public enterprises have particularly been singled out for public concern and debate recently in the newspapers. The first has to do with the poor performance of these enterprises; the second relates to the level of corruption that exists within these parastatals; whereas the third has to do with occupants of the boards and top management positions within these parastatals.

There is no question that public enterprises such as NITEL, NIPOST, PHCN, Ports Authority, General Hospitals, and so forth, are clearly performing below expectation. This is particularly worrisome when seen against the background that the costs of their services have continuously gone up; whereas the services themselves have either remained stagnant or have significantly degenerated. There is need to, instead, ensure their penetration even to rural areas for even "the poor" to benefit from them.

On the question of public corruption, the general public is already very excited that a sense of discipline and accountability appeared to have returned back to Nigeria, with the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under Olusegun Obasanjo regime. In fact, the numerous probes that had been inaugurated since the A.P.C. Government took over power under President Buhari which have already been inaugurated, had served to illustrate to the public that corruption would be truly and comprehensively tackled. The point to note, however, is that crimes, such as corruption and the notorious "419", could better be addressed by providing alternative avenues for the public, especially the young generation, to actualize themselves and accumulate resources for their future. There is,

therefore, the need to find out more efficient and realistic ways of comprehensively tackling the issue of public corruption and the "419" crimes in Nigeria that allows the youth to actualize themselves profitably.

Another aspect of the public enterprises debate that is bound to surface at any Constitutional review or restructuring relates to the issues of ethnicity, regionalism, and religious bigotry as well as Federal Character, already discussed above. Newspapers and Magazines are full of paid advertisements indicating that some ethnic groups, regions or even religious groups are, usually, favoured in appointments as Chief Executives or Chairmen and members of these parastatals.   The view here is that if the clause of Federal Character as enshrined in our Constitution, had been fully applied; such complaints, perhaps, might not have arisen. On this note, we further suggest that the Government should ensure the retention of the Federal Character clause in the Nigerian Constitution. In short, the only way of ensuring this is to consider the question of Federal Character, as enshrined in the Constitution, as one of the settled issues and not subject to debate at any Constitutional review or restructuring forum in Nigeria.

(v)   The Institutional/Legal Integration Dimension

A lot of public discourse now also relates to the type of Government, or for that matter the form, the government should take in the restructured or revised Constitution to be arrived at. Two areas will be specifically addressed here. The first relates to the form or type of government to be adopted; while the second has to do with the party system. They all have serious implications for national security and electoral integrity.

Whatever it is, it is clear now that Nigerians have experimented with the Presidential System in the two party arrangement and the parliamentary system with a multi-party arrangement (1960-1966). In the recent debate regarding the Constitutional review or restructuring, public opinion clearly differs on this matter. On the one hand, there were those who feel that there has been no problem with the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions. The problem had been with the operators. In which case, it is simply a waste of time and resources to engage in another Constitutional review, in the first place. On the other hand, there are those who feel that our experience with the Presidential system had already proved it to be too expensive and are already calling for a return to the parliamentary model.

We beg to disagree with those who say that calling for a Constitutional review or restructuring now is a waste of time. However, we would like to side with those who have expressed the view that having tried the Parliamentary and Presidential Systems, as well as the multi-party and two party systems, we are now better placed to make a decision on which one could be best for Nigeria. In short, the operations of the two political parties created by the General Ibrahim. B. Babangida Government, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), have now given us the necessary raw materials with which to review this thinking.

We had discovered that the policy of funding political parties and providing for their other logistical support, such as vehicles and offices, had tended to elevate the two political parties into some kind of mega government parastatals that had constituted very serious burden on the economic resources of the Federal Government. Party officials and chieftains at the Federal, State and Local levels, saw themselves as managers of government parastatals in the "oil boom" era, who never thought of how to generate resources for themselves, but only of how to spend. They tended to rely entirely on government subventions for their operational and fixed costs. It is the view here, therefore, that no

political party should be funded in future beyond the level that will be or is provided for in the Constitution.

As it concerns the type or form of government, some have said that there may also be need to re-examine the Presidential System once more. Having watched a full blown Presidential system in operation, some had come to realize that, given our fragile economic base, an expensive political superstructure such as the Presidential System, may not be the best suitable for Nigeria, unless it is dramatically modified. Our opinion here is to the effect that what had made the Nigerian Presidential System expensive was public corruption and not the system itself. Now that the corruption problem is being seriously dealt with, there may be no need to abandon the Presidential System.

