

JOHN STUART MILL'S UTILITARIANISM: A CRITIQUE

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ABSTRACT

The determination of what one ought to, and ought not to do, the search for moral principles that guide one's actions; these have led a number of philosophers into propounding different moral theories. Among such philosophers is John Stuart Mill who set out to establish an ethics based on pleasure and the morality of human action. Mill needed a measure of quality or value and for him; it is "the principle of utility" otherwise called "the greatest happiness principle". This principle aims at seeking the pleasure or happiness of the majority. Can these principles serve as a standard of morality in our contemporary society? Should the greatest happiness principle be sought at all cost even at the detriment of some persons? Our work aims at having a moral principle that won't subjugate personal freedom and liberty. It offers its objectives by determining the moral worth of happiness and undertaking a critical study of the principle of Mill's utilitarianism. Our work significantly makes a distinction between what is just and what is mere useful. It recommends the Moral Objectivism of Louis P. Pojman thereby, offering for a moral principle that has to do with amelioration of suffering, resolution of conflict, and the promotion of human flourishing.

INTRODUCTION

Utilitarianism as a moral theory, generally considered to have been founded by Jeremy Bentham, a 19th century English philosopher and social reformer centred on the concept of happiness, and sought to promote happiness. To act ethically therefore, implies striving to bring about the greatest possible amount of happiness for the greatest possible amount of people. Therefore, utilitarianism as a theory and principle is consequential in nature. He felt we should treat unhappiness as something consisting of pain. Among our choices, what produces the most amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain ought to be chosen as the right. Consequently, Bentham's view on happiness is seen not only as eudaimonistics but explicitly, hedonistic. Bentham therefore, did not distinguish between different forms of pleasure. For him, anything that gave rise to happiness was fundamentally good.

Bentham's hedonic calculus led to questions and disagreement of his all-inclusive view on pleasure. Thus, Mill seeking to clarify the concept of utilitarianism rejected human nature as exclusively egoistic. Having left the turf of egoism, he proposed altruism as the meaningful basis for the moral command and responsibility. Mill's acknowledgement of the obvious qualitative differences among pleasures made him depart from Bentham's calculus as the meaningful means for determining the criterion for right action whether or not a certain action ought to be done. His loyalty and devotion to Bentham and utilitarianism, however, led Mill to reduce the differences between Bentham's position and his own.

In addition, establishing a universally set or principle of morality that would be applicable to all climes, persons and even circumstance led to the question of "what is right?" Thus, the question of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, led to Ethics as a branch of philosophy defending, and offering notions of right and wrong conducts.

Philosophers from ancient times have offered their concepts on how humans ought to conduct themselves, and more generally, defined theories which they deemed as platforms, upon which

ethical principles should be established. It is this attempt to recommended moral principles that led to different moral theories, and subsequently to utilitarianism as an ethical principle.

Attempting to modify Jeremy Bentham's hedonistic version of utilitarianism, which failed to differentiate between kinds and qualities of pleasure, and so received the name of "pig philosophy", Mill substituted a more complex theory of happiness for Bentham's undifferentiated pleasure.

BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL (1806 – 1973)

John Stuart Mill was born in London on May 20, 1806. His father, James Mill, was a journalist and an official of the East India company. Two years after John Stuart Mill's birth, his father met the philosopher and reformer Jeremy Bentham; for the remainder of his life he was Bentham's devoted friend, disciple and spokesman. His commitment to the utilitarian creed involved his son, whom James Mill chose to educate at home in order to cultivate the perfect utilitarian individual.

Mills tells the story of his incredible education in his Autobiography, published after his death by his stepdaughter Helen Taylor in 1873. By age three, Mill had studied Greek and, by eight, Latin. He began philosophy and logic at twelve, spent a year in France, and returned to England at fifteen to study law with the famous legal thinker John Austin. Throughout this process Mill conversed with his father's Benthamite friends on philosophical, political, and economic issues and engaged in drills, recitations, and debate under his father's severe direction.

