

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND NATION BUILDING-PREVENTING NIGERIA FROM BECOMING A “FAILED STATE”

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ABSTRACT

Whether one is concerned with value allocations or political system legitimation, how effective and efficient national security, good governance and nation building are carried out in any society, have serious implications for the policing and stability of that society. It also determines the extent of the peace, security and sustainable development such a nation will experience. The failure to appreciate and handle these issues effectively, has created several problems for many nations in the world today and is still doing so. Some have already become “failed States”. As a consequence, a few additional Nations are already in the process of also becoming “failed States”, including Nigeria. By “failed States”, we mean States whose political, economic, social and security systems have collapsed or become so weak that their governments are no longer in control. The paper consequently suggests policy options or recommendations for the government attention, consideration and implementation. We believe strongly that when accepted and implemented, things will start to get better in Nigeria and the possibility of her becoming a totally “failed State” prevented. It is only then that Nigeria will be restored to her manifest destiny of becoming truly the Giant of Africa, which most Nigerians and non-Nigerians expect the Nation to be.

Key Words: *National Security Architectures, Good Governance, Nation Building, Nigeria, “Failed State”, Segmentary National Security System, Co-ordinated National Security System, Integrated National Security System; Herdsmen/Farmers Crises, Boko Haram, Jihad, Benue State.*

I INTRODUCTION

Whether one is concerned with value allocations or political system legitimation, how effective and efficient national security, good governance and nation building are carried out in any society, have serious implications for the policing and stability of that society. It also determines the extent of the peace, security and sustainable development such a nation will experience. The failure to appreciate and handle these issues effectively has created several problems for many nations in the world today and is still doing so. Some have already become “failed States”.

As a consequence, a few additional Nations are already in the process of also becoming “failed States”, including Nigeria. By “failed States”, we mean States whose political, economic, social and security systems have collapsed or become so weak that their governments are no longer in control. As **Wikipedia Encyclopedia** (2017) puts it, a “failed State is a political body that has disintegrated to a point the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly”.

We are now living witnesses to the collapse of despotic and unpopular regimes the world over, including those on the African continent. Subordinate groups, classes and other social cleavages have sprang up with agitations for participation in the affairs of their nations and societies (Mou, 2016, 2017). This has, no doubt, confirmed Almond and Verba's declaration that: "If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world; it is what might be called the participation revolution" (Almond and Verba, 1963, p.17).

There is no doubting the fact that this "participation revolution", has engulfed African societies, including Nigeria as well (Ake, 1996; Meredith, 2006; Mou, 2016, 2017). What still remains in doubt, and this paper hopes to clarify, is the particular forms this "participation revolution" has assumed within the different African societies". Particularly limited, it seems, is our knowledge of how this "participation revolution" has come to affect and is affecting national security, good governance and nation building in African nations. Besides, these developments have brought about severe political and socio-economic consequences as well as security challenges to these African nations, governments and their citizens that need to be properly investigated. Here, we examine in particular, the Nigerian situation. There are now great signs and anxieties at home and abroad, that if due care is not taken, Nigeria too may soon become a "failed State".

What has been the impact of the quest for democratization and mass participation; or as Almond and Verba put it, the "participation revolution" on national security, good governance and nation building in Nigeria? What other consequences and security challenges have arisen within Nigeria with respect to the different social cleavages and citizens? By social cleavages here, we mean those divisions in the Nigerian society that are based on ethnicity, classes, region, religion, gender, language, race and even caste (Parkins, 1971; Mou, 2015). Is Nigeria too in the process of joining the league of nations who have become "failed State". What lessons can African nations learn from the Nigerian experience? What are the policy recommendations that can be put up and implemented to address all of these issues and prevent Nigeria from becoming a "failed State"? These are the questions that this paper attempts to answer.

More specifically on the Nigerian situation, we propose to demonstrate that national security and good governance under a democratic setting, are opposite sides of the same coin. As good governance under a democratic setting goes up or improves, national security also goes up in that challenges to national security become lesser and lesser in such a society. Whenever the other side suffers, the opposite side is inevitably bound to suffer as well (Mou, 2016, 2017). Managing the State apparatus to bring about good governance, nation building and development, or exercising political power, becomes always striking a favourable balance between the imperatives of national security and good governance in a democratic social order. In all societies, when national security and good governance go up, these are favourable conditions for nation building and policing. However, when the reverse is the case, it also affects negatively nation building and policing as well.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND NATION BUILDING: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

It is certainly not our intention to bore you the reader, with too much theoretical issues surrounding the question of national security, good governance and nation building in Nigeria. However, some of the theoretical debate is absolutely necessary for a clear conceptualization and understanding of the issues at stake. Their brief discussion, therefore, will ensure that we are all on the same page as you read this paper.

(i) Scope of National Security and Varieties of National Security Systems (VNSS) or Architectures

A traditional definition of the State, often attributed to Max Weber, requires as a necessary condition, the effective monopoly of the use of violence within a given territory. The security of State was, therefore, threatened by any change that might threaten that monopoly of violence, whether it was through external invasion or internal rebellion. National Security was therefore, viewed purely from the military perspective. Consequently, National Security was, in the past, narrowly understood and insufficiently conceptualised. From most of the literature available, adopting this narrow view, National Security concept is given an essentially strategic meaning by equating military defence with national security as a whole.