(vi)   The Security (Military/Police) Integration

The role of the military in Nigerian society has increasingly come under devastating attach recently. In fact, there are those who think that Nigeria's current economic, political and social problems were caused by repeated military interventions in our polity. The call for a constitutional review or restructuring are also blamed on the military who clearly, because of their command style of Government introduced unitary elements in our Federalism.

There are some agitations for constitutional review or restructuring that are seeking to temper even with the position of the military in the Nigerian society. They are seeking to be allowed to have their Military and Police Force in their States or Regions/Zones. As we have stated above, why the possibility for creating State Police should be considered and even allowed for States who can afford it; no State should be given the autonomy to the level of setting up their own military. This will give birth ultimately to struggle by such States or Zones for separatism. It should not be allowed under any guise.

VI. NATIONAL SECURITY AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has tried to examine closely national security and electoral integrity in Nigeria. It shows that there are growing pressures from the citizens world-wide, including those in Nigeria, to have not just the form of democracy, but also the real substance of it. This, they believe, can be achieved when favourable conditions or avenues are created for their participation in the affairs of Nigeria, especially through transparent elections that promote electoral integrity under a secure environment. These pressures, when not fully tackled, through good governance, can lead any Nation to becoming a "failed State". Unfortunately, Nigeria is on the brick of it right now!

However, the paper argues that regardless of how one defines or conceives national security, good governance and electoral integrity, policies dealing with these issues must cater for the welfare of the majority of the citizens, if they are to stand the test of time and be sustained. This, the paper shows, is what States or Governments, especially democratic ones, are all about.

The paper reveals that in Nigeria, because of the multiplicity of security challenges, and lack of electoral integrity in the process of electing political leaders, this is not happening fast enough for the citizens of Nigeria to appreciate. Some may even say, they are not happening at all! For instance, while the general national economic growth indices, such as GDP and Income per Capita, are going up, the reverse is the case with those indices relating to the issues that matter the most to the public – poverty eradication, job creation, security, human rights protection, electoral integrity and peace. These ones are still moving very fast in the negative direction.

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

Nigerians are beginning to wonder why the whole country is engulfed in one military and other Security agencies internal security interventions or the other, all over the country. Yet, Boko Haram and other insurgencies, have not been dealt with and prevented! They cannot understand why effective policing has not been happening and herdsmen/farmers clashes, hijacking, ritual killings and so on, cannot be stopped despite these numerous internal security operations. The number of farmers being killed and property destroyed on daily basis by herdsmen and Boko Haram, especially since January, 2018, have clearly shown that Nigeria has started showing signs of a "failed State". The incapacity of the Military and other Security Agencies to put a stop to it, has further confirmed these fears of Nigeria being on the verge of becoming a "failed State". This should not be allowed to happen.

Thus, electoral integrity to enable them elect competent leaders to bring about good governance is suffering in the process and others are now forced to be calling for constitutional amendments and restructuring. They are looking for ways out of these current dilemmas in Nigeria. Still others, especially the youths, have become impatient with the government and leaders. They are engaging in self-help efforts, which include militancy and violence. Others are seeking illegal means and moving to other continents and nations, especially to Western Europe. To help address these security problems and electoral integrity challenges, we offer the following policy recommendations:

(i)   The Government must ensure that the Federal Character Clause in the Constitution is strictly followed in making appointments into the Public Service. This is particularly more so in the Military and other Security Agencies. The Principle of Federal Character must also be applied strictly in the appointment of Electoral Commissioners and Chairman, not only the Chairman and the Electoral Commissioners, must be subjected to this Principle, but the recruitment of Officers and other staff to work with and in the Commission must also reflect Federal Character. Like it is done to National Security Officers, the electoral leadership and staff must also be subjected to security vetting and put on oat.

This way, electoral integrity will start to be fully protected right from the beginning. It creates a sense of justice and equity thereby promoting nation building and patriotism in the citizens. It also guarantees that the elections to be conducted by the Commission, namely the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), will not be compromised right from the start.

(ii)   The training and preparation of the staff for their electoral jobs must also be comprehensive and thorough. Even where the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) are to be recruited and used as temporary staff during the elections, they should also be properly vetted and trained. Those known to be card carrying members of political parties should not be accepted for recruitment in the Commission.