In 1823 Mill completed his education and was employed by the East India Company, where he remained until his 1858. In 1856 he was appointed to the office of Chief Examiner, the company's second highest post, and two years later refused government employment when the company was dissolved by act of parliament.

In 1826, at the age of twenty, Mill was the victim of an intellectual crisis. Later he would recall the event as the beginning of his intellectual independence from Bentham. He had once been so totally committed to Bentham's utilitarianism that it served for him as a vital religion; he was student, disciple, and even evangelist of this rational, humanistic faith, founding the utilitarian society, editing the Benthamite journal, the *West minister Review*, and leading the "Philosophical Radicals", the young Benthamite organisation. But at twenty he came to recognise his lack of emotion and feeling; he had become a pawn of reason, without tenderness or sensitivity. He turned to Wordsworth and Coleridge, the great romantic poets, for guidance in those feelings without which life could not be whole and fulfilled.

In 1831 Mill met Mrs. Harriet Taylor, the young wife of a wealthy merchant; she became his closet friend and confidant. As the years passed, the platonic relationship deepened, and eventually, shortly after her husband's death in 1849, the two married. Mill's praise for Harriet Taylor's intelligence, imagination, and tenderness of soul was boundless; he was devoted to her and acknowledged her profound influence on his thinking and his life, to her, Mill would say, should be ascribed the human element in his writings and the sensitive application of principle to the issues of the day. In 1858 she died in Avignon, while on a vacation.

Perhaps the outstanding result of their collaboration- and Mill's most famous political work – is on *Liberty*, published in 1859. At least from 1854 they had worked on this account of the significance of individual self-development, enriched by Mill's study of Woodsworth and Coleridge, and the limitations of social and governmental control over the individual. In it Mill famously argues that creative self-development is central to personal character and that only self-protection justifies limitations on individual freedom. When Harriet died, the book had not

received its final revisions, but Mill sent it to the publisher, without further alteration and dedicated it to her.

After Harriet's death and his retirement, Mill wrote extensively, bringing to fruition many projects that he had begun during the eight years of their marriage. Among these were the considerations on Representative Government, published in 1861, and the Subjection of Women, his revolutionary defense of women's capacity for self-development, which was written in 1861 but appeared only in 1869.

In October, November and December of 1861 Mill published three essays in a prominent intellectual monthly, Fraser's Magazine. It was his attempt to appeal to an educated lay audience about some fundamental matters concerning morality, religion, reason, pleasure, and duty. These essays, reworked into five chapters and published in book form as utilitarianism in 1863, are an act of radical reform, an effort to defend the integrity of a benevolent, rational moral view that was humane and that would encourage positive change. The book was also an attack-on Kant and intuitionist moral theorists and on Bentham, whose conception of the goal of utility was too narrow and intellectualistic for Mill. It remains to this day a classic formulation of instrumentalist moral theory.

Two years later Mill was elected to parliament from Westminster, serving three years until 1868. From then until his death on May 8, 1873, he wrote and avoided those who sought him. Tended in these last years by his stepdaughter Helen, Mill died quietly and was buried in Avignon, alongside his beloved Harriet.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

For a better understanding of our work, it would be pertinent to define terminologies that we would use frequently. The most used term would be utilitarianism which is the core of our work (Mill's utilitarianism though). Other terms like hedonism, eudaimonism and consequentialism would be regular too.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is the ethical theory which holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong, as they tend to produce pain. Utilitarians believe that the purpose of morality is to make life better by increasing the amount of good things (such as pleasure and happiness) in the world and decreasing the amount of bad things (such as pain and unhappiness). That is, morality is justifiable based on its "happiness", or positive contribution to human (and perhaps non-human) beings.

Hedonism

According to hedonism, the only thing that is good in itself is pleasure (or happiness). Hedonists do not deny that food, friends, freedom, and many other things can be good. The hedonists however, see these as "instrumental" goods that are valuable only because they play a causal role in producing pleasure or happiness. Pleasure and happiness are "intrinsic" goods, meaning they are good in themselves and not because they produce some further valuable thing. On the other hand, pain and unhappiness are intrinsically bad, that is, bad in themselves and not because they produce some further bad thing.