This insufficient, essentially strategic, understanding of the concept is evident in the definition provided by Michael Louw. According to him, National Security can be defined as the condition of freedom from external physical attack (Louw, 1985). The same conclusion is advanced by Amos Jordan and William Taylor who see National Security as a term that signifies protection of the Nation's people and territories against physical attack (Jordan and Taylor, 1985). Similarly, Weifram Horrieder and Lorry Bud in their book *Words and Arms*, defined National Security as the protection of the nation from all types of external aggression, espionage, hostile reconnaissance, sabotage, subversion, annoyance and other inimical influences (Horrieder and Buel, 1984). These are all military-centered definitions of National Security.

It can be seen that the above strategic definitions of National Security are largely concerned with the protection of a nation-state from external aggression. This overwhelmingly military approach to national security is based on the erroneous assumption that the principal threat to a nation's security comes from other nations or external attacks. Little attention is paid to the fact that the greatest threat to security of a nation could be internal, particularly when one is considering, as we are, transitional or developing societies. It is sometimes such internal threats that make states susceptible to external attacks. Avner Yenor, a Russian military scholar, was thus right when he stated that,

the ability of a nation to survive in conflict or even to win a war hinges not only on its military capabilities, but also on economic potential for war and the level of social mobilisation. Over emphasizing one of these elements of national security while disregarding the others may be natural in the course of a brief crises, but it could be disastrous in the long term (Yenor, 1985, p.25).

For the public to be mobilised to defend the Nation, they must also be allowed access to the public interest at stake. National Security as Avner Yenor stated above, does not therefore, have to do with military defence alone. The concept of National Security must be located where it rightly belongs by attaching to it a broader meaning that emphasizes not only development in the military or defence sense; but also political, economic and social development of the society. This encompasses good governance and nation building as well. Development is thus a central concept in our understanding of National Security. There is, in fact, a dialectical relationship between the concept of development (which depicts both quantitative and qualitative improvements in the conditions of existence of a nation and its nationals) and national security. This includes improvement in the political, economic and social conditions (Mou, 2016; 2017).

According to Robert McNamara, a one-time President of the World Bank,
as development progresses, security progresses, and when the people of a nation-state have organised their own human and natural resources to provide themselves with what they use and expect out of life, and have learnt to compromise peacefully

among competing demands in the larger national interest, then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase (McNamara, 1968, p.12).

As a matter of fact, no country, no matter the level of military development, can be regarded as secure, if its economy continues to be described as a predicament, if unemployment, poverty, hunger and inequality continue to exacerbate.

National Security has also been seen by Dan Mou (2017, 2018) as protecting the interest of the dominant group/elite, who control the commanding heights of the economy, including the security apparatuses of the State. It is again seen by him as all efforts aimed at protecting the strategic interest and way of life of the people in a given society, by defending the territorial integrity, cultural values and norms of the society (Mou, 2017; 2018). Mou has further postulated that National Security Systems or Architectures are of different types or varieties. Their efficacies also differ greatly as we see below (Mou, 2017; 2018).

III VARIETIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS OR ARCHITECTURES

In his recent book **National Security, Democracy and Good Governance in Post-Military Rule Nigeria**, Volumes one and two (2017), Dan Mou has demonstrated that there are basically two broad approaches for classifying the different varieties of national security systems or architectures. These are:

First, is what Mou (2017, 2018) calls the Dominant Ideology Classification of varieties of National Security Systems or Architectures. This approach categorizes national security systems or architectures as follows:

- a. **Captured National Security System (CNSS) or Architecture:** Under this situation, Mou argues that the dominant interests of a given social cleavage or a set of them in that society, have taken control of the State security apparatuses, so that the national security policy and objectives are influenced by the elite group. This group uses the nation's security apparatuses as the oppressive tool for their economic and political exploitation of others (Mou, 2018). The interests of the public, defined as whatever in the society that is for the common good of all, will not be a priority under this system or architecture of national security. The information for public consumption will also be distorted to suit the interests of that particular social cleavage elite. Opposition media houses tend to be oppressed with government machinery (Mou, 2018). A classic example is apartheid period in South Africa, where the government security apparatuses were used for the interest of the minority white people. It was also practiced in Germany during the rule of the Nazis, led by Adolf Hitler (Mou, 2018). In fact, it is a common security architecture or system that operates in most nations, in different degrees, including in Nigeria, as we shall see below.
- b. **Autonomous National Security System (ANSS) or Architecture:** This, according to Mou (2018), exists where the state security apparatuses are operating independently of the dominant elites or classes in that society. National Security policy and its apparatuses are more rational and objective in carrying out state policy, implementation and security policies that concern/cater for all its citizens. Security information management therefore, is easier since public interest and national security become similar (Mou, 2017). This type of security architecture currently operates mainly in industrialised nations such as the USA, USSR, China, Germany, Britain, etc.

c. Relatively Autonomous National Security System (RANSS) or Architecture: This position presupposes that the national security apparatus is neither captured nor autonomous (Mou, 2018). In most democracies, national security is relatively autonomous because they cater to some extent, for the common good of all citizens. The state operates a policy of freedom of information as the media have access and are empowered to seek for information. However, laws of secrecy exist and not all information is available at all times to the public (Mou, 2017).