(iii)   The INEC must be truly Independent. It must have the authority and autonomy to carry on with their jobs completely insulated from political control by the Executive Arm of the Government, especially the Presidency or any other. The Uwais Committee Report has good recommendations of how this could be done. It talks of how they are to be appointed, financed, and disciplined, where they violate their codes of conduct and the ethics of their jobs. This Report should be fully implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

(iv)   The welfare and working conditions of INEC staff should be properly guaranteed. The situation where they are proceeding on their electoral assignments and they are not paid their basic travelling

and accommodation allowances, should be stopped so as not to expose them to temptations from the political parties or those contesting in the elections.

(v)   Just like in building an upstairs, the type of security architecture is very important. When security challenges are at their highest, only an Integral National Security System (INSS) or Architecture can be appropriate in dealing with them. This does require the restructuring of the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) to more ably handle this task of operating an Integrated National Security System or Architecture in Nigeria. It may even require a new legislation to make this stable and permanent.

(vi)   The nature of the economic, political, social and other policies – in short good governance - is critical to facilitating the Military and other Security Agencies in doing their work. It is also necessary to support electoral integrity. Nigerians must know that the foundations for effective and efficient policing, begins with the national security system, good governance and the level of electoral integrity the Government is promoting. Good governance is positively correlated to national security and electoral integrity.

(vii)   Government must ensure that the Armed Forces and other National Security Agencies carry out their mandates and assignments or operations in a professional manner. So also, the Officers and Staff of INEC. They must not be "captured" by a particular social cleavage or a set of social cleavages be they of ethnic, regional, religious, language, gender, class or even caste. They should also not be captured by a political party or parties. A situation where they are captured and hijacked by any of these cleavages to serve their parochial interests is too dangerous. It damages electoral integrity and precipitates more problems than solving them. It also affects the transparency and legitimacy of the electoral results.

(viii)   Subordinate groups, classes and other social cleavages hitherto very docile when Nigeria was under military rule, have suddenly sprang up, with agitations for participation in the affairs of their nations and societies. There is clearly a "participation revolution" going on throughout the world, Nigeria inclusive. These agitations are mostly for poverty eradication, socio-political justice, electoral integrity, and inclusive growth. If avenues are not quickly created by the Nigerian Government to allow them opportunities to participate in the electoral and developmental processes, this could be grounds for political, social and economic instability that will further threaten our corporate existence and development.

(ix)   It is regrettable that ever since the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was scrapped against the advise of the Orasanye Committee a few years ago, there is still no Federal Government or Agency that is dealing, on a massive scale, with the challenges of poverty and social exclusion in Nigeria. The Social Investment Programme in the Presidency is rather too small in scope, coverage and the number of employees, to make a serious impact on these conditions. In a Nation of about 185 million people, where 71% of them are living below the poverty line of one dollar a day, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), a more comprehensive poverty eradication and social security system is needed. Electoral frauds of vote selling and buying and even recruitment as tugs for the Political Parties and Candidates to engage in electoral violence or Ballot Box snatching; in the hope of being paid money to take care of their basic needs, becomes rather attractive. This should be discouraged. Government must devise more efficient and effective means of taking care of the basic needs of the poor and economically excluded in our society.

There is therefore, the great need for the Federal Government to create a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion or at least a National Poverty Eradication and Equal Opportunity Commission or Agency, to deal with these matters. With seventy-one per cent (71%) of the population of Nigeria in poverty and unemployment, such a Federal Ministry or Commission is not just desirable, but even an imperative.

This is indeed, the model or vehicle being used to deal with such issues in Asia and Latin American countries. In Latin American countries, they all have full National Ministries of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion for dealing with such matters. For example, in Ecuador, it is also called the Ministry for Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion. Thus, whether the security, economic, political and social problems challenging national security, good governance and electoral integrity currently in Nigeria, would get better or worse, depends on what happens to this 71% of Nigerian's population still living below the poverty line of one dollar a day.

(x) There is need to also promote the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of Government policies and programmes in Nigeria, especially in INEC, to promote good governance. It is not enough to make budgets and allocate money to the Ministries, Departments and Agencies of Government. They must be closely coordinated, monitored and evaluated. Appropriate monitoring structures must be put in place.