Consequentialism

Consequentialism is the ethical theory which holds that the consequences of one's conduct. In consequentialism, the consequences of an action are everything the action brings about, including

the action itself. The most traditional view among consequentialists is that the only kind of result that is good in itself is happiness.

Eudaimonism

Eudaimonism is from the Greek word, eudaimonia. Etymologically, it consists of the words “eu” (good) and “daimon” (spirit). It refers to a state of having a good indwelling spirit or being in a contented state of being healthy, happy and prosperous. In ethics, eudaimonia refers to the right actions as those that result in the well-being of an individual.

THEMATIC DISCUSSIONS ON SOME ETHICAL POSITIONS

EUDAIMONIA

In the beginning of his work in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle starts with an introduction which sets the tone for his principle of eudaimonia:

Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choices, is thought to aim at some good; and so the good has been aptly described as that which everything aims. But it is clear that there is some difference between ends; some ends are activities, while others are products which are additional to the activities. In cases where there are ends additional to the actions, the products are by their nature better than the activities. (Nicomachean Ethics, from hence, to be abbreviated *N.E.* 1094a1-7).

Aristotle believes that all tends towards the good. However, a difference exists among these aims or ends. What is aimed at is sometimes the exercise of a faculty, sometimes a certain result beyond that exercise. If there exists then an end beyond the act, the result is better than the exercise of the faculty. Aristotle is of the opinion that the eudaimon life is one of ‘virtuous activity in accordance with reason’ (NE 1097b22-1098a20). For Aristotle, eudaimonia involves activity that exhibits virtue “arête” (sometimes translated as excellence) in accordance with reason.

For Aristotle, only the best of things is to be conceived as final. Therefore, “happiness in particular is believed to be complete without qualification, since we choose it for itself and never for the sake of anything else” (NE 1097b). Aristotle sees happiness as moving towards an end.

For him, the end of all human action is happiness leading to his moral philosophy being categorised as Ethical Teleologism. His notion of happiness is also rational, thereby leading to the name Rational Eudaimonism. Happiness for him is rationalistic and not sensual.

It is advisable in Aristotle’s view, to develop certain principles in the early stages of life, for this will profoundly affect the later life. A person too must have knowledge, and must choose virtues for their own sake with his activities originating from a firm and unshakeable character, which represents the conditions for having virtues.

Aristotle tried to make ethics scientific by saying that virtue should strike a balance in the middle. This we see in his golden mean, where he is of the opinion that moral behaviour is the mean between extremes-at one end is excess, at the other deficiency. To act morally is to find a moderate position between those two extremes (N.E.1150a16-25).

In his notion of eudaimonia, Aristotle informs that it consists of contemplation where one has to elevate himself to the level of the gods through contemplation. It seems then that his eudaimonia is not what everyone wants. For contemplation can only be achieved by a philosopher. It is we who can get to the contemplation, he talks about through the exercise of the ‘divine faculty’ of reason.

Aristotle's golden mean has been criticized. The biggest criticism on the mean is that what is extreme for Mr. A, may not be extreme for Mr. B. For instance, five bottles of beer may just be enough for Mr. A, while two bottles of same beer would lead to drunkenness on Mr. B. What is good for the goose may not be good for the gander. The scale of preference as shown in Economics, as placement of goods according to their degree of importance. This is a psychological issue. A preference for buying of books may not be same for Mr. B. Where lies the mean in the scale? One factor that shouldn't be overlooked here is that though Aristotle talks of striking a balance. The 'middle role' can lead to a life of mediocrity, which can dampen competition.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Kant's argument in his work, *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals* was contrary to the moral sense theories, also called sentimentalism (the theory which holds that distinctions between morality and immorality are discovered by emotional response to experience) and teleological moral theories which were dominant during his time.

Central to the character of the principle on which a person chooses to act upon is the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is the notion that one must act only according to that precept which he or she would 'will' to become a universal law.

In his unique work the *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant gives an ingenious foundation to the metaphysics of morals by stating that philosophy which puts forth its doctrines solely from principles a priori, is pure philosophy. When the pure philosophy is merely formal, it is called logic; but if it is limited to determine objects of the understanding, then it is called metaphysics (AK 4:388).

