

## **INTERNAL SECURITY, POVERTY ERADICATION AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN NIGERIA**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*After the scraping of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), contrarily to the advise of the Stephen Orasanye Committee, which had recommended merger with the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), to create a National Empowerment and Employment Agency, there is no poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth Agency or Commission or a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion at the national level in Nigeria that can assist in the task of implementing the N500 Billion approved in the 2017 National Budget. Moreover, such a Ministry, Commission or Agency must device ways of training the recipient in some marketable skills that will enable them get jobs immediately and be taken off the welfare programme. In this Policy oriented paper, a strong case is made for the creation of such a Federal Ministry or an Agency or Commission. It must be noted that with seventy one percent (71%) of Nigerians currently in poverty, creating such a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion to handle their case, is not just necessary but even an imperative. We further discuss also why and how it shall succeed where others had failed. The only alternative we see is a situation where as the security, economic, political and social crises intensify, Nigerian Government, even if it is simply for its self-preservation, will be forced by the objective conditions, to move drastically against the interests of the dominant classes and groups. These are the ones that have captured and hijacked economic, political and social power for their exclusive use, and are not eager to promote inclusive growth, nor poverty eradication, and job creation, on a serious note.*

**Key words:** Internal Security; Poverty eradication; Inclusive Growth; Nigeria; Social cleavages; and National Poverty Eradication Commission.

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

The concern of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Federal Republic of Nigeria, His Excellency, President Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR for the plight of the poor and down trodden Nigerians is not in doubt to anyone, even though his methodology for accomplishing this task is rather strange. This group of under-class and lower class Nigerians, who live below the poverty line, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), constitute Seventy One Percent (71%) of the population of Nigeria. The 2015 National Electoral Statistics for the 2015 Presidential Election show clearly that over Ninety Percent (90%) of this category of Nigerians voted for President Buhari in that election (Mou, 2016).

It can therefore be confidently said, that they basically voted President Buhari into power. They are, therefore, without any doubt, his main and important constituency. All their hopes and aspirations are also hung on the shoulders of the Buhari Government. In fact, they believe that through his Government, their poverty and alienation will terminate, and they will start to enjoy the benefits of democracy and inclusive growth. They further believe that with the present Federal Government of Nigeria under President Buhari, they stand to benefit from the proverbial “National Cake” in Nigeria (Mou, 2016).

Even the efforts President Buhari has been making since taking over Government, to sanitise the Nigerian society are being interpreted correctly as directed at recovering the looted wealth of the ruling class in Nigeria to cater for the marginalized and impoverished Nigerians. There is clearly a firm belief that it will all be applied to the development of the country, where all shall be partakers and no groups and classes would be excluded from enjoying the dividends of democracy and inclusive growth any longer. The tendency in the past under the previous regimes in Nigeria, was that Nigeria was experiencing economic growth of six (6) to eight (8) percent annually. Yet, this category of Nigerians never benefited (Mou, 2016; 2017).

While the general national economic growth indices, such as Income Per Capita and Gross National Product (GDP) were going up, the reverse was the case with those indices relating to the issues that mean the most to the masses and lower class Nigerians. They observed, for instance, that despite the stories about the economy of Nigeria doing well, issues such as poverty, unemployment and hunger were increasing on a daily basis. Coupled with the growing insecurity and human rights abuses in the land, life was truly becoming a nightmare for the majority (71%) of Nigerians living below the poverty line (Mou, 2016; 2017).

It was in the midst of all these dissatisfaction and resentment against the then regime of former President Goodluck Jonathan, under the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), that made them to vote massively for CHANGE thereby putting President Buhari into power under the All Progressive Congress (APC). This CHANGE will mean a lot to them when President Buhari takes bold actions and creates new or restructures existing governmental structures and institutions for effective service delivery, especially to this marginalized and poverty stricken classes mentioned here above, who constitute 71% of Nigeria’s current population.

## **II THE PURPOSE FOR THIS POLICY ORIENTED PAPER**

The purpose of this policy oriented paper is to suggest why and how this creation or restructuring of governmental structures and institutions can be done in order for President Buhari to better cater for the rapidly growing numbers of Nigerians still in poverty, unemployed, hungry and not enjoying the dividends of democracy and development. There is need for them too to be partakers of the developmental process and included in the “baking” and “Sharing” of the “National Cake” in Nigeria for the peace and prosperity of this great Nation (Ake, 1996; El-Rufai, 2013; Mou, 2016, 2017).

No one is in doubt in this country that the “participation revolution” going on in the world, has engulfed the Nigerian society as well. Social cleavages based on groups and social classes that had been docile, are now becoming very active or even militant. They are also asking not just for the form of democracy but also for its substance. By social cleavages here, we mean, those divisions in the society that are based on ethnicity, religion, region, gender, class, race, language or even caste (Mou, 2016). These demands for the dividends of democracy and development as part of the concerns for poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth, are getting louder and louder (Mou, 2017).

In truth, one does not need to be a “political prophet” to predict that if these challenges facing these 71% of Nigerians still in poverty are not successfully addressed by the Buhari’s Administration, the country will be faced with very severe national security and other social, political and economic crises (Mou, 2016; 2017). This will put to question President Buhari’s philosophy of CHANGE, undermine his Administration and discredit the APC as a party.

It is true that President Buhari had finally succeeded in getting the National Assembly to approve the N500 Billion (Five Hundred Billion Naira) included in 2017 Budget to address this category of Nigerians. However, as the National Assembly noted correctly, in our view, there is currently no effective and efficient vehicle available to him and his Administration, policy and institutional wise, for assisting in administering some of these funds to the target groups (Mou, 2017).

After the scraping of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), contrarily to the advise of the Stephen Orasanye Committee, which had recommended merger with the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), to create a National Empowerment and Employment Agency, there is no poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth Ministry, Agency or Commission at the national level that can assist in the task of implementing the N500 Billion approved (Mou, 2015). Moreover, such a Ministry, Commission or Agency must device ways of training the recipient in some marketable skills that will enable them get jobs immediately and be taken off the welfare programme. In this Policy oriented paper, we make a strong case for the creation of such a Ministry, Agency or Commission. We further discuss also why and how it shall succeed where others had failed.

## II. DEVELOPING A PHILOSOPHY OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

It is important to note that in the last Millennium, it may be fair to say that poverty reduction and inclusive growth, were not major agenda on the list of global concerns. However, this can no more be said of the present Millennium. The former United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki Moon, stated this much in his message to the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty on the 17<sup>th</sup> of October, 2007 when he said:

*At the dawn of the Millennium, world leaders made bold pledges to the world’s poor. They pledged a world where all children complete their elementary education; a world where people have access to safe drinking water and families are protected from deadly diseases like malaria; a world where nations work together to cut greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global warming. Above all, our leaders promised a world where people are no longer condemned to a life of extreme and egregious poverty. This year International Day for the Eradication of Poverty falls just after the midpoint in the race to reach those commitments - the Millennium Development Goals - by the target date of 2015. The Day provides an important opportunity to take stock of our progress and to re-energise our efforts (Ban Ki Moon, 2017, p.4).*

From available records, the message on the performance of the various regions and nations of the world, on the issues of poverty eradication, job creation, and inclusive growth ever since the renewed interest in them started, is also loud and clear. All world regions have already met the goal of halving poverty by the MDG target year of 2015, with the notable exception of Africa. To quote the UN former Secretary-General, Mr. Moon once more:

*Our global scorecard is mixed, the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day has fallen, and we remain on track to meet the MDG target of halving extreme poverty. But progress has been uneven, and some regions - particularly sub-Saharan Africa is not on track to redeem even a single one of our grand promises. Today, the world must refocus its attention, and its resources, on the places and people that are being left behind. As we do, we must bear in mind that none are more committed to ending poverty than the poor themselves. Often, all they lack is the guidance, the tools, and the opportunities to win this fight. Our task is to address these failings (Ban Ki Moon, 2017, p.5).*

Thus, there is clearly a compelling need to refocus attention, resources and policy strategies to critical areas as suggested by the former Secretary-General of the UN. This is indeed self-evident now that Nigeria has moved to a democratic form of Government that must be pre-occupied with providing dividends of democracy and inclusive growth for the people. To turn the challenges of poverty and growing inequalities in the country into real opportunities, there is need for refocusing Nigeria's Poverty Reduction, job creation and inclusive Growth Strategies (Ake, 1996; Mou, 2015; Meredith, 2006; El-Rufai, 2013). These are what the paper hopes to propose on how it could effectively, efficiently and successfully be done.