The Office of the Director-General in the Presidency for Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation that was recommended by the Vision 20:2020 Document and set up by the Jonathan Administration, has been closed since the present regime under President Buhari came to power. That Office is very important and needs to be reopened. Without accurate data, and analysis and evaluation of Government policies, programmes and projects and reports submitted directly to the Presidency and other approved stakeholders, they may not know how the various MDAs are performing and what changes need to be made to the policies they are trying to implement. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), even collects such M&E reports to compile their data.

(xi) As was suggested by the Vice-President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, GCON, SAN, recently and approved by the National Assembly, there is urgent need to review the Federal Constitution of Nigeria, and permit States to have their own Police Force, in addition to the Federal Police Force. This will help States to address more speedily their internal security challenges and support INEC during elections by providing them with enough security. We also support the calls for Constitutional Review or Restructuring in our polity. However, we recommend that this should be the task to be conducted or at least mid-wife by the National Assembly.

We went further to suggest what role the Federal Government should play to make sure the debate for restructuring is not used to dismember Nigeria. Hence, the various insurgency groups should be persuaded to lay down their arms and come to the table to consider restructuring of the country and find ways of addressing their grievances peacefully.

(xii) Every nation must strive to reward hard work and merit as they promote development and electoral integrity. This is certainly not incompatible with the Federal Character Clause. In every social cleavages, qualified individuals (men and women) exist. Security Agencies must fish them out for appointment, reward and national honours. When mediocrity, nepotism, sectionalism and favouritism, become the accepted norm of governmental behaviour or public policy action, such a nation is doomed. It can never develop, neither can it enjoy good governance, electoral integrity, effective national security or continuous nation building.

The resultant crises from such an unfavourable and unjust system will generate sustainable crises, conflicts and other security challenges that will make effective nation building and policing difficult, if not in fact impossible. It will also affect electoral integrity, as explained above.

(xiii)   The Nigerian Police Force is clearly understaff, under paid, under nourished, under equipped, under trained and so forth. These issues must all be looked into. No one can ever say they are not important. A lot of what the military is doing in internal security operations now, could be left for the Police - State and Federal - if well trained and equipped. The recommendation being made here is that these are all supplementary to a good national security architecture, good governance and increased electoral integrity. When a good national security architecture is in place, good governance exists, electoral integrity, effective and inclusive policing becomes easier to accomplish.

(xi)   To have a truly "inclusive approach" to policing, national security and electoral matters, the Nigerian Police Force and the other Security Agencies, must mobilise the citizens as part of their strategy, especially under the policy of community policing and inclusive security. It is especially important that the Traditional Rulers must be coopted into it. The Traditional Institutions in Nigeria, have a fundamental role to play, not just in community policing; but also in other security matters and in promoting electoral integrity within their domains. They can effectively be involved in building a united, peaceful and prosperous country. They can also help to prevent some of the electoral frauds we are discussing here among their subjects, thereby helping to promote electoral integrity.

The British Colonialists used them under the "Indirect Rule Policy". The Nigerian Police, the other Security Agencies and INEC can do the same at this time by giving them a key role in community policing security and election watch. They will help improve the peace, security as well as the integrity of elections held within their communities. Most of their subjects listen to them in their localities, tremendously.

VII   CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have attempted to deal with the question of national security and electoral integrity. We argued that without good governance that will guarantee security and electoral integrity where effective, competent and visionary leaders could be elected to provide such good governance, Nigeria is already heading to join the league of "failed States". We believe this should not be allowed to happen. Hence, we made policy recommendations that will help address the challenges.

We then discussed the various political, economic, social, legal and even security reasons, that have been presented by different social cleavages in Nigeria, calling for constitutional review or restructuring. On this, we also made our pertinent recommendations in each case. On the whole, we agreed that there is need to proceed with the constitutional review or restructuring in Nigeria. However, there is no need to inaugurate any new body, be it a sovereign or none-sovereign Constitutional Conference or Constituent Assembly. This should be the task to be conducted, or at least midwifed, by the National Assembly.