The second broad approach, Mou (Mou, 2018) postulates, is the Organizational Determinant Categorization of National Security Systems or Architectures. This second approach also categorizes National Security or Architecture into three types. These are: (a) the Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture; (b) the Coordinated National Security System (CNSS) or Architecture; and (c) the Integrated National Security System (INSS) or Architecture (Mou, 2017, 2018). The three key distinguishing words are: Segmentary, Coordinated and Integrated. Each of these National Security Systems or Architectures has its advantages and disadvantages, which are considered briefly below.

(a) Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture

The Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture tries to apply the principle of federation or even confederation to the security of a country. Under this arrangement, the country's security arrangement is left to the individual military or security services or their special units (Mou, 2018). In the event of security threats, each Service adopts its own strategy in repelling the threat. Individual Service Chiefs or Heads of Security Agencies therefore, mobilise their men and weaponry in the defence or securing of whatever target is threatened. There is little or no harmonization of efforts by the various Services or Agencies and no coordination of their attack reaction to the enemy or enemies. There is usually little or no communication and reporting across Services or Agencies during the operations (Mou, 2016; 2017). With the exception of South Africa and Libya (during President Gadhafi), all other African countries (including Nigeria) have adopted the Segmentary Security System or Architecture at one time or the other, even though the degree of application varied from one country to the other.

In Nigeria, for instance, under the administration of former Presidents Shehu Shagari and Jonathan administration, the Military and other security Agencies all operated separately, with little coordination and integration between them and other Security Agencies. The same appears to be the case now even with the present President Muhammadu Buhari Administration (Mou, 2018). This became more visible in their different strategies and operations regarding the control of the Herdsmen and Farmers conflicts and clashes all over the Nation, but especially in the North Central Zone of Nigeria (Mou, 2018). In the event of any security threat, as is the case with the Herdsmen and Farmers clashes, therefore, these Services react differently, with little coordination and integration of their efforts. This same SNSS is what was applied under former President Jonathan that is apparently being utilised under President Buhari in the war against Boko Haram. Hence, despite President Buhari's personal commitment, political will and allocation of a lot of resources, Boko Haram is still to be wiped out. The limit of the segmentary national security system or architecture, the SNSS, in our view, is also mainly what is hindering the successful conclusions of the military/national security operations throughout the country, including the failure to address decisively the Herdsmen and Farmers conflicts, all over the nation.

For instance, instead of the Armed Forces Coordinating efforts, with the Nigeria Police Force and other security Agencies, they always order the Nigerian Police Force, even the Police Special Terrorist Units, to withdraw before they start their own operations, as it was the case with the “Cat Race” operation “Ayem a Kpatuma” in the North Central, particularly Benue State.

Advantages of Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture

- (i) The greatest advantage of the SNSS is that it allows the various Security Services and Agencies to develop their separate security systems/strategies in any way they deem fit. Those that are more determined and hardworking will invariably do better in preparing themselves for the National Security defence of the country more than those that are not (Mou, 2018).
- (ii) It allows a lot of room for Service/Agency autonomy. Thus, the Military and the other Security Services become fairly free in deciding on their National Security defence policies and strategies (Mou, 2018). There is therefore, no single National Security policy, in the real sense of it, for such a country.
- (iii) The SNSS also reduces the job of the Service Chiefs, Heads of the other Security Agencies and the Commander-in-Chief. Once the broad guidelines for national security defence are established, these are passed on to the lower units commanders down the ladder in their Services or Agencies, whose responsibility it becomes of deciding on the manner and specific strategy for protecting the country and dealing with National Security threats.
- (iv) In its reckless application, the strategy also allows the Service Chiefs/ Heads of other Security Agencies, and others at the top, to pass on the blame in the failure to repel a particular national security threat to the inefficiency at the lower levels (Mou, 2018). To avoid this, the Commander-in-Chief and the Service Chiefs/Heads of other Security Agencies become overtly committed to allowing only the best officers in their Services/Agencies to hold Command positions to avoid the possibility of such errors occurring since this is the only insurance against failure under the SNSS (Mou, 2017; 2018).

Disadvantages of Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture

The Segmentary National Security System also has several disadvantages. These include the following:

- (i) It does not allow for proper coordination of the National Security efforts of the various Services and Security Agencies (Mou, 2018).
- (ii) It does not promote the full utilization of the national security defence resources of the country. Instead, they tend to be hoarded by particular Services or Heads of individual security agencies (Mou, 2018). In event of threats or attacks, full mobilization of the national security defence resources for a coordinated and integrated attack against the offenders becomes impossible.
- (iii) This strategy also allows room for “blame shifting” when it is shown in the case of an actual security lapse that the entire security defence programme failed to yield good results. This is because the Service Chiefs and Heads of Security Agencies turn round to blame the failures on other Security Agencies or Sector Operations Centres (SOCs); who in turn blame the Commanding Officers (COs) who turn around and load it on the Battery Commander (BCs) who in turn blame Command Post Officers (CPOs), etc. (Mou, 2017).
- (iv) But the greatest defect of the SNSS or Architecture has to do with its lack of proper inter-service co-operation and inter-agency and inter-units communication. As we all know, communication is a most important aspect of national security defence. It is the means

through which effective command and control is exercised by national security commanders over their men and weaponry (Mou, 2018). Early warning information must be quickly given in event of a threat or attack. With this, they would know if they need reinforcements from other Services or Units. When such communication is lacking, a coordinated attack becomes unthinkable (Mou, 2016; 2017).