This Policy paper, thus, argues that the major explanation for the poor performance of poverty eradication policy strategies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is that such policies and programmes are made and relatively large funds of money allocated for their execution. Yet, no provisions of funds are made for the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of such policies and programmes. Nor are staff of the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in these countries trained to carry out such tasks properly. In fact, most of the MDAs in these African countries, including Nigeria, do not even have Departments or Units in their set-up specifically dedicated to coordination, monitoring and evaluation of such poverty reduction, Job creation and inclusive growth policies and strategies - the Departments of Planning, Research and Statistics being only mere poor substitutes, for proper M&E outfits (Mou, 2015; 2017).

Certainly, therefore, there is limited quality data gathered on the actual performance of such policies, programmes and strategies when implemented. Whatever data that are brandished in the absence of effective coordination, monitoring and evaluation, therefore, tend to be speculative and inconclusive. In fact, where poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth strategies and policies, as any other, being implemented are not closely coordinated, monitored and evaluated, progress reports that would warrant changes, if need be, in the policies themselves or strategies of implementation are lacking, resulting in the ineffectiveness, and sometimes, even total failure of such policies, programmes and strategies (Mou, 2015; 2017).

The evidence from several studies, is now conclusive that this is at the heart of the persistence of mass poverty, high unemployment and non-inclusive growth across the continent of Africa in general, and Nigeria in particular (Ake, 1996; Meredith, 2006; El-Rufai, 2013; Mou, 2015; 2017). Hence, none of these nations in "Sub-Saharan Africa (were) not on track to redeem even a single one of the grand (MDG) promises", to quote Mr. Moon once again from his already cited statement above. In short, if appropriate policies and strategies are not quickly devised and implemented to address the compelling need for poverty reduction, job creation and inclusive growth, these sub-Saharan African Countries, including Nigeria, will suffer the same fate under the newly formulated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Hence, this paper attempts to address these issues by answering the following questions: What are the issues and challenges in the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of Poverty Reduction, Job Creation and inclusive growth policies and strategies? What strategies can be

devised to refocus and resolve these issues and address these challenges, and ensure efficient and effective poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth to take place in Nigeria? Is the main essence or purpose of all democratic governments, the world over, not to improve the welfare of their citizens by reducing poverty, creating more jobs and promoting inclusive growth? These are the questions that this paper attempts to address. In the process, it is necessary to discuss, even if only briefly, some of the conceptual and theoretical issues involved in poverty eradication, Job creation and inclusive growth.

#### **IV INTERNAL SECURITY, POVERTY ERADICATION, JOB CREATION AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH**

##### **(i) Internal Security and Scope of Inclusive Growth in Plural Societies**

It is important to investigate the various strategies available for the management of political conflicts challenging our internal security, arising from mass poverty and non-inclusive growth. The major focus in this regard, is on the management of political conflicts in the design and implementation of government policies, programmes and projects to prevent the creation of inequalities and non-inclusive growth that would create internal security problems in a society, be it at the Federal, State or Local Government levels. We believe, however, that this discussion will have some relevance to political conflict management that arise from inequalities and uneven development in the private sector as well. Four basic assumptions underlie these propositions.

First, we believe that public bureaucracies which are responsible for the design and implementation of government policies, programmes and projects are very crucial in an underdeveloped economy such as ours (Joseph, 1982; Lijphart, 1977; Young, 1977; 2012; Mou, 2014; 2015). This is particularly so given the extensive involvement of the government in the regulation and control of the economy and society. This being the case, it is necessary for us to see to their proper functioning and eventual success by devising necessary and appropriate strategies for them to successfully prevent and where they do arise, manage political conflicts that come with growing poverty and non-inclusive development, to guarantee our internal security.

Internal security is often times, used inter-changeably with the term National Security. It appears to mean different things to different people in different situations as well. However, the term “internal security” covers the whole spectrum of the individual’s concept, as providing safety and freedom from danger and anxiety, to that of sovereignty. This is the ability of a nation to protect its values from external or internal threats (Al-Mashat (ed.), 1985; Raskin, 1979 and Mou, 2016; 2017).

In a narrow context, it could also mean the citizen’s expectation of government to provide protection from violence in the form of civil wars, riots, insurrections and repression. They also look for protection from structural violence of exploitation, security of their jobs, protection of life and property. This concern for security apparently stems from the felt need for survival and unhindered development of a nation (Berkowitz and Cook (eds.), 1965; Horriender and Buel, 1984; and Mou, 2016). It is the desire to fulfil this expectation of the citizens that every Government; and indeed every Nation, including Nigeria, have gone to great lengths in their attempts to upgrade their security apparatuses.

Second, it seems that to be able to manage political conflicts successfully, our public bureaucracies would need some information about the sources, nature and dynamics of political conflicts (Mou, 2014, 2015). For these are likely to have some bearing on the various government policies and programmes as well as on their acceptability by the masses or target population.

Thirdly, in any society prevalent with social cleavages based on social classes, issues of cultural pluralism and gender, political conflict management becomes absolutely necessary, if the intentions of governments and the governed are to be realised. By social class conflicts here we mean those conflicts in the society that are based on economic inequalities. These conflicts relate to the differential opportunities and resources available to the rich and poverty stricken members of the society. Whereas conflicts based on cultural pluralism are those that have to do with ethnicity, religion, language, race, region and caste. Gender Conflicts, on the other hand, are rooted in the inequalities between men and women. The management of political conflicts is therefore nothing but sincere attempts to eliminate or at least reduce the manifestation of physical and non-physical overt and covert disagreements between social classes, cultural pluralist and gender groups (Parkin, 1981; Piven and Cloward, 1971; and Mou, 2014; 2015).

Fourthly, and lastly, public bureaucracies, especially public corporations, have recently come under intense criticisms for their lack of efficiency, low productivity, nepotism and sectionalism. But why this is so has not been seriously addressed within the discourse of political conflict management as of yet. Instead, it tends to be argued or even merely assumed that inefficiency, low productivity and other similar vices are inherent features of public sector bureaucracies (Bates, 1981; El-Rufai, 2013). We do not think this is necessary and always the case. Hence, in this paper, we seek to identify ways that may substantially improve the ability and capacity of our Federal, State and Local Governments bureaucracies in the management of political conflicts so as to be able to function more efficiently, productively and objectively.

**(a) Government Programmes and Managing Political Conflicts Arising from Inequalities, Mass Poverty and Non-Inclusive Growth**

There are quite a variety of ways of perceiving the government and its programmes. Each of these ways also have different implications for the conception of what governments are; who they should serve; who are their constituents and how their staff and political leaders are to be chosen and appointed from society. Each of these, in turn, affect differentially the perceptions of individuals, ethnic and gender groups as well as social classes of these government programmes and the officials in charge of them (Mou, 2014; Young, 2013).

Research has now established that the general public, unless when led to think otherwise, tends to perceive the government and governmental bureaucracies and institutions as some kind of “neutral agents” that operate for the “common good” of everyone in the society. It is also in the interest of any government or its agencies for the sake of peace and stability, to be so perceived by the public. The most sophisticated and articulate members of the public may even go further to suggest that sometimes, there are problems and government programmes no longer work for the common good of the society. But so long as even these are seen as exceptions and NOT the rule; there is also no such danger for governmental incumbents in terms of their legitimacy and political uprisings against the leaders (Dahl, 1981; Young, 2012).