All previous Reports by former Constitutional Conferences, should accordingly be passed over to the National Assembly for further necessary action. No need to waste more revenues setting up a new body to do it. We predict strongly that if the recommendations made in this paper are implemented, Nigeria will be restored to the possibility of becoming the true African Giant, which we believe is her destiny, in our life time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adedeji, G. Amos and Istifanus S. Zabadi (ed.) (2005), The Military and Management of Internal Security Conflict in Nigeria, (Kuru: Jos, National Institute Press);

Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba (1963); The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University press);

Achebe, Chinua; The Trouble With Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers);

Annan, Kofi, (2006); Ex-Secretary - General's Message on the International day for the eradication of poverty;

Ake, Claude (1979); Social Science as Imperialism. Ibadan: University of Ibadan press;

Ake, Claude (1996) Democracy and Development in Africa. (Washington Brookings Institute);

Ashley, Richard (1980); The Political Economy of War and Peace, New York: Niocols. Publishing Co;

Az - Zubair, Amina Mohammed (2009); Senior Special Assistant to the President on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) at the Opening of the International Conference on Poverty Reduction in Nigeria at the Sheraton Hotel, Abuja, 2th April;

Babangida, General I.B. (1985); "Analyses of the Threats to Nigeria". Lagos: Address as Chief of Army Staff to Senior Officers;

Berkowitz, M. and P.G. Book (eds.) (1965); American National Security: A Reader in Theory and Policy. New York;

Block, Fred (1977); "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule," Socialist Revolution, No. 33 (May - June, 1977);

Block, Fred (1980); " Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subject," in Raph Miliband and John Sanile (eds.), The Socialist Register. London: Merlin Press;

Carnoy, Martin (1984); The State and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1984);

Cobb, Roger W. and Charles D. Elder (1080); Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building. The John Hopkins Press;

Cupps, D. Stephen (1977); "Emerging Problems of Citizen Participation," Public Administration Review. (March/April, PP. 478-487; 96;

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Chapter VI, Section 229.

Dahl, R. (1981); Dilemma of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press;

Dahl, Robert A. (1956); A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press;

Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 91) Adopted and Proclaimed by the General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10th December, 1948;

Deng, Lual (1984); "Research and values: The African Context". Paper presented at a session on Discourse in Africanist Social Science, at the Twenty - Seventh Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, Hilton Hotel, California, U.S.A;

Deng, Lual and Dan Mou (1985); "African Economic Crises; Structural Adjustment and Donor Community", Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.II, No.1, PP. 33 - 54;

Dye, Thomas R. (1987); Understanding Public Policy, New Jersey: Prentice - hall Inc;

Dudley, Billy (1973); Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press;

Easton, David (1953); The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. New York: Knopt;

Easton, David (1965); A Framework for Political Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice -Hall, Englewood Cliffs;

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

Edelman, Murray (1977); Politics as Symbolic Action. Chicago: University of Illinois Press; Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed, Policies that Fail. Madison: Academic Press;

Edelman, Murray (1984); "Systematic Confusions in the Evaluation of Implementing decisions". Lean Linberg (ed.), Politics and Public Policy in America. Chicago: University of Chicago press;

Edelman, Murray (1980); The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press;

EI- Rufai, Nasir Ahmed (2013); The Accidental Public Servant. Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd.;

Eze, Osita (1984); Human Rights in Africa. Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria Ltd.;

Gambari, Ibrahim A. (2008); "The Challenges of Nation Building: The Case of Nigeria". First Year Anniversary Lecture, Mustapha Akanbi Foundation, Sheraton Hotel, Abuja, Nigeria, 7th February;

Garuba, A. Chris (1998), Statecraft, Peace and Security (Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd.);

Gormley, William T. (1983); "Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System," APSA, Chicago;

Gowa, J. "State Powers, State Policy: Explaining the Decision to close the Gold window," Politics and Society, Vol. 13, No.1 (1984), PP.91-117;

Gromping, M. and Ferran Martinez (2014), Electoral Integrity in Africa, The Electoral Integrity Project;

Hagher, Iyorwuese (2001); Beyond Hate and Violence: Understanding the Tiv Struggle for Citizenship Rights and Social Justice in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Caltop Publications);

Hagher, Iyorwuese (2011); Nigeria: After the Nightmare, New York: University Press of America;

Hamilton, N. (1981); "State Autonomy and Dependent Capitalization in Latin America," British Journal of Sociology, Vo1.32; No.3, p. 305;

Holloway, J. and S. Piccito, (eds.) (1978); State and Capital. London:

Huntington, Samuel P. (1981); American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, Harvard: Harvard University Press;