(a) Coordinated National Security System (CNSS) or Architecture

- (i) The CNSS ensures that all Services, Agencies and Units assigned with the responsibility of national Security are closely monitored and supervised. This is close to the INSS approach, except that in this case, the Agencies and Units are not brought under one top command umbrella. The closest example of coordinated national security system in operation in Nigeria, was during the Governments of General I.B. Babangida at the time of Alhaji Muhammadu Gambo Jimeta as the National Security Adviser (NSA) (Mou, 2017).

Advantages of CNSS or Architecture

- (i) The CNSS strategy allows for close monitoring and supervision of the national security formation in all Services, Agencies and Units by the National Security Adviser. In this way, all those connected with national security in the Military and other Security Agencies are fully mobilised whenever there are security threats or attacks (Mou, 2017).
- (ii) Unlike the SNSS, the CNSS approach ensures that security operations at any one time does not depend entirely on one Service or Agency or Unit to repel an attack. Provision is made for the other Agencies, Services and Units to join in repelling the threat or attack once it is sighted and the information passed to the other Services, Agencies and Units (Mou, 2018). In this way, there is closer monitoring of the planning and development of national security strategies by those assigned the responsibility from the Military and other Security Agencies to carry it out.
- (iii) The CNSS allows for the attempts by mobilized Civil Defence Units to be properly coordinated with those of the Military and other Security Agencies properly. In this way, the Armed Forces and the other Security Agencies become more aware of whatever initiatives and efforts Civil Defence Units are also making. This makes it easier for ways of assisting and improving Civil Defence Units to be appropriately fashioned and integrated in operations (Mou, 2018).
- (iv) Where properly carried out, a CNSS approach, (just like the integrated one to be discussed below) allows for the proper mobilisation of the National Security Defence men and weapons in all Services, Agencies and Units to cope with security attacks or raids no matter how marathon they may be (Mou, 2018). To be able to operate successfully a CNSS or Architecture, the then NSA, Alhaji Gambo Jimeta, had Mr. Steve Agodo as Permanent Secretary (National Security). In addition, he appointed Dr. Dan Mou, as Special Adviser (National Security Matters) to him and brought in also Amb. Adamu Mohammed as his Deputy NSA.
- (v) Finally, the CNSS approach ensures that the national security defence arrangements by and within the Military, other Security Agencies and the Civil Defence Organisations are not contradictory to one another and in line with National Security Defence Policy (Mou, 2018).

Hence, the success of this model was far better than under the regime of President Jonathan and most clearly also under the present regime of President Buhari. In short, under the Administration of Jonathan, despite the growing security threats, the National Security Adviser then, (Col. Sambo Dasuki), refused to change the Segmentary National Security System or Architecture on the ground. He also did not advise former President Jonathan to appoint Deputy National Security Advisers (DNSAs). Nigeria's national security basically collapsed, giving birth to the emergence of the Boko Haram Islamic Militants and even the capture of substantial Nigerian territory by them. This clearly shows the weakness of the SNSS or architecture that Col. Dasuki operated.

Disadvantages of CNSS

- (i) If not properly carried out, attempts at coordinating the various Armed Forces and other Security Agencies and Units could create inter-agency and inter-units conflicts. Various Armed Forces and other Agencies and Units in all the Services tend to be predisposed to protecting what they see as their own "autonomy" and "spheres of control". Trying to monitor their activities and coordinate them with others, might be wrongly construed as "too much interference" (Mou, 2917, 2018).
- (ii) National security coordination, if not done with a specific national security objective, can result in a lot of unnecessary waste of time that could have been productively utilized for other purposes. For instance, it requires regular meetings by the various Service Chiefs and Heads of other Security Agencies with the National Security Adviser. If such meetings are not properly planned and regularized; they may very soon be seen as unwarranted and a mere waste of time and even resources (Mou, 2018).
- (iii) Coordination of the various Armed Forces and other Security Agencies and Units by the National Security Adviser that are not statutorily accountable to him directly, may sometimes prove difficult (Mou, 2018). This is where the Integrated National Security System (INSS) approach has an advantage over the CNSS. For it ensures that the various Heads of Armed Forces and other Security Agencies and Units in all the Services, be brought together under one umbrella, such as the Integrated National Security System under consideration here, to be headed by the National Security Adviser (NSA), and assisted by three Deputy National Security Advisers (DNSAs). In this way, there is clearly an authority and command chain. Thus, conflicts and personality clashes by the various Heads of the Armed Forces and National Security Agencies, are greatly reduced; if not in fact eliminated (Mou, 2017; 2018).

(c) The Integrated National Security System (INSS) or Architecture

The INSS or Architecture is the most comprehensive approach to National Security yet devised. It has also proved, in practice, more effective than the rest discussed here so far. It is variously referred to by security and strategic studies experts as the "multi-services" or "multi-faceted national" security system. In Nigeria, this approach has been adopted only by General Yakubu Gowon, during the Civil (Biafra War) of 1967-1970; General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau when he was the National Security Adviser under the regimes of General I.B. Babangida and Chief Ernest Shonekan and by Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, during General Sani Abacha regime. This INSS or Architecture stated above, is a comprehensive and demanding approach to National Security. It is also the most

effective and efficient one ever devised so far (Mou, 2018). All advanced countries such as the USA, USSR, China, France and Germany use it.