Whether or not government programmes benefit certain ethnic or gender groups, classes or individuals is thus seen as a function of their participation in politics. Consequently, the losers blame themselves and political conflicts become thus minimized. Participation here is used to mean the ability of citizens or some collectivities of citizens to influence Government programmes in favour of what they stand for (Pateman, 1970; Mou, 2014). Sometimes, it may be the collection of valued items in society (such as roads, schools, hospitals, industries, etc.); or it may be some appointments into public offices.

There are some public policy analysts who would query the proceeding view of government and the common good assumption. For they see the above view as inadequate in

conceptualizing the complex issues of government programmes and the resultant political conflicts (Miliband, 1983; Ntalaja, 1982 and Joseph, 1983). It is claimed, for instance, that in a context where there are social cleavages based on ethnic, religious, regional, class, gender and even local state divisions; it is sometimes difficult for the government to adopt policies and programmes or make political appointments in such a way that they are in the overall interests of all the individuals and social cleavages in the society. In most cases, an ethnic group manages to hijack most policy benefits or dominate political appointments relative to their population and thus create substantial basis for political conflicts (Miliband, 1983; Ntalaja, 1982 and Joseph, 1983).

Thus, the base line is that any President, Government, Local Government Chairman of the Federal, State or Local government, would have, of necessity, to make conscious efforts - day in day out - to ensure the common good of the whole society and not just a particular ethnic group or class, as the case may be. Consequently, the dominating ethnic group or section thereof, begins to make the Federal State or Executive to limit the kinds of demands that the other ethnic groups or sections other than their own, can make on the Federal or State or any Chief Executive. Sometimes this is accomplished merely by the Chief Executive or the bureaucracy refusing to take these other demands seriously. The manner of political communication or language the Chief Executive and the top bureaucrats begin to employ helps to accomplish this as well. This is because it discourages the other ethnic groups or sections from coming near the Chief Executive or his/her staff (Mou, 2014; Hagher, 2002).

For the Chief Executive be they, the President, Governor or L.G.A. Chairman or any top—level bureaucrat, it is a very dangerous position to be cornered into. Once manipulated into such a position, to get out becomes exceedingly difficult. It means the perpetuation of conditions for political conflicts. The judicious and right thing for the Chief Executive or top bureaucrat is to resist these pressures from the start and make it clear to all groups. If not, it is a sure prescription for persistent political conflicts and agitations, the bi-product of which is policy immobility, official indecision, coercion of mass dissent, favouritism and sure capture by a highly manipulative ethnic group or other section of the society (Mou, 2016; 2017).

**(b) Strategies for Managing Political Conflicts Arising from Mass Poverty, Inequalities and Uneven Development**

How can the capture of government programme, the public bureaucracy or even the Chief Executive be he the President, Governor or L.G.A. Chairman, by a highly manipulative class or ethnic group or any other section of the society, be prevented and political conflicts prevented or at least minimised? There are a few ways of stopping undue influence by an ethnic group or any section of the society on the leadership and adopting public policies and programmes in the public interests.

The first is for the Chief Executive and top-bureaucracy to make concrete attempts to give equal opportunities to all the various ethnic groups or other social cleavages in the society to participate in governmental activities and be heard. But beyond that, the Chief Executive or his staff have to make deliberate attempts at equal representation (based strictly on population) of the various ethnic groups and sections of the society. This means reflecting this in all government programmes and political appointments.

The interesting thing is that democratic societies the world over, rely strictly on population (when they want to be fair and just) in representation and political appointments, unless where there is need to tackle historical injustices to a group or section of that society. Where this rule is avoided, of course, dissatisfaction pervades those government programmes and appointments. In which case, it can be regarded as a form of organised interest group representation in public policy-

making and implementation that tries to be fair and just to all the social cleavages in the civil society. We know this in Nigeria as “Federal Character” (Mou, 2015).

What this means, in effect, is that once an ethnic group or any section of the society begins to control the Chief Executive and state power; it also tries to dominate the state bureaucracy and its Secret Services as well. This is accomplished by pushing those from their religious or ethnic groups or any section of the society concerned, to take up key positions in the Civil Service and Intelligent Agencies or Units even within the Chief Executive's Office. This then becomes an insurance for the manipulative ethnic or religious group dominance and hegemony to be perpetuated (Mou, 2016; 2017).

Political deception and scapegoating are also old techniques in reducing political conflicts (Edelman, 1977; Mou, 1986). Basically, political deception involves that process whereby under privileged individuals, groups and social classes who are denied material advantages, social well-being, political power and status, are provided with psychological satisfaction. This is accomplished mainly through what Murray Edelman, in his book: *Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail*, regards as political language and symbolic uses of politics (Edelman, 1977). As for scapegoatism, it simply means constructing scapegoats to explain the failure of government programmes and therefore, displacing mass anger against the Government to other objects, individuals and groups (Mou, 1986). All of these strategies help to reduce political conflicts in government programmes. Most governments rely on all or a combination of these strategies.

In sum, we can say that in this section, we have analysed the circumstances under which, if not carefully checked, social cleavages arising from mass poverty and non-inclusive growth, could create internal security problems and therefore, undermine the good intentions of government and generate political conflicts. We showed how this can manifest itself either in the harvest of benefits from the Government or in political appointments by the Chief Executive be he or she the President, Head of State, Minister, Governor etc. as we said above. We also discussed the various strategies concerning how the Chief Executive can manage and control such pressures and prevent the emergence of hegemonic power or status of an ethnic or religious group, as well as any particular section of our society. We believe that if properly followed, political conflicts can be more properly managed by the governments in Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, thereby reducing internal security challenges that are on the increase all over the continent and not just in Nigeria.

(ii) Dynamics of Poverty, Job Creation and Poverty Eradication

Unlike in the past when poverty was just considered the inability of the household or individuals to have sufficient income; the definitions of poverty are steadily moving towards a human rights-based vision highlighting its underlying multitude of causes. The General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10th December, 1948 on Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25(1), which helped to popularize this approach stated, for instance:

*Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.*

This realization is what has led the UNDP to develop the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI). These efforts have opened up avenues for more holistic approaches to poverty analysis, poverty eradication and job creation strategies, as well as monitoring and evaluation, because they consider issues such as life expectancy, infant mortality and maternal mortality. These are subjects of research and M&E



involving data collection, collation, analysis and interpretation to create tools or instruments for an informed policy or law making, to solve the problems of poverty, high unemployment and bail out the masses in poverty out of its quagmire. **The Millennium Declaration** also recognizes the importance of the relationship between poverty eradication and human rights. It states:

*We will spare no efforts to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want (The Millennium Declaration, 2000).*

Human rights, poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth, are not matters only for the executive arm of Government. Sometimes, new legislation is required to make the policies and strategies of implementation more effective. In fact, these are issues which are legal in nature as well where the legislature should be found to excel. This is only possible when legislation also is backed up by research and proper M&E of the resultant policies. There is the need, for instance, to know the number of people in poverty, their gender, what type of work they do and where they reside. In particular, the challenges they face and the level of deprivations that are confronting them. It is equally an M&E issue when the poor are made to participate in the decisions that affect them with a view to setting up an appropriate strategy to solve the problems (Mou, 2016).

Coordination on the other hand, is required in that it is the best way to cause action and develop partnerships among Governments, Non-Governmental Organizations, the Organized Private Sector, Community and Faith-Based Organizations as well as the International Community, to pull resources together and eradicate all forms of extreme poverty and high unemployment in the world (Mou, 2016). It needs to be mentioned at this point, that in this paper, poverty eradication will be mostly used to refer to the desire and actions taken to eliminate all forms of extreme, subsistence and dehumanizing poverty which denies the individual in poverty of the ability to meet his basic needs for survival. The importance of M&E findings in poverty eradication policy formulation and law making towards addressing the causative factors of transitory and intergenerational poverty, cannot be over-emphasized. Transitory poverty is temporary, transient and short-term in nature; while intergenerational poverty is long-term, persistent poverty, the causes of which are structural.