Jonathan, President Goodluck Ebele (2011); Speech at the Retreat and Induction for New Cabinet Members, Special Adviser and Permanent Secretaries;

Jonathan, President Goodluck Ebele (2011); The Transformation Agenda, (Abuja: Government Press);

Laswell, Harold (1963); The Political Process, New York: McGraw - Hill; and Theodore Louw, "Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government," in R.B. Ripley (ed.), Public Policies and their Polities. New York: Norton (1966) PP. 27-28;

Leadtimes Africa Magazine (2013), Vol.5, No.3 (June-July);

Leboug, Fabrice (2005), "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences", Review in Advance, Feb., 6;

Lijphart, Arend (1977); Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New haven: Yale University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1963); Political Man. New York: Doubleday;

Louw, Theodore (1964); "American Business, Public Policy, Case Study and Theory," World Politics, pp. 677-713;

Louw, Michael H. (1985); cited in National Security in the Third World edited by Abdul-Monen A. AI-Mashat, London: Westview press; 17. McNamara, R.S (1968); The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row;

Lorwin, Lewis L. (1931); "Exploitation", in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York, VoI,VI.;

Lukes, Stephen (1974); Power: A Radical Views. London: Macmillan;

Mazrui, Ali A. (1986); "Monitoring Human Rights and the Quest for a Pan African Moral Code.", Department of Political Science, Seminar paper, University of Jos, Jos;

Mbachu, Ozoemenam and Chukwu Eze (eds.) (2009), Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers);

Meredith, Martin (2006); The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. Greek Britain: The Free Press;

Mill, John Stuart (1946); Representative Government. New York: Oxford University Press;

Mou, Dan (2018); "National Security Architecture, Good Governance and Nation Building: Preventing Nigeria From Becoming a "Failed State" International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol.5, No.1, June, pp.1-32;

Mou, Dan (2017); National Security, Good Governance and Democracy in Post-Military Rule Nigeria Volumes One and Two (London and Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse UK);

Mou, Dan (2016); National Security, Good Governance and Democracy in Africa (London and Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, UK.);

Mou, Dan (2015); Making of an African Giant: State, Politics and Public Policy in Nigeria Volumes One and Two (London and Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, UK.);

Mou, Dan (2013); National Security and Democratic Governance in Nigeria: From Obasanjo to Jonathan Administration (Abuja: Top African Publication House);

Mou, Dan (1989), Causes of Students Unrest in Nigeria: A Theoretical Exploration", Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives Vol.VIII, No.4 (Dec.), pp.41-63;

Mou, Dan (2013); Girl Child Education, Democratic Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa (Abuja: Pan African Publishing House);

Mou, Dan (2017); "Internal Security, Poverty Eradication and Inclusive Growth in Nigeria, International Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Vol.4, No.2, December, pp.77-102;

Mou, Seseer P. and Dan Mou (2017); "Peace, Security and National Development in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects", International Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Vol.4, No.2, December, pp.20-40;

Mou, Dan and Seseer P. Mou (2018); "The State and Religion in Nigeria: An Analysis of Religious Tolerance on Nigerian University Campuses" Review of European Studies, (Forthcoming);

Mou, Dan (1988); "The Politics of Deceptive Scapegoatism: Illegal Aliens and Domestic Social Order". The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. XXVII, No.3, pp.33-56;

Mou, Dan and Terlumun Avav (1997); The Case for the Creation of More States in Tiv Land, Abuja: Restoration Publications. This mini book by Mou and Avav became the basic document that was used by the Tiv people to demand for the creation of more States in Tiv land, especially by the Movement for the Creation of Katsina-Ala State, which Mou and Avav initiated and championed. This received unanimous acclaim and support from all Tiv people and was almost created but for the ignorance of some Tiv Elders and Chiefs who kicked against it;

Mou, Dan and Chris A. Garuba (2013); "National Security and the Brewing Catastrophe in Niger Delta: Rethinking Current Agenda for Restoring order in Niger Delta and Fast-Forwarding the Attainment of President Yar'Adua's Vision for Nigeria". Being a National Security Policy Memo to Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua, GCFR, President and Commander-in-Chief of Nigerian Armed Forces, State House, Abuja, August. This Memo was accepted and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and the Amnesty Programme for the Niger Delta Militants, which we recommended there, were all accepted and implemented wholesale;