It demands for the appointment of Deputy National Security Advisers, since you cannot expect a Director in the Office of the NSA to preside over the meetings of Service Chiefs and Heads of Security Agencies, in the absence of the NSA himself or in Special Committees that have to be formed for regular consultations on operations and strategies, that are needed under the INSS or Architecture to be carried out. It is like saying the Inspector-General of Police should “sack” or not allow the President to appoint the Deputy Inspectors-General and Assistant Inspectors-General of Police and operate instead only with Commissioners of Police. Of course, if that happens, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigerian Police Force will go down dramatically. This will affect effective policing across the whole country.

Yet, this is exactly what Col. Sambo Dasuki did with the Office of the NSA when he was the NSA during President Jonathan’s Administration and the present NSA, Gen. Babagana Mongunu has done in the Office of the NSA currently under President Buhari Administration. This is because they have adopted the Segmentary National Security System or Architecture. We have already discussed the characteristics, implications and consequences of adopting this kind of Security Architecture for the nation above.

Any National Security Policy expert will most likely conclude that the National Security Policy and implementation will suffer greatly under the SNSS model. They will also predict long term or medium term failure of any Nation that is operating this Segmentary National Security System. That was why the French and American Security Policy Organisations, predicted that Nigeria will collapse in 2013 and 2015 respectively. This is because nation building suffers the most and new security challenges continue to come, that are not anticipated or attended to in time. Also, old ones cannot be effectively and efficiently dealt with under this model. Soon, the Military and Security Agencies become overwhelmed by the multiplication of security threats to the Nation. This is usually the root cause of what makes a Nation to become a “failed State” (Mou, 2017, 2018). This is exactly what is happening in Nigeria at the moment (Mou, 2018). Hence, the Military is now directly involved in Internal Security Operations in the thirty States out of the thirty-six States in Nigeria. They are trying desperately to prevent Nigeria from becoming a “failed State”!

To operate the Integrated National Security System or Architecture under the Gen. Babangida regime, Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, the then NSA, had to appoint in the Office of the NSA, three (3) Deputy National Security Advisers, viz: Alhaji Zakari Ibrahim as DNSA (Admin. & Finance); Ambassador Adamu Mohammed as DNSA (International and Liaison); Engr. David Awoniyi as DNSA (Technical) and Chief (Mrs.) Ayo as Permanent Secretary (National Security) and Dr. Dan Mou as Special Adviser (National Security Matters) to the NSA (himself) just like Gambo did. Hence, the Government of Babangida was able to handle effectively and efficiently the security challenges of that era – which included the then “Boko Haram” – Maitatsine Militant Islamic Religious sect and the very serious consequences of the dramatic economic and political policies that Gen. Babangida was operating, which earned him the nick name of “Maradona.” It was the Integrated National Security system and staff that Gen. Gusau put in place that Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo inherited, including Dr. Dan Mou as his Special Adviser (National Security Affairs). It was Alhaji Gwarzo who took over from Gen. Mohammed Gusau as the NSA under Gen. Abacha regime. This was how Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo was also able to operate an Integrated National Security System or Architecture during Abacha’s regime.

Basically, according to Mou (2018), an INSS seeks to integrate the Armed Forces and the various Security Agencies and Units into a singular National Security Strategy. This involves the full participation of those concerned in National Security Policy making and implementation. It calls

not just for coordination of all the Armed Forces services and the Security Agencies and Units concerned with, and engaged in, any form of National Security matter, but their full integration under the NSA.

Advantages of INSS

- (i) The INSS approach allows for both National Security policy and strategy integration as well as organizational and structural integration. This allows not simply for proper coordination but unity of purpose and harmony. It also makes it possible for the roles and functions of the individual Armed Forces and Security Agencies to be clearly defined and mapped out. In a sense, it is clear that INSS approach allows for both vertical and horizontal integration in National Security matters (Mou, 2017, 2018).
- (ii) The INSS makes it easy for centralized National Security planning and decentralized execution; but centralized control, monitoring and evaluation with alertness. In other words, it allows the whole complex problems of National Security to be examined in their various dynamics and National Security strategies devised and targeted to address any eventuality, accordingly (Mou, 2018).
- (iii) The INSS also reduces or even eliminates conflicts and suspicion among the various Military Services and other Security Agencies concerned with National Security. This is so to the extent that competition among them is eliminated. All these Military Services and Security Agencies begin to see their National Security role as one and complementary (Mou, 2018).
- (iv) Because this strategy avoids unnecessary duplication of functions and roles, it saves resources, personnel and weapons. Consequently, it is more efficient and cost effective approach to National Security ever devised (Mou, 2018).
- (v) INSS has a deterrence, political and social appeal as well. Because of its comprehensive nature, it gives an immediate impression of strong commitment to the National Security of a country. Because the various formations in the different Services, Security Agencies and the Civil Defence Organisations are mobilised and deliberately encouraged to participate in the planning and execution of National Security exercises, the whole society becomes mobilised for the purpose of ensuring that National Security is not compromised (Mou, 2017, 2018).