There are those who postulate, correctly in our view, that the lack of access to opportunities must be the basis for defining poverty. Thus, they tend to define poverty as a condition of severe deprivation resulting from a lack of access to economic empowerment to acquire the fundamental necessities of life, including, food, clothing, shelter, basic education and healthcare (Kpakol, 2008). Thus, they argue that poverty is therefore, always and everywhere, the result of the inability of man to acquire the empowerment to overcome the challenges of his environment.

Beyond the deprivation and capability approaches to poverty, other scholars have examined it from the perspective of the entitlement mentality that is prevalent, especially in Nigerian Societies. The *Entitlement Mentality* of the people towards efforts of getting out of poverty line is also seen as the cause of transitory and chronic poverty. The mentality and belief of people that they are entitled to the success or wealth of relations affect their ability to work hard by engaging in economic activities that can get them out of poverty. As a result, these groups of people waste all their lives hoping that the wealth of relations should trickle down to them, which make their transitions out of poverty difficult (Mou, 2015).

Given the array of definitions and approaches to poverty, it is worthy to note here that poverty apart from being an economic issue, is also attributable to social and political conditions of the affected societies. Hence, we stated above that it is multi-dimensional.

In this paper, the point of concern, is mainly how to best coordinate, monitor and evaluate poverty reduction and job creation policies, programmes and related projects. This is because despite the varying conceptions and approaches to the issue of poverty, it is only proper coordination, monitoring and evaluation that will ensure the success of poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth policies and projects. It is also such efforts that will enable us to know whether or not we are making progress with respect to poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth, regardless of how we choose to define them. This is the bane of all Nigeria's previous efforts in tackling poverty and these other issues in Nigeria and even in Africa as a whole.

(iii) The Concepts of Inclusive Growth and Development

The concepts of growth and development, have been subjected to various definitions as well. Development is most of the time, equated with economic growth. As a matter of fact, public policy analysts and economists have long argued on the semantic distinction between the two closely related concepts – growth and development. Others insist that they should be distinguished for clarity purposes.

In his book, Making of an African Giant: State, Politics and Public Policy in Nigeria, Volumes one and two, Mou has pointed out that there is no such thing as “inclusive development”. The right terminology or concept, is “inclusive growth”. This is because “development” means “inclusive growth” by definition. Anytime “development” does not equate “inclusive growth” it must be qualified as “uneven development” (Mou, 2015). Thus, in the scholarly literature today, one hardly finds the concept of “inclusive development”. What a review of the literature on public policy and development economics reveal, is the concept of “inclusive growth.” Growth and development are certainly not the same. However, when “growth” is qualified as “inclusive growth”, it assumes the status of “development”.

This is because, as Mou showed in that book:

*Development is not synonymous with growth. Growth in this case is conceived simply as an almost totally economic process involving quantitative increases in indices like Income Per Capita, National Income and Gross National Product (Mou, 2015).*

Development, on the other hand, according to Mou, “refers to certain processes among which are increasing productivity, the equitable distribution of these gains among all social, cultural, economic, and geographical groups and classes, as well as the building of ‘appropriate’ political and social structures. In other words, development as viewed here, has economic, political, social and psychological dimensions” (Mou, 2015, p.220). Thus, the position is that if we understand development as a process of institutional change of a legal, political, social or economic nature; then a rate of development should not be stated in quantitative terms alone as a rate of growth.

Once this is granted, then it makes D. Seer's conceptualization of the term development particularly important. According to Seers in his book, The Meaning of Development,

*The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? What has been happening to poverty? If any of these three of the above become less severe, then beyond doubt, there has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be difficult to call the result development even if per capital income increases (Seers, 1979).*

Nigeria is, based on this understanding, then a classic example of this lack of development, as we shall see below.

Seers therefore, emphasizes changes in the social conditions resulting from economic growth as being central to development (Seers, 1971). Development indeed means growth plus change. In other words, while growth emphasizes quantitative increase, development emphasizes qualitative improvement resulting from the quantitative increase and this qualitative improvement or qualitative change encompasses political, economic and social dimensions of the society.

Finally, Atome Kunu also provides a very comprehensive and elaborate meaning of the concept of development. He explains chronologically that development must encompass:

- (i) A sustained increase in social aggregate economic indices as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), and Per Capital Income (PCI);
- (ii) The reflection of (i) above in the enhanced capacity, of the citizens to meet their vital daily needs while allowing for a comfortable margin to save for the rainy day;
- (iii) The reduction, if not the elimination of inequality, unemployment, poverty, diseases and ignorance;
- (iv) The diffusion of influence and guarantee of basic freedoms to participate fully in political, social and economic progress of the society; and
- (v) The assurance of a stable and peaceful political order essential for sustained productive activities and a guarantee of safety of lives and property (Kunu, 1987).

The above conception of development embraces also the economic, political and social values that a country strives at. This definition, accords well with the declared development objectives of Nigeria as spelt out by the Second National Development Plan of 1970-1974. The objectives included:

- (i) A limited, strong and self-reliant nation;
- (ii) A just and egalitarian society;
- (iii) A great and dynamic economy;
- (iv) A land full of bright opportunities for all citizens; and
- (v) A free and democratic society.

The extent to which the declared objectives of the Plan have been realised is a different question; but the objectives caught the essence of development as encompassing economic, social and political sectors of the society.

It is important to also consider directly the concept of “inclusive growth”, which is very central to good governance and democracy. The OECD Centre for Opportunity and Equality (COPE), defines inclusive growth thus:

*Inclusive Growth is economic growth that creates opportunities for all segments of the population and distributes the dividends of increased prosperity, both in monetary and non-monetary terms, fairly across society (OECD, 2015).*

The OECD approach to inclusive growth clearly sees it as multi-dimensional. For them, it goes beyond income and that the proceeds of economic growth must be shared. They argue persuasively that inclusive growth does provide “a golden opportunity to future growth on a socially sustainable footing” (OECD, 2015).

In their study on “Inclusive Growth: An Imperative for African Agriculture”, Kanu, Salami and Namasawa have defined it similar to the OCED as follows: “Inclusive growth refers to economic growth which results in a wider access to sustainable socioeconomic opportunities for the majority of people” (Kunu, Salami and Namasswa, 2015). Here, it is obvious that in a society where a few elites or dominant groups and classes benefit from the growth without the majority benefitting, it cannot be regarded as inclusive growth.

But as Joseph Felipe insists, it is not just partaking in the benefits of growth alone that is important in inclusive growth. The majority in the society must also have an opportunity in

participating and bringing such growth about for it to be regarded as inclusive growth. As he puts it: “Growth is inclusive when it allows all members of a society to participate in, and contribute to the growth process on an equal basis regardless of their individual circumstances” (Felipe, 2015). The 71% of Nigerians, therefore, have to be mobilised and empowered, if the philosophy in the present Administration in Nigeria includes inclusive growth! We believe that is what President Buhari meant when he declared during his Presidential Inauguration that: “I am for everybody and for no body” (Buhari, 2015).

There is no question that in any society where the ideals of inclusive growth are not just professed but practiced, such a society will be practicing good governance and democratic rule. It will also help reduce national security challenges greatly. This is because, as Mou pointed out in his other book titled: National Security, Good Governance and Democracy in Africa, there is a positive relationship between good governance (including inclusive growth), and national security (Mou, 2016). He puts it thus:

*National security and good governance are opposite sides of the same coin. As good governance improves, national security also improves, in that challenges to national security become lesser and lesser in such a society (Mou, 2016, p.342).*

Thus, Mou argues that most of the problems we are experiencing; whether they come as youth militancy, political conflicts, economic or social challenges to our national security-stem, mostly from our failure in the past, to practice inclusive growth over the years. This is indeed the greatest challenge today, not just in Nigeria, but all over Africa, and perhaps even the entire world.