Mou, Dan and Seseer P. Mou (2017); "Religious Intolerance on Nigerian University Campuses", International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, Vol. VIII, No.8.4 Quarter, pp.1-44;

Mou, Dan and Seseer P. Mou (2018), "The State and Religion in Nigeria: An Analysis of Religious Tolerance on Nigerian University Campuses", Review of European Studies (Forthcoming);

Mou, Dan and Seseer P. Mou (2018), "The Youths and Leadership in Emerging Democracies", Journal of Good Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol.4, No.1, April, pp.57-67;

Mou, Dan (2018), "National Security, Good Governance and Nation Building: Foundations for Effective and Inclusive Policing", Being paper presented at the Northern States' Stakeholders Security Summit Organised by the Nigerian Inspector-General of Police, Ibrahim Kpotun Idris, on the theme: Nation Building: Security Challenges and the Need for Inclusive Approach Summit held at the Arewa Hall, Kaduna, Nigeria, on 28th February;

Mou, Dan and Seseer P. Mou (2018), "Emerging Internal Security Threats to University Educational System: The Challenges of Religious Intolerance on Nigerian University Campuses", Being a paper for presentation at the National Education Conference in Nigeria on the sub-theme: Issues of Quality Education and the Challenges of Insecurity. Conference to hold at the Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria from July 24th to 20th;

Mou, Dan and Elone J. Nwabuzor, "Leadership in a Plural Society" in J.A.A. Ayoade et.al. (eds.), Political Parties and the Third Republic. Abuja: Center for Democratic Studies Publication (1991), pp. 29 - 36;

Mou, Dan (1990); "SAP and the Relative Autonomy of the Nigerian State in the Third Republic," A.T. Gana and G Tyoden, (eds.) Towards the Survival of the Third Republic. Jos: Sources Publishers;

Mou, Dan (1985) "Intellectual Discourse and African Development, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. xxiii, No.2 (Sept., 1985), PP.1-10; 139.

Nabris, Khalid (2002); Mentoring and Evaluation (PASSIA: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs);

Norris, Pippa, Thomas Wynter and Sarah Cameron (2018), "Electoral Integrity and Campaign Media", Electoral Integrity Project, August;

O'Connor, James (1973); The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin Press;

Odinkalu, Chidi, (2018) "Fostering a Sustainable Economy, Credible Elections and Security in Nigeria – What Role for the Online Publishers?;

Olaopa, Tunji (2009); Public Administration and "Civil Service Reforms in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press, Plc.;

Onwubiko, Emmanuel (2012); Unemployment Deadlier Than Bombs, Lagos: African Centre for Media Information Literacy;

Parkin, Frank (1981); Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. London: Verso Books, (1981);

Pateman, Carole (1970); Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Pitkin, Hanna (1967); The Concept of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press;

Poulanzas, N. (1973); Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left Books;

Rapoport, Anatol (1974); Conflict in Man-made Environment. Baltimore: Penguin Books;

Raskin, Marcus (1979); The Politics of National Security. New Jersey: Transaction Books;

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1941); The Social Contract. New York: Dutton;

Schumpeter, Joseph (1947); Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy;

Skocpol, T. (1985); State and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Dan Mou, 2018, 5(2):71-109

Stallings, Barbara (Forthcoming); "International Lending and the Relative Autonomy of the State," Politics and Society;

Therbon, Goran (1977); "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy." New Left Review, No. 103;

Therbon, Goran (1978); What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? London: NLB (1978);

Uwais Committee Report: "10-Year Ban for Electoral Offenders", Election Reform Project;

Wright, E.O. (1978); Class, Crisis and the State. London: Verso Books;

Watson, Richard A. (1973); Promise and Performance of American Democracy John Wiley and Sons. Inc.;

Wolfram, Horrieder and Larry Buel (1984); Words and Arms. London: Westview press;

Wikipedia (2018), "Electoral Integrity", Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia;

Wilson, James Q. (1973); Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books;

Yar'Adua, President Umaru Musa (2007); Inaugural Address;

Young, Crawford (1986); Ideology and Development in Africa. New Heaven: Yale University Press;

Young, Crawford and T. Turner (1985); The Rise and the Decline of the Zairean State. Madison; University of Wisconsin Press;

Young, Crawford (2012); The Post-Colonial State in Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).