This led to his idea of a twofold metaphysics: metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals. Although physics and ethics have their empirical and rational part, however, the empirical part for Kant could be called practical anthropology, the rational part morals.

His metaphysics of morals set out to investigate the idea and principles of a possible pure will and not to the actions and conditions of human volition in general, which are mostly drawn from psychology (AK 4:390)

For him, the representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a 'command' (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative. He notes that all imperative commands are either hypothetically or categorically. The former represents practical necessity of a possible action as a means to attain something else which one wills, or might will. While the Categorical Imperative represents an action as objectively necessary for itself without any reference to another end (AK 4:413-414).

The hypothetical imperative for Kant is problematic and is an assertoric practical principle. The categorical imperative which declares the action for itself as objectively necessary without reference to any aim, or end is valid as an apodictically practical principle.

The problem with the Kantian Categorical Imperative stems from subjecting to an extreme degree, ethical action to rational duty. In a situation where known assassins inquire the whereabouts of a friend who took refuge in your house, what becomes of your duty bound Categorical Imperative not to lie?

The Categorical Imperative reduces to mere principles, the golden rule of "do unto others what you would like them do unto you". For if I were an employee who put in an extra work for a

ground breaking project in my firm, I would likely be expecting a bonus. As a manager then, I know it might hurt not to receive a bonus for extra work and dedication. The golden rule requires that the manager should put himself in the shoes of the employee and give the bonus he or she deserves. For Kant however, such a situation is not moral. His reasons are not on the grounds of a wrong committed, but because the action cannot be applied universally.

HAPPINESS FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER

Bentham hoped that ethics would become as exact and precise a science as mathematics and physics. Bentham used his felicity calculus as an algorithm for calculating the degree or amount of pleasure which can result from a specific action. For the calculation are several variables, which Bentham called “circumstances”. They are

1. Intensity: how strong is the pleasure
2. Duration: how long will the pleasure last?
3. Certainty or uncertainty: how likely or unlikely will the pleasure occur?
4. Propinquity or remoteness: how soon will the pleasure occur?
5. Fecundity: the probability that the action will be followed by sensations of the same kind
6. Purity: the probability that it will not be followed by sensations of the opposite kind.
7. Extent: how many people will be affected?

At the beginning of his Chapter One in his, *The Principles for Morals and Legislation*, Bentham writes: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. They alone point out what we ought to do and determine what we shall do”. For Bentham, the principle of utility recognises this subjection, and makes it the basis of a system that aims to have the edifice of happiness built by the hands of reason and of law.

Bentham by the principle of utility as can be read from *The Principles for Morals and Legislation* (Ch. 1:2) means: “The principle that approves or disapproves of every action according to the tendency it appears to have to increase or lessen—that is, to promote or oppose the happiness of the person or group whose interest is in question”.

Hampshire in his article “Fallacies in Moral Philosophy” (473-475) asserts that Bentham deliberately reduced all moral problems to technical ones. To take an exact account, then, of the general tendency of any act, sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and then of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it bears on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act, if on the other side of pain, bad tendency.

Bentham’s approach indicates the possibility of pleasure and its amount exactly quantifiable. Because of its emphasis on duration and purity however, Bentham’s hedonism is closer to Epicureanism than Cyreniacs. The difference between early hedonism and Bentham’s utilitarianism lies in the fact that Bentham positively considered the extent, the number of people who are affected by such a pleasure. Thus the great amount of pleasure is also to be for the greatest number of people.

According to a webpage sponsored by the phenomenology of studies and ethics, it is noteworthy to point that Bentham universalizing hedonism is not altruistic at all, but rather collective egoism. Bentham believed that first of all, the human being as an individual is determined by the pleasure and pain principle, which is no other than egoism. Bentham thinks that most people think of the other of their happiness, too. This does not mean altruism, for Bentham would have considered the other a higher priority than oneself, which Bentham did not hold. Therefore, his universalized hedonism is indeed the collective egoism of the masses constituent of the given society (“Eudaimonism IV”).