The point is that, as Mou explains:

*We are now living witnesses to the collapse of despotic and unpopular regimes the world over, including those on the African continent. Subordinate groups, classes and other social cleavages hitherto very docile, have suddenly sprang up, with agitations for participation in the affairs of their nations and societies. There is clearly a ‘participation revolution’ going on throughout the world (Mou, 2016 P.345).*

Certainly, as the Government adopts and pursues the goal of inclusive growth, poverty reduction and full employment will become easier to achieve. These will in turn, also promote social, political and economic justice that will make it necessary and easier for peace and prosperity to exist in this Nation, Nigeria, and all over Africa as well.

(iv) Good Governance and Inclusive Growth

The approach one adopts to the understanding of these issues or challenges of poverty, high unemployment and lack of inclusive growth, tends to determine the nature of policy choices. Obviously, some approaches or strategies are better than others, hence their policy prescriptions are also more efficacious than others. What must first be noted is that every state or government policy is usually informed by one theory or perspective, whether openly acknowledged or not.

As Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson have powerfully articulated in their book, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, there are “theories that don’t work” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p.45). Simple! African Nations are poor today, because their policies and strategies were based on wrong theories, dictated mostly from abroad, especially by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Any national leader that allows such theories and adopts policies and strategies based on them, will make his nation to be poor, have high unemployment, bad governance, human rights violations, high debt burdens, and all the other challenges that African leaders are now facing. They will also never develop or prosper. It is not an issue of race, colour or even geographical location (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

China and India, the fastest growing economies in the world, never took advice from the World Bank and the IMF. Neither did the “Asian Tigers”. African, Latin American and Caribbean Countries that took advice from these organizations are worst off today. This should be a cause for reflection. Everyone now regrets that the best strategies and policies that were imbedded in the **Lagos Plan of Action**, were unfortunately, jettisoned for the World Bank and IMF prescriptions, that have now proved a colossal failure all over Africa and beyond.

If a nation or continent is always forced by others or the so called international “donor” or “development” agencies or institutions, to follow certain kinds of theories and their policy prescriptions, they will of course, remain with these challenges for long. The challenges may even increase over time, as it is happening in Nigeria (Mou, 1989). This has been the lot of the African continent, its leaders, and its people. Mou offers possible ways out of the quagmire in his recent book: *Making of an African Giant: State, Politics and Public Policy in Nigeria*, Volumes 1 & 2 (2015). Here, only a mere sketch can be made.

Until the theories themselves and therefore, the policy prescriptions are changed, the situation in Africa, Nigeria inclusive, and that of her people will never change. Period. There are no two ways about it. It is not an issue of lack of technology or capital, as important as these may seem to the uninitiated in the “politics of underdevelopment and the development of underdevelopment”. It is purely an issue of politics and political economy. Solve this first, and the other problems of technology, capital, extension services and similar technical issues, will definitely take care of themselves or be made to do so without further delay (Mou, 2015).

If it were an issue of capital, Nigeria for instance, with all her billions of dollars from oil daily over the years, would never have been suffering the same challenges with the other resource starved smaller African nations now. Surprisingly, most African countries are rich in key minerals and other relevant natural resources. So their current common challenges come from elsewhere – politics and political economics. Acemoglu and Robinson, make this point quite cogently when they state:

*Because there is no such consensus (on theories and policies), what rules society ends up with are determined by politics: who has power and how this power can be exercised... that's why our theory is about not just economics but also politics. It is about the effects of institutions on the success and failure of Nations – thus the economics of poverty and prosperity; it is also about how institutions are determined and change over time; and how they fail to change even when they create poverty and misery for millions – thus the politics of poverty and prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p.45).*

Commenting specifically on the situation in the continent of Africa, they stated quite pungently:

*The bottom of the world income distribution paints as sharp and distinctive a picture as the top. If you instead make a list of the poorest thirty countries in the world today, you will find almost all of them in sub-Saharan Africa. They are joined by countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Nepal, which, though not in Africa, all share something critical with African nations, as we explain (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p.45).*

One does not need to be a “Political Prophet” to predict that the African continent, including of course Nigeria, will witness worst civil disobedience, violence, Boko Haram type revolts, militancy, breakdown of law and order, more kidnapping, more of their citizens trying to “check out” of their countries or even continent to other parts of the world in the future; if they fail to address successfully the present challenges confronting them. Thus, uninhibited and politically

unconstrained discussion of these issues, is not just useful in academic and policy sense. It is also a sign of patriotism.

In that sense, African Governments and their advisers, should welcome frank analysis of these issues and proposing of practical solutions that will help to address these problems as well. These issues are unquestionably and increasingly creating legitimation crisis for African leaders, African Governments and even African states. It is also creating lack of trust, cynicism and resentment even against the African dominant classes or the top business classes. We are referring here to what Marxist analysts refer to as the “local bourgeoisie.” (Ntalaja, 1972; Frank, 1972).

It is sometimes easily forgotten, that leaders need legitimacy and trust from citizens for the stable social order to continue. This is because prevailing political science and public policy research paradigms and political practice in post-colonial societies, have given the mistaken impression that good governance and democratic politics are only about, as David Easton puts it, the “authoritative allocation of values.” (Easton, 1979). The evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case. Pertinent to good governance and democratic politics or even military rule, which still exists in some African countries, is also the issue of the legitimization of the extant social order. This includes the viability and sustainability of the state and the existing political structures (Edelman, 1973; 1984; Mou, 1986; 2014).

That the legitimization aspects of politics, defined according to Harold Laswell, as “who gets what, when and how,” (Laswell, 1963) have not received much attention in political science and public policy analysis literature, is no testimony to the fact that they are not important. In fact, without due attention paid to the legitimization aspects of politics and public policies, political systems and states or governments, especially democratic ones, would not survive. As Murray Edelman states it correctly:

*Political systems allocate values, and they also legitimize themselves. The two functions can be independent of each other because governmental value allocations are always markedly unequal, requiring that the great majority, who get the least of whatever is valued, receive psychological attention, promises and reassurances which, together with some coercion, maintain their loyalty, docility, and services (Edelman, 1974, p.80).*

Whether one is concerned with value allocations or political system legitimization; how challenges of good governance, poverty, unemployment, human rights and insecurity, are dealt with to ensure the survival of the political system and the nation-state become very important. It is therefore, necessary that we examine these growing challenges to our leaders and Governments frankly, dispassionately and unemotionally.

The concept of ‘good governance’ is equally contentious. It is both a juridical, ideological and public policy concept (Mou, 2017). From the juridical or legal perspective, good governance can be defined as governing in accordance with the rule of law and providing the public good for the general public by the leaders in a given society; or by the government or the State in accordance with their rights and entitlements (Mou, 2017).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 (1) as adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of December, 1948, defines good governance from this legal or juridical perspective. According to the United Nations Declaration just cited about, citizens of every nation and indeed all human beings have basic needs and human rights. From this perspective, once the leader or government or the State caters well for these basic needs and protects these human rights; then there is good governance in that society.

As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 (1) 10<sup>th</sup> December, 1948 states it:

*Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (1948).*

The basic needs of man and the protection of economic rights, are therefore the basis, under this definition, for determining whether there is good governance in a given society or not. Most African countries, including Nigeria, do not have these economic rights stated in their Constitutions under the juridical sections where they can be held accountable. As we can see, in the case of Nigeria, they are only stated as “Directive Principles of State Policy”. Thus, no citizen can have the legal basis to sue regarding what the particular Economic Rights he is insisting upon.