Disadvantages of INSS

- (i) When first mentioned, it could appear as an expensive National Security System. Consequently, given our current economic predicament; it is likely to be seen as a call for undue increase in National Security expenditure. However, this view is not correct. Every Nation requires an effective National Security System for any other Sector in the country to function properly (Mou, 2018).
- (ii) The other most serious disadvantage of the INSS is that it calls for a radical structural adjustment of the existing National Security policy and strategy. As noted already, the present one under President Buhari is a Segmentary National Security System (SNSS). Such a change will certainly task the political will of our Commander-in-Chief and may require legislation by the National Assembly for the Office of the NSA to be properly constituted and instituted. For it demands that structural reforms and legislative reforms be made. Once legislated upon, it will no longer be left to the NSAs to determine how they want the Office of the NSA to be organised and whether there should be a Deputy National Security Advisers or not. This will create stability and permanency in the organogram of the Office of the NSA and make it more effective and efficient, as explained above already.

(iii) The introduction of an INSS may also promote resistance from some Service Chiefs and Commanders who may see it as interfering with their “autonomy” and “spheres of operation”. However, if it proves as successful as we expect, such initial opposition will, of course, gradually fade away (Mou, 2016; 2017).

More than any other period in the history of Nigeria, the Military and other Security Agencies are simultaneously engaged in major internal security operations. As we write, they are engaged in these operations in the six geo-political zones of the country in the thirty States out of the thirty six in Nigeria.

These major internal security operations include the war against terrorism, the Boko Haram war, the deadly herdsmen/farmers clashes, cattle rustling, kidnapping, oil theft and pipeline vandalism. Other joint interventions which even cover the whole nation include: the joint police/military security outfit against criminal activities such as armed robbery in the thirty six States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Thus, military personnel are now deployed all over the country in operations that should normally be police and other Security Agencies’ operations.

IV INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

To give a sense of what we are discussing here, it is perhaps necessary to state some of these military involvements in internal security operations, with the other Security Agencies. These various operations involve huge deployment of military assets and manpower. They are also being prosecuted simultaneously at a period of dwindling national revenue and protracted war against terrorism and insurgency that has lasted over eight years, thereby stretching the military too thin. Yet, without them, Nigeria can easily slip into a “failed State”. When classified by Zones in Nigeria, they include the following:

1. **North-East Zone:**
 - (i) **Operation Lafiya Dole:** This operation handles the overall counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations with expanded scope, scale and depth comprising three divisions and more than five States.
 - (ii) **Operation Crackdown:** This is a specialized operation to wind down the war against insurgents and clear the remnants of the Boko Haram Sect in the Sambisa Forest.
 - (iii) **Operation Gama Aiki:** This operation serves the same purpose as the **Operation Crackdown**, in the northern part of Borno State.
 - (iv) **Operation Safe Corridor:** This operation was set up for the de-radicalism and rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram terrorists.

2. **North Central Zone**
 - (i) **Operation Save Haven:** This operation headquartered at Jos, Plateau State, covers a wide area, which extends to Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa and Kwara State. What the public and the media have had a field day debating is the name of the Operation, “Save Haven for who?” Many have concluded that its main target was to create “Safe Haven” for the herdsmen and their cattle. In other words, it was an operation to establish what became known as the “Cattle Colony Policy” of the Federal Government of Nigeria by force of arms.

The Military and other Security Agencies, have however explained the purpose and objectives of the operation differently. They argued that it is designed to quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal activities in the Middle Belt of Nigeria.

- (ii) **Operation “Ayem Akpatuma”, a Tiv language phrase translated as “Operation Cat Race”:** This operation was launched after the repeated massive killings by herdsmen in the North Central, especially in Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba and Plateau States. This reckless killings of the natives in these States resulted in the massive killings of 1st January, 2018, in Benue State, that terminated the lives of seventy-three (73) indigenes of the State that were given mass burial recently. This incident generated a lot of uproar, both at home in Nigeria and abroad. This then gave birth to the Operation “Ayem Akpatuma”.

3. **North West Zone**

- (i) **Operation Sara Daji:** This operation was commenced with President Buhari himself, in his capacity as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces in full Military camouflage regalia. Its main purpose was to deal with cattle rustlers and armed bandits that were operating particularly in Zamfara, Kaduna, Kebbi, Sokoto, Kano and Katsina States.
- (ii) **Operation Harbin Kunama:** This operation was launched to complement the **Operation Sara Deji** and they shared the same purpose, objectives and operational areas.

4. **South South Zone**

- (i) **Operation Delta Safe:** This operation was to secure the oil wells, pipelines and all the activities involved in the strategic petroleum activities that takes place in the Zone. It covers all the oil producing States. It was also aimed at crushing the Niger Delta Militants.
- (ii) **Operation Pulo Shield:** This was also launched in the South-South Zone and it shared the same purpose, objective and operation areas as the **Operation Delta Safe**. These include crushing the resurgent Niger Delta Militancy and other acts of criminality, like oil theft, vandalism, and bunkering in the region.

5. **South West Zone**

- (i) **Operation Awase:** This operation Awase covers the whole of the South West. Its brief was to contain the criminal operations around Ogun-Lagos axis, particularly in the Arepo where illegal bunkering and pipeline vandalism are regular occurrences.

6. **South East Zone**

- (i) **Operation Iron Fence:** The purpose of this operation was to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers.