Critics of Bentham's utilitarianism have argued against the reduction of human action and morals to pure mathematics. Hence, Higgins in his work, *Man as Man in the Science and Art of Ethics* (88) holds that motive and intention count in the assessment of any human action and it is not what we can arrive at though the use of mathematic since human beings are complex beings.

The egoistic nature of Bentham's universalized hedonism could lead to subjective or "opinionated morality". Actions would be taken based on an individualistic basis as it is believed to be pleasurable in its individuality to be applicable to the vast majority of people.

In his work *Methods of Ethics*, Sedgwick emphasized the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the fundamental goal of ethics. He analyzed the intuitionist and utilitarian ethical arguments. He showed the doctrine of common sense rests on the principle of utilitarian ethical arguments. He showed the doctrine of common sense rests on the principle of utilitarianism, but in the end he could not demonstrate why an individual should choose to sacrifice his or her own happiness at the expense of the society.

Sedgwick adopted a position which may be described as ethical hedonism, according to which the criterion of goodness in any given action is that which produces the greatest possible amount of pleasure. This view however, was not confined to the self, but involved due regard for the pleasure of all, which he termed "universalistic hedonism". However, Sedgwick did not abandon the principle that no man should act so as to destroy his own happiness, he left an unresolved dualism. Sedgwick distinguished three basis methods of ethics: egoistic hedonism (rational egoism), universalistic hedonism (utilitarianism), and intuitionism (dogmatic or intuitional morality).

Sedgwick in the *Methods of Ethics* (9) attempt to determine the extent to which these methods were compatible, and described each system as an ultimate ideal of ethical conduct, and how each is interpreted by moral duty. Egoistic hedonism makes the private happiness of each individual the greatest good and justifies actions in terms of how much happiness they produce for the agent. Intuitionism holds that moral virtue or perfection was the ideal, rather than happiness, and suggested that it might be achieved by actions other than those which promote happiness. Universalistic hedonism made the general happiness of all individuals the greatest good.

As a result, Sedgwick argued that neither egoistic hedonism nor intuitionism could, by themselves, supply an adequate basis for rational conduct. Instead he proposed a system of "universalistic hedonism". This reconciles the apparent conflict between the pleasure of self and that of others. He opined that intuitionism and utilitarianism supplement each other, and that their conclusion forms a systematic whole. Thus, it is reasonable to act as those conclusions dictate. He admitted to the future consequences of actions in order to determine which course of action would bring about the greatest happiness.

Sedgwick was not able to demonstrate in conclusive terms whether the individual should always promote the happiness of all individuals rather than his own personal happiness. Sedgwick ended his work on *The Methods of Ethics* (10) with the statement that "the prolonged effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to have been foredoomed to inevitable failure". With the way each method functions, one can deduce that he left an unresolved dualism.

JOHN STUART MILL'S NOTION OF UTILITARIANISM

In his work on Utilitarianism, the claim that "happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge all human conduct" stands at the centre of Mill's practical philosophy, determining how individuals should act, individually and collectively (X:237). In line with Mill's claim, Omoregbe in his work *Metaphysics without Tears* (111) highlights that:

In the moral sphere being remains the foundation goodness of actions are judged morally good or bad in terms of their relations to the being of other people. Actions that enhance the being of other people are good while those that adversely affect the being of other people are evil actions. It is therefore with reference to being that is, the being of other people that actions are judged as good or evil, for being is the foundation of goodness.

Mill claims that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the Agent's own happiness but that of all concerned (Utilitarianism, X:234). By showing that happiness is desirable, that nothing other than happiness is desirable, and that every person's happiness is equally desirable, Mill holds that the principles of utility is proved. Of course, it is not a proof in the traditional sense of being a logical deduction of the principle of utility. For Mill acknowledges that in a strict sense, ultimate ends are amenable to proof. Being based on critical examination of how we do reason, claims about how we ought to reason-whether practically or theoretically-must remain provisional and open for Mill, presents considerations capable of determining the intellect. As such, the principle is shown to have rational grounds (The Protagora, XI:61).