The naturalist conception understands law and human rights as handed down by providence or human reason. Thus, writing within the naturalist viewpoint, Canston defines human rights to be “something of which no one may be deprived of without a great affront to justice. These are certain deeds which should never be done, certain freedoms which should never be invaded, some things which are supremely sacred” (Canston Quoted in Osita Eze, 1984, P. 155). This conception, however, can be seen as largely idealistic. It also does not recognize the variations of human rights practices across cultures and societies. We know as of fact that “justice” as a value may vary from society to society and that the law does not often recognize what ought to be. Rule of law meaning simply operating under the existing laws.

It is partly these limitations with the naturalistic view of good governance and human rights that gave birth to the “positivists” type definitions. Within this realm, Osita Eze has maintained correctly that: “human rights represent demands or claims which individuals or groups make on society, some of which are protected by law and have become part of *ex lata* while others remain aspirations to be attained in future. In strict legal terminology, only a right recognized and protected by the legal system can be considered as right” (Osita Eze, 1984).

The question of legal recognition of human rights is very important. This is because no right can be presumed to exist which is not recognized within the legal infrastructures of that particular society. Hence, it is meaningless for one to claim a right when others do not agree that such an individual does in fact have such a legitimate claim. Human rights are therefore, those claims which the prevailing legal infrastructures of a given society do allow individuals, groups or organizations to enjoy.

In our specific society, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has clearly outlined those Fundamental Human Rights to which we are entitled. Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for instance, recognises the following fundamental human rights for Nigerians; even though the economic rights are not recognized. They are only listed as Directive Principles of State Policy. The rights recognized are as follow:-

*Right to life;*

*Right to dignity of human person;*

*Right to personal liberty ;*

*Right to fair hearing;*

*Right to private and family life;*

*Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;*

*Right to freedom of expression and the press;*

*Right to freedom of assembly and association;*

*Right to freedom of movement; and  
Right to freedom from discrimination.*

In addition to the Constitution, Nigeria is also a member of international organizations, such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To the extent that Nigeria is a subscriber to the Charter of such organizations; it becomes obligatory on Nigeria to abide by them as well. Consequently, by the dint of her membership of and signatory to the UNO and AU Charters on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nigeria automatically has to accept the provisions of human rights as provided therein. In the light of this, any government in Nigeria is supposed to shoulder the responsibility of protecting such rights as enunciated by these international organizations. It is in this context that the poor and unemployed people in Nigeria have a case, which must be carefully addressed.

In his book on Africa, titled *Ideology and Development in Africa*, Crawford Young has argued, that there are no universal standards for measuring good governance, even though there may be some for measuring development. He argues that the ideology of nations, especially in Africa, affects what they consider as ingredients for good governance. Good governance in Africa should therefore, be seen in moral or ideological terms (Young, 1986).

Incidentally, Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, also agrees that economic rights in Africa are to be considered as a moral, rather than juridical matters. As he puts it in his message to the 2006 International Day for the Eradication of Poverty:

*The campaign to make poverty history, a central moral challenge of our age, cannot remain a task for the few, it must become a calling for the many. On this International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, I urge everyone to join this struggle. Together, we can make real and sufficient progress towards the end of poverty (Annan, 2006, p.7)*

From a public policy perspective, it is usually possible to come out with indices to measure good governance. These indices are then used to judge leaders and governments. From this point of view, two methods are usually adopted. First, the relevant legal documents, policy statements by the leaders or Governments and party manifestos are used to develop criteria for good governance (Mou, 2017). Second, analysts can also come up with their own, deductively, based on their review of the literature on good governance (Mou, 2017).

Whatever the approach, it is clear that issues such as eradication of poverty, satisfaction of basic needs, provision of employments, free press, protection of human rights, provision of basic infrastructures, creation of conducive environment for economic activities, rule of law and laws on social development and so forth, are usually included (Mou, 2017). Also, income indicators, levels of unemployment, gender issues, and youth development tend to be included. The tendency usually is to include on the list general economic indicators such as income per capita, gross domestic product, capital utilization and foreign exchange stability (Mou, 2017).

Since national security is very important, law and order, security of lives and property and freedom from external aggression etc. are also usually included. Thus, we can say that indices of good governance must have political, economic, social, institutional, security, rule of law, and international dimensions (Mou, 2017).

To the extent that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policies, there is always the need to include a foreign dimension in the assessment of good governance. It is indeed a combination of some of these indices of good governance, using both the juridical, moral and policy analysis criteria, that are applied to judge governments and leaders (Mou, 2017).



What follows below is a list of recommendations for consideration for policy formulation and implementation. These recommendations stem directly from the analysis and discussion in this policy paper. A conclusion is then made at the end.

## **V POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

(i) The concern for poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth is a global phenomenon. At the recent (September 2017) meeting of the United Nations, General Assembly (UNGA72), for instance, these same issues were again discussed under the theme: “Focusing on People: Striving for Peace and a Decent Life for All on a sustainable planet. As noted already, countries in Africa, including Nigeria, have not done very well in these areas. Tables 1 to 13 below proof this beyond doubt. There is therefore, the need to intensify efforts at all levels of Government and within the Private Sector on these matters. This requires a national Agency or Commission to coordinate, monitor and evaluate such massive efforts across the country. Infact, one can say, with all sincerity, that it demands even a full scale Ministry. We therefore, recommend the creation of a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion in Nigeria, without any further delay. The Commission or Agency to be also created with then be a parastatal under this Federal Ministry, when established.

(ii) Subordinate groups, classes and other social cleavages hitherto very docile, have suddenly sprang up, with agitations for participation in the affairs of their nations and societies. There is clearly a “participation revolution” going on throughout the world. These agitations are mostly for poverty reduction, job creation, and inclusive growth. If avenues are not created by the Nigerian Government to allow them opportunities to participate in the developmental process, it could be grounds for political, social and economic instability that will further threaten our national security situation and development.

(iii) There is need for the Federal Government to create a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion in Nigeria. In addition, a National Poverty Eradication Commission (NAPEC) could also be established to replace the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) that was scrapped last year as a parastatal under this Federal Ministry. This had indeed been recommended already by the Stephen Orasanye Committee. With 71% (seventy-one per cent) of the population of Nigeria in poverty and unemployment, such a Ministry and Commission are not just desirable, but even imperatives. This Ministry could then be tasked to handle matters relating to NATIONAL EMPOWERMENT AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH as were. South Africa and others in Africa, have similar institutions already. This Agency or Commission will become a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion recommended for creation in (i) above.

(iv) There is need to promote Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of Poverty Eradication, Job Creation and Inclusive Growth efforts at all levels of Government in Nigeria. There is therefore, the great need for Nigeria to follow the example of South Africa, and other nations to establish a Ministry of Monitoring and Evaluation. It should be part of its responsibility to keep a keen eye on how Nigeria is doing. Without accurate data and analysis, the Government and other stakeholders may not be able to know how well or otherwise Nigeria is doing in these and other areas.

(v) It is regrettable that up till date, Nigeria has no National Policy on Poverty Eradication, Job Creation and Inclusive Growth. While serving as the Secretary of NAPEP, Dan Mou had volunteered and produced a draft of such a National Policy. He presented it to his colleagues and it was well received. However, with his posting out of NAPEP shortly after that and the subsequent scrapping of NAPEP, nothing has been done in that regard. There is need for the Government to take immediate action on this matter. However, when the Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion is created, if accepted, they shall take on this responsibility as well. The Commission or Agency as a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion as we have recommended above.

(vi) The Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social inclusion as well as the Poverty National Poverty Eradication Agency or Commission, when created, should be mandated to take over the Staff, Assets and Liabilities of the scrapped National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). That way, there will be no need to worsen the unemployment situation in the country by sacking any of the NAPEP staff. It will also not cost the Government much to set up the Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social inclusion in that NAPEP already had furnished offices, vehicles and other assets across the Nation that the Ministry and Agency will simply takeover. They will also be given, the mandate to administer part of the N500B already approved in the 2017 Budget in Nigeria. This Federal Ministry will eradicate poverty, create jobs and promote social inclusion, this reducing the number of illegal migration by Nigerian Youths to Europe and other places, where they are now being maltreated in Libya and sold as slaves.