- (ii) **Operation Python Dance I and II:** The major aim of these operations were to quell the growing agitations for the separatist movement led by Mr. Nnamdi Kanu to create a “new Nation of Biafra”.
- (iii) **Operation Mesa:** Operation Mesa, unlike the others that were mainly conducted by the Military, was a Joint Task Force (JTF). It was targeted against all forms of criminal activities in all the States of the Federation.

We have shown above how extensive the Nigerian Military and other Security Agencies are involved in internal security operations all over the country. Here, we intend to briefly choose only one case, Benue State, to discuss the operations against the National Security Systems (NSS) or Architectures discussed earlier above.

To discuss all these operations will require volumes of books. Even the Benue case study will require at least three volumes of books or more to do justice to it. However, for those interested in the more detailed analysis and discussion of these National Security issues that could lead to a “failed State”, and how they affect good governance, nation building and the consequences for policing, peace, security and sustainable development in Nigeria, we suggest they read the recent books on the subject. Some of the most important ones they can consult are:

- (a) Dan Mou, National Security, Good Governance and Democracy in Post-Military Rule Nigeria, Vols. One and Two (London and Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2017);
- (b) Dan Mou, National Security, Good Governance and Democracy in Africa (London and Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2016);
- (c) Dan Mou, National Security, Good Governance and Democracy in Nigeria: From Obasanjo to Jonathan Administration (Lagos: Top African Publication House, 2015); and
- (d) Dan Mou, Making of an African Giant: State, Politics and Public Policy in Nigeria Vols. One and Two (London and Bloomington, Indiana, AuthorHouse, 2015).
- (e) Ozoemenam Mbachu and Chukwudi (eds.), Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers, 2009);
- (f) Chris A. Garuba, Statecraft, Peace and Security (Lagos: Gadumo Publishing Co. Ltd., 1998); and
- (g) Amos G. Adedeji and Istifanus S. Zabadi (eds.), The Military and Management of Internal Conflict in Nigeria (Kuru: National Institute Press, 2005).

V THE BENUE STATE CASE STUDY

The Benue State case study will be briefly discussed under the following headings:

- (i) Intelligence Gathering, Analysis and Utilization;
- (ii) The Ideological Determinant National Security Systems or Architectures;
- (iii) The Structural Determinant National Security System or Architecture;
- (iv) The Rapid-Reaction Ability of our Military and other Security Forces; and
- (v) The Media and Communication ability.

(i) **Intelligence Gathering, Analysis and Utilization:** The operations in Benue State are code named as, we stated above, **the Operation Safe Heaven and Operation Ayem Akpatuma (Cat Race)**. This operations proved clearly that the Nigerian Military and other Security Agencies need to improve on their data gathering and management capabilities. Evidence shows clearly that they never had advanced knowledge of the threats and if they had, they never attempted to use it for to stop the killing in Benue State by the herdsmen, whatever reasons, one is not certain.

The Governor of Benue State, Dr. Samuel Ortom, published letters which he actually wrote to President Buhari and Heads of the Military Services and Security Agencies (See Saturday Sun, November 4, 2017; Sunday Vanguard of January 14, 2018 and Daily Sun of January 8, 2018). This shows that early security reports were supplied to the relevant authorities by Governor Ortom, the Benue State Governor. Yet, they were not acted upon and mass killings by the herdsmen of farmer and massive destruction and burning of villages in the various communities, especially in Logo and Guma Local Governments took place. The worst was on January 1, 2018, when seventy three (73) Benue natives were massacred by herdsmen despite the early warnings. This led to local and international outcry especially when the massive burials were displayed on Television Stations Worldwide.

Aside from the Governor of Benue State, Professor Iyorwuse Hagher also published his private letters to President Buhari and the reply from the Presidency notifying him they will take action to ensure that the mass killing by herdsmen of farmers would not take place. The Presidency reply even thanked him profusely for giving them early information to prevent the intending genocide of local farmers in the affected areas in Benue. Yet, no actions were taken by the Military or other Security Agencies to prevent this genocide from happening, even though **Operation Safe Haven**, was already in force at that time. (See Professor Hagher's letters published in Sunday Vanguard, January 14, 2018; Daily Sun, January 8, 2018 and The Nation, January 28, 2018).

(ii) The Nature of National Security System or Architecture in place: We have already discussed that the Segmentary National Security System (SNSS) or Architecture was during President Jonathan and is in operation in Nigeria at the moment (Mou, 2018). The weaknesses and strengths of this model of Security Architecture are covered in details above. They apply *ipso facto* to what is happening in Nigeria at the moment under the Administration of President Buhari!

(iii) The Ideological Determinant National Security Architecture: It is clear from the statement of the Minister of Defence, General Dan Ali, and the Inspector-General of Police, Ibrahim Kpotun Idris that the herdsmen version of what was happening, had already been bought by them. They all agreed that the problem or reason for the destructing and the killings of hundreds of farmers in Benue State was because of the Anti-Grazing Law. They ignored the fact that before the **Anti-Grazing Law**, the herdsmen/farmers attacks were already in existence. This suggests a "Captured Model" of National Security System. (See The Nation, January 8, 2018; Daily Sun, January 8, 2018 and Sunday Vanguard, January 14, 2018). The advantages and weakness of this form of National Security Architecture have already been copiously discussed above.