Mill introduced into utilitarianism that pleasure differs in quality and not simply in terms of quantity. For him some pleasures are superior to others and are desirable than others:

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than other, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference [...] that is the more desirable pleasure. (Utilitarianism, X:211)

Mill claims that utilitarianism identifies that pleasure differs in quality as well as quantity; in the judgement of those who have experience of different pleasures, some are preferable to others. He then moves from preferable to higher, thus surreptitiously introducing a moral classification among pleasures.

HIGHER AND LOWER PLEASURES

A difference in the quality of pleasure is determined, Mill claims, by the preference of those who distinguish among pleasures irrespective of their quality. To determine what sorts of pleasures are of higher quality than others. Mill holds that pleasures "of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments" are amongst the higher pleasures (Utilitarianism, X:211).

Mill's view of the sense of dignity and intellect as consisting of the higher pleasures is well summarised by McGreal (82) who notes that Mill acknowledges the capacity of those who are acquainted with the lower and higher pleasures, who exercise his intelligence and maintains his sense of dignity, give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.

His doctrine however, needs not to be read as restrictively intellectual. As well as pleasures of the mind, he holds that pleasure gained in activity are of a higher quality than those gained passively (Liberty, XVIII:262)

Some suspect that in distinguishing qualities of pleasure, Mill depart from hedonism. For Mill's anti-hedonist interpreters, his claim that "a small amount" of pleasure can be more valuable than a "high amount" suggests placing value on something apart from the pleasurable experience itself. As Nussbaum in his article Mill between Aristotle and Bentham holds that those who doubt Mill's hedonism have in general claimed that Mill moves towards a eudaimonistic or perfectionist account of happiness.

THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF MORAL STANDARD

To the question that would confront the utilitarian, "why am I bound to promote the general happiness?" Shahakian in Systems of Ethics and Value Theory (126) notes that the utilitarian standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. For Mill, there are external and internal sanctions based on the principle of utility. The external sanction is provided by the approval of both men and God; men generally approve action that aims at their happiness, and God is ordinarily conceived to be a spirit whose concern is for the general happiness.

The internal is the ultimate sanction of all morality; its fundamental reason is a subject feeling in our minds, a pain, more or less intense, whenever duty is violated. McGreal noted that with the faculty called conscience, is a natural basis of sentiment that offers to the utilitarian, a method of resolving moral problems.

A CRITIQUE OF JOHN STUART MILL'S UTILITARIANISM

MERITS OF MILL'S UTILITARIANISM

Mill's utilitarianism has positive implications for the contemporary society. Utilitarianism as a principle deserves some recommendations for admitting and making explicit, the fact that the hidden quest of man is pleasure. Man consequently abhors pain. The denial of this would be a psychological impossibility. Virtually everybody seeks pleasure and avoids pain. Hence, the following arguments are in favour of Mill's utilitarianism.

Elevation of the Intellect and Virtues

Upgrading on the pleasure principle of Bentham, which some critics labelled "pig philosophy", Mill gave the "pleasure Principle" for the greatest number of more moral foundation by ascribing as pleasurable quality over quantity. By establishing that pleasures that is from the intellect is higher, and that pleasures coming from activity higher than passive pleasures, Mill abstains from reducing morality to mere sensations and feelings.

Altruistic Way of Living

Mill's utilitarianism is an expression of the life most of us live. It recognises man as a social being, thus, Mill's principle is a great stimulus to social improvement. It takes man's egoistic tendencies and harnesses them to social needs. Since each individual sees his own happiness integrated in that of the group.

Promotion of the Common Good

Those charged with public welfare can hardly use any other principle, since they must seek the common good and at the same time protect individual rights. Mill's principle gives each person

the right to seek his own pleasure and limits a person when he encroaches on another person's right. This makes the principle workable for the common welfare.

DEMERITS OF MILL'S UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism as a principle has attracted a lot of criticisms. It has been argued that the implication of utilitarianism sharply conflicts with what most people consider as moral judgements which are strong reason to reject utilitarianism in all its ramifications. We shall study the criticisms of Mill's utilitarianism, and mention those criticisms which we have observed ourselves from our study of John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism.