## **VI CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, we can say that no one is in doubt that the “participation revolution” going on in the world has engulfed the Nigerian society as well. Social cleavages based on groups and social classes that had been docile, are now becoming very active or even violent and militant. They are also asking not just for the form of democracy, but also for its substance. The demands for the dividends of democracy, as part of the concerns for poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth, are getting louder and louder. The Federal Government of Nigeria and the entire Nation can no longer afford to ignore them anymore.

The conclusion from the foregoing analysis is that the economic, political and social problems challenging national security and the social order in Nigeria, would get better or worse, depending on what happens to poverty eradication, job creation and inclusive growth. As we said above, one does not need to be a “political prophet” to predict that if these challenges are not successfully addressed, the country will be faced with severe crises. Hence, my suggestion that a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion as well as a parastatal to be known as a National Poverty Eradication Agency or Commission be created to help manage and carter directly for the needs of the 71% of the population of Nigeria still living below the poverty line.

It is a terrible mistake to assume, as some have wrongly done, that as the infrastructure improves and the economy grows, the benefits will finally “trickle down” to this group which is 71% of the population of Nigeria. As the data and analysis we have presented below show, this does not and cannot happen in any society where the “poverty membrane” is too thick. In Nigeria, this “poverty membrane” is 71% on the total population as of today. Therefore, the “trickle down” effect cannot occur and will not occur as the records in Nigeria over the past two decades have shown. These records are shown in the Tables below.

Economic growth indices, such as Income Per Capita (IPC), Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross National Income (GNI), were going up. Yet, rather than the effects trickling down to the

poor, unemployed, and excluded from growth segment of the society, their conditions were becoming worst in the same era when Nigeria was celebrating rapid economic growth. As we showed above and presented data to fully substantiate our argument, below, the poverty level, unemployment levels and inequalities were all going up equally rapidly. This created a class of 71% of Nigerians excluded from the growth and consigned to live below poverty line.

Naturally, the internal security situation worsened in the country! The 71% of Nigerians deserve an allocation and a Federal Ministry and an Agency or Commission to handle their case directly, rather than wasting everybody's time talking of "trickle down effects" as the World Bank and IMF apologists, who helped to create these problems for Nigeria and Africa in the first place, are doing all over the country. The Federal Ministry and the Agency or Commission can then be mandated to administer a part of the N500B President Buhari had already provided in the 2017 Budget. They will also take over the staff, assets and liabilities of the scrapped National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). That way, it will not cost the Federal Government much money to set them up, anyway.

As we have said above, it is possible to foresee a situation where, as the security, economic, political and social crises intensify, the Nigerian Government, even if it is simply for its self-preservation, will be forced by the objective conditions, to move against the interests of the dominant groups and classes that have captured and hijacked the economic, political and social power for their exclusive use. This group of Nigerians, unfortunately, are not eager to promote inclusive growth; nor even poverty eradication and job creation on a serious note. Yet, only the creation of the Federal Ministry and the Agency or Commission as we have recommended here, will serve as safety valves, for more severe economic, political, social and security challenges to our Nation. Otherwise, once these pressures become unbearable for the Federal Government, there will be significant policy changes to cater for the welfare and well-being of the majority 71% of Nigerians, including promoting inclusive growth, poverty eradication and massive job creation. It is only then that Nigeria can realistically be restored to the possibility of realizing her manifest destiny of becoming the African Giant, as we Nigerians are hoping.

### Appendix

**Table 1.1: National Poverty Trends by Year and Form of Government**

Year	Poverty Incidence %	Est. Pop (Million)	Pop. In Poverty (Million)	Form of Government
1980	28.1	65	17.7	Military
1985	46.3	75	34.7	Military
1992	42.7	91.5	39.2	Democracy
1996	65.6	102.3	67.1	Democracy
1999	70.0	160	112	Democracy
2004	54.4	165	89.7	Democracy
2012	50	175	87.5	Democracy

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

**Table 1.2: Trends in Poverty Level by Zones (1996-2004)**

	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004
South-South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1
South-East	12.9	30.4	41	53.5	26.7
South-West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43
North-Central	32.2	50.8	46	64.7	67
North-East	35.6	54.9	54	70.1	72.2
North-West	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.2	71.1
National	27.2	46.3	42.7	65.6	54.4

Source: National Planning Commission (NPC, 2006) Economic Performance Review: Abuja.

**Table 1.3: Poverty Rates by State**

Rank	STATES	1996	2004	Rank	STATES	1996	2004
1	Jigawa	71.0	95.1	20	Kaduna	67.7	50.2
2	Kebbi	83.6	89.7	21	Delta	56.1	45.4
3	Kogi	75.5	88.6	22	Ebonyi	51.0	43.3
4	Bauchi	83.5	86.3	23	FCT	53.0	43.3
5	Kwara	75.5	85.2	24	Ekiti	71.6	42.3
6	Yobe	66.9	83.3	25	Ondo	71.6	42.1
7	Zamfara	83.9	80.9	26	Cross River	66.9	41.6
8	Gombe	83.5	77.0	27	Akwa Ibom	66.9	34.8
9	Sokoto	83.9	76.8	28	Edo	56.1	33.1
10	Adamawa	65.5	71.7	29	Osun	58.7	32.4
11	Kaduna	77.7	71.1	30	Ogun	69.9	31.7
12	Niger	52.2	63.9	31	Enugu	51.0	31.1
13	Lagos	53.0	63.9	32	Rivers	44.3	29.1
14	Taraba	65.3	62.2	33	Imo	56.2	27.4
15	Nasarawa	62.7	61.6	34	Oyo	58.7	24.1
16	Kano	71.0	61.3	35	Abia	56.2	22.3
17	Plateau	62.7	60.4	36	Anambra	51.0	20.1
18	Benue	64.2	53.6	37	Bayelsa	44.3	20.0
19	Borno	66.9	53.6		All Nigeria	65.6	54.4

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

**Table 1.4: Changes in Poverty Rates by State**

Rank	STATES	Decline (%)	Rank	STATES	Decline (%)
1	Ogun	-38.2	20	Benue	-8.9
2	Oyo	-34.6	21	Ebonyi	-7.7
3	Abia	-33.9	22	Sokoto	-7.1
4	Akwa Ibom	-32.1	23	Katsina	-6.6
5	Anambra	-30.9	24	Gombe	-6.5
6	Ondo	-29.5	25	Taraba	-3.4
7	Ekiti	-28.3	26	Zamfara	-3.0
8	Imo	-28.8	27	Plateau	-2.3
9	Ogun	-26.4	28	Nasarawa	-1.1
10	Cross River	-25.3	29	Bauchi	2.8
11	Bayelsa	-24.3	30	Kebbi	6.1
12	Edo	-23.0	31	Adamawa	6.2
13	Enugu	-19.9	32	Kwara	9.7
14	Kaduna	-17.6	33	Lagos	10.6
15	Rivers	-16.2	34	Niger	11.7
16	Borno	-13.3	35	Kogi	13.1
17	Delta	-10.8	36	Yobe	16.4
18	Kano	-9.7	37	Jigawa	24.1
19	FCT	-9.7		All Nigeria	-11.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

**Table 1.5: Contribution by Sector and Zone to National Poverty**

Zone	Incidence	Contribution
Urban	43.2	35.0
Rural	63.3	65.0
South South	35.1	9.7
South East	26.7	5.6
South West	43.0	15.5
North Central	67.0	17.7
North East	72.2	17.7
North West	71.2	33.6

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

**Table 1.6: Contribution by Zone to National Poverty**

Zone	Incidence	Popu-lation	Contri- bution	Excess Contri- bution
South South	35.1	15.0	9.7	-5.3
South East	26.7	11.7	5.6	-5.8
South West	43.0	19.7	15.5	-4.2
North Central	67.0	14.5	17.7	3.2
North East	72.2	13.6	17.7	4.1
North West	71.2	25.6	33.6	8.0

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

**Table 1.7: GDP: Shape and Real Growth Rates**

	Share	2005	2006	2007
Agriculture (%)	42.2	7.1	7.4	7.7
Solid Mineral (%)	0.3	3.5	10.3	10.5
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas (%)	19.4	0.5	-4.5	-5.6
Manufacturing (%)	4.1	3.6	3.4	9.9
Telecommunication & Post (%)	2.3	29.6	33.7	33.8
Finance & Insurance (%)	3.8	2.9	5.0	4.8
Wholesale and Retail Trade (%)	16.2	13.5	15.3	15.5
Building and Construction (%)	1.7	12.1	13.0	12.6
Others (%)	10.0	7.5	7.2	7.1

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

**Table 1.8 GDP Growth and Unemployment Trends in Nigeria 2007-2012 (Percent)**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GDP Growth Trends	7.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	7.4	6.3
Unemployment Trends	12.7	14.9	19.7	21.1	23.9	27.4

Source: The Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda 2011-2013.

**Table 1.9: GDP Growth and Unemployment**

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
7.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	7.4	6.3	7.2
12.7	14.9	19.7	21.1	23.9	27.4	Not yet Available

Source: The Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (2013), PP. 72 and 76.

**Table 1.10: Socio-Economic Indicators for Nigeria**

Social Indicators	
Population – 2006	140 million
Life expectancy at birth (1970-1975) in years	42.8
Life expectancy at birth (2000-2005) in years	43.3
Infant mortality per 1000 live births (1970)	140
Infant mortality per 1000 live births (2004)	101
Under 5 Mortality rate (1970)	265
Under 5 Mortality rate (2004)	197
Probability of Birth surviving to age 65 (Female)%	33.2

Probability of Birth surviving to age 65 (Male)%	31.6
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

Table 1.11: Nigerian States Population, 2006

S/No	States	Zone	Population	S/No	States	Zone	Population
1	Kano	NW	9,383,882	20	Kogi	NC	3,278,487
2	Lagos	SW	9,013,534	21	Zamfara	NW	3,259,848
3	Kaduna	NW	6,088,582	22	Enugu	SE	3,257,298
4	Katsina	NW	5,792,578	23	Kebbi	NW	3,238,628
5	Oyo	SW	5,591,589	24	Edo	SS	3,218,332
6	Rivers	SS	6,185,400	25	Plateau	NC	3,178,712
7	Bauchi	NE	4,676,485	26	Adamawa	NE	3,188,101
8	Jigawa	NW	4,348,849	27	Cross River	SS	2,888,966
9	Benue	NC	4,219,244	28	Abia	SE	2,833,999
10	Anambra	SE	4,182,032	29	Ekiti	SW	2,384,212
11	Borno	NE	4,151,193	30	Kwara	NC	2,371,089
12	Delta	SS	4,098,391	31	Gombe	NE	2,353,879
13	Niger	NC	3,950,249	32	Yobe	NE	2,321,691
14	Imo	SE	3,934,699	33	Taraba	NE	2,300,738
15	Akwa Ibom	SS	3,920,208	34	Ebonyi	SE	2,173,501
16	Ogun	SW	3,728,088	35	Nasarawa	NC	1,883,275
17	Sokoto	NW	3,698,999	36	Bayelsa	SS	1,703,358
18	Ondo	SW	3,441,024	37	FCT	NC	1,405,201
19	Osun	SW	3,423,535		Total Nigeria		140,003,542

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

Table 1.12: Performance on Millennium Development Goals Status at a Glance

Status at a Glance					
GOAL	1990	2000	2007	Target 2015	Progress Towards Target
<b>1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger</b>					
Absolute PPI (US\$/day)%				21.4	Slow
Relative (%)	42.7	66	54.4	21.4	Slow
-Population (million)	91.5	91.5	140.0		Slow
-Population under poverty (m)	39.07	39.07	67.11		Slow
Percentage of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption.	13	13		5.2	Good
Percentage of underweight under-5 children.	35.7	31	25	18	Slow
<b>1. Achieve Universal Education</b>					
Net enrolment ratio in primary education	68	95	89.6	100	Good
Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5	67	97	74	100	Good
Primary six completion rate	58	76.7	67.5	100	Good
Literacy rate of 15-24 years old	70.7	64.1	81.4	100	Good
<b>1. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women</b>					
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education (girls per 100 boys)	76	78	93.6	100	Good
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education (girls per 100 boys)	75	81	97.6	100	Good
Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education (girls per 100 boys)	46	66		100	Good
Share of women in wage employment in the non-agriculture sector	66.3	79		100	Lack of data

Seats of women in national parliament	1.0	3.1	7.7	30	Slow
<b>1. Reduce Child Mortality</b>					
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	91	81.38	110	30.3	Worsening
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	191	183.75	201	63.7	Worsening
Percentage of one-year olds fully immunized against measles	46	32.8	60	100	Good
<b>1. Improve Maternal Health</b>					
Maternal mortality ratio		704 <sup>a</sup>	800 <sup>c</sup>	100	Worsening
Births attended to by skilled health personnel	45	42 <sup>a</sup>	36.3 <sup>c</sup>		Slow
<b>1. Combat HIV &amp; AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases</b>					
HIV prevalence among pregnant young women aged 15 to 24		5.4 <sup>a</sup>	4.3 <sup>e</sup>		Slow
Young people aged 15-24 who both correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV and who reject the major misconceptions about HIV transmission			25.9 <sup>e</sup>	100	Slow
Young people aged 15-24 reporting the use of a condom during sexual intercourse with non-regular sexual partner				100	Slow (lack of data)
Children orphaned by HIV & AIDS			1.97 <sup>e</sup>		Lack of data
Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria					Slow (Lack of data)
Prevalence and data rates associated with tuberculosis					Slow (Lack of data)
<b>1. Ensure Environmental Sustainability</b>					
Land area covered by forest		14.6	12.6	20	Worsening
Gas fared	68	53	34	0	Slow
Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per US\$1 GDP (PPP)			1.5		Slow (lack of data)
Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita)		4799	2500 <sup>e</sup>		Improving
Total population with access to safe drinking water (%)	54	54	49.1	100	Worsening
Total population with access to basic sanitation (%)	39	42.9	42.9	100	Worsening
People with access to secure tenure (%)		38.4	61.2	100	Improving
Residential housing construction index (ACI) (proxy)		53	31 <sup>d</sup>		Worsening
<b>1. Develop a Global Partnership for Development</b>					
Per capita official development assistance to Nigeria (in US\$)	3.0	1.47	81.67		Improving
Debt services as a percentage of exports of goods and services		9	1.2		Good
Private Sector Investment (US\$ million)	50	75	8100		Improving

Tele-density (per 1000 people)	0.45	0.73	27.41		Good
Personal computers (per 1000 people)		6.38	6.74		Lack of data
Internet access (%)	0.1	0.1	1.9		Slow

Source: Office of the SSA to Mr. President on the MDGs

Table 1.13: Global Poverty Facts

- **Nearly 3 billion people live on less than \$2 a day.**
- **Over 1.1 billion people live on less than \$1 a day.**
- **Poverty does not affect every region of the world equally.**
- **Sub Saharan Africa is very significantly devastated by poverty compared to the rest of the world.**
- **In Sub Saharan Africa around 50% of the people live on less than \$1 a day.**
- **In South East Asia 37% of the people live on less than \$1 a day.**
- **In East Asia about 17% of the people live on less than \$1 a day.**
- **In Latin America only about 14% live on less than \$1 a day.**
- **In the Middle East and North Africa only 2% of the people live on less than \$1 a day**

Source: Wikipedia Encyclopedia.

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