Greatest Happiness as Consequentialist

Mill's utilitarian principle emphasizes on the effects of an action. If an action produces an excess of beneficial effects over harmful ones then, it is right, otherwise it is not. It means that the consequence of an action determines its rightness or wrongness, irrespective of the motive for which the action is performed. Opponents of utilitarianism have criticized this principle calling attention to the abhorrent policies might justify under certain possible or actual circumstances. Thus, MacIntyre in *After Virtue: A Study of Moral Theory* (4) describes the greatest happiness principle of the greatest number as: "a notion without any clear content at all. It is a pseudo-concept available for a variety of ideological uses, but not more than that".

Lack of Justice and Equality

Mill's Utilitarian principle doesn't have enough room for the equality of individuals. The individual is counted among other individuals; Scheffler in *Consequentialism and Critic* (6) observes that:

Utilitarianism's vulnerability on issues of distributive justice can be attributed to the specific way in which it evaluates outcome. Given any two outcomes with different totals of aggregate satisfaction... utilitarianism will always say that the outcome with the higher total is better, even if satisfaction is distributed very unequally.

Would it be right to secure the greatest happiness for the greatest number by isolating one innocent person in a perpetual life of horrible torture? Surely, the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means even of saving a nation. Therefore, utilitarianism fails to appreciate the uniqueness of persons and to acknowledge that happiness is as unique as the person whose happiness it is. Thus, it encourages injustice and inequality.

Inconsistency in Mill's Utilitarian Principle

The inconsistency of Mill's utilitarian principle on desirability in which he gives as the only proof that an object is visible if people actually see it, sound audible if it is heard and desirable if it is actually desirable is famously found in G.E Moore's *Principia Ethica* (118). Moore suggests that the fallacy in the steps is so obvious that it is quite wonderful how Mill failed to see it.

'Desired does not bear the same relation to 'desirable' as 'heard' does to 'audible' - for desirability is the property of being deserving or worthy of being desired, whereas audibility is property of being capable of being heard. Mill's choice of framing the argument in this way is, admittedly, unfortunate, but the basic thrust of the argument is nevertheless strong, if understood in terms of its own aims.

Mill's Utilitarianism is Elitist

In order to explain what constitutes happiness, Mill enlisted a level of elitism. For him, only the intellectual enlightened can know what true happiness is, and this enlightenment is only achieved by experience. Mill is actually arguing for social modernity. This of course begs the question

“how can one quantify happiness?” Although Mill does not directly answer the question, he does explain that precedence and common sense can and must be used for utilitarianism to work.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Reading through Mill’s utilitarianism, we see its intention to free man from imputation. Utilitarianism stresses the nature of man and recognizes the sympathetic impulse in man as a natural endowment. It urges the individual to live not for one self but for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It is democratic in its general tendency and aims at setting up a community in which all have equal rights and none enjoys special privileges to the disadvantage of the rest. Having x-rayed all the essential principles of John Stuart Mill, there is no doubt the existence of happiness and pleasures in human life, hence, from utilitarian point of view, the systematic approach to ensure happiness is justified by its utility.

It was developed as a practical criterion of judging the rightness or wrongness of an action, the utilitarian principle of consequences breaks down the exact estimate of the pleasant or unpleasant consequences of various possible courses of action. It would be worthy to contribute that, there are when a person ought to disapprove of conduct that results in the greatest happiness of the greatest in favour of doing that which is just, equitable, and right when it is called for, such as supporting the right of the oppressed and minority group.

In such moral instance therefore, we would recommend the Moral Objectivism of Louis P. Pojman which holds that moral principles are those adherence to, which meet and should be adhered most significant need of persons. For him, there are valid rules of actions that should be adhered to, but may be overridden by another moral principle in cases of moral conflict. He posited this version of Moral Objectivism because for him, moral goodness has something to do with the amelioration of suffering, resolution of conflict, and promotion of human flourishing.

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