(iv) The Rapid Reaction Capacity of Nigerian Military and Security Agencies: Here, they did not act in time enough to stop the attacks and the subsequent ones, that are still going on, President Buhari however, acted very fast and directed the Inspector-General of Police, Mr. Ibrahim Kpotun Idris to relocate to Benue State. This was welcome and very efficient. However, when the Police Officers and men too were being killed in Logo and Guma Local Governments, by these same militant herdsmen, it took the Military exactly two months: from January, 2018 when the major killings took place till 1st March, 2018, before the commencement of their **Operation Ayem Akpatuma**. This reaction time was not fast enough at all.

(v) The Media and Communication capability: Because of the actions and inactions mentioned in (i) to (iv) above, the Military and the Security Agencies could not win the media war,

locally and internationally. Consequently, both them and the Federal Government of Nigeria had to suffer heavy negative media coverage at home and abroad.

VI NATURE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

The concept of 'good governance' is equally contentious. It is both a juridical, ideological and public policy concept (Mou, 2015). From the juridical or legal perspective, good governance can be defined as governing in accordance with the rule of law and providing the public good for the general public by the leaders in a given society; or by the government or the State in accordance with their rights and entitlements.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 (1) as adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of December, 1948, defines good governance from this legal or juridical perspective. According to **the United Nations Declaration** just cited above, citizens of every nation and indeed all human beings, have basic needs and human rights. Once the leaders or government or the State, caters well for these basic needs and protects these human rights; then there is good governance in that society.

As **the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 (1) 10th December, 1948** states it:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

The basic needs of man and the protection of economic rights are therefore the basis, under this definition, for determining whether there is good governance in a given society or not. Most African countries, including Nigeria, do not have these economic rights stated in their Constitutions under the juridical sections where they can be held accountable. As we shall see, in the case of Nigeria later, they are only stated as "Directive Principles of State Policy". Thus, no citizen can have the legal basis to sue regarding what particular Economic Rights he is insisting upon.

There is no question that the concept of fundamental human rights is truly fundamental. At the heart of it all, is the recognition and acceptance that man, as a superior animal, should of necessity distinguish himself from other living things, such as animals and beasts. The driving motive behind the idea of fundamental human rights is therefore, essentially human brotherhood, irrespective of individual differences.

The problem, however, is that central as these rights are in defining good governance, there is no consensus on them among nations. There is also no consensus amongst scholars and policy makers, regarding these fundamental human rights that others consider the minimum condition for rating a leader or government as engaged in good governance". This fundamental divide is between the "naturalists" and the "positivists".

The naturalist conception understands law and human rights as handed down by providence or human reason. Thus, writing within the naturalist viewpoint, Canston defines human rights to be "something of which no one may be deprived of without a great affront to justice. These are certain deeds which should never be done, certain freedoms which should never be invaded, some things which are supremely scared" (Canston, 1984). This conception, however, can be seen as largely idealistic. It also does not recognise the variations of human rights practices across cultures and societies. We know as of fact that "justice" as a value may vary from society to society and that the law does not often recognise what ought to be. Rule of law meaning simply operating under the existing laws.

It is partly these limitations with the naturalistic view of good governance and human rights that gave birth to the "positivists" type definitions. Within this realm, Osita Eze has maintained correctly that:

human rights represent demands or claims which individuals or groups make on society, some of which are protected by law and have become part of *ex lata* while others remain aspirations to be attained in future. In strict legal terminology, only a right recognised and protected by the legal system can be considered as right (Osita, p.13).

The question of legal recognition of human rights is very important. This is because no right can be presumed to exist which is not recognised within the legal infrastructures of that particular society. Hence, it is meaningless for one to claim a right when others do not agree that such an individual does in fact have such a legitimate claim. Human rights are therefore, those claims which the prevailing legal infrastructures of a given society do allow individuals, groups or organizations to enjoy.

In the specific Nigerian society, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has clearly outlined those fundamental human rights to which Nigerians are entitled. Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for instance, recognises the following fundamental human rights for Nigerians; even though the economic rights are not recognized. They are only listed as Directive principles of State Policy. The rights recognized are as follows:-

- Right to life;
- Right to dignity of human person;
- Right to personal liberty;
- Right to fair hearing;
- Right to private and family life;
- Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- Right to freedom of expression and the press;
- Right to freedom of assembly and association;
- Right to freedom of movement; and
- Right to freedom from discrimination.

In addition to the Constitution, Nigeria is also a member of international organizations, such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To the extent that Nigeria is a subscriber to the Charter of such organizations; it becomes obligatory on Nigeria to abide by them as well. Consequently, by the dint of her membership of and signatory to the UNO and AU Charters on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nigeria automatically has to accept the provisions of human rights as provided therein. In the light of this, any government in Nigeria is supposed to shoulder the responsibility of protecting such rights as enunciated by these international organizations. It is in this context that the poor people in Nigeria have a case which must be carefully addressed.

In his book on Africa, titled **Ideology and Development in Africa**, Crawford Young has argued that there are no universal standards for measuring good governance, even though there may be some for measuring development. He argues that the ideology of nations, especially in Africa, affects what they consider as ingredients for good governance. Good governance in Africa should therefore, be seen in moral or ideological terms (Young, 1980).

Incidentally, Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, also agrees that economic rights in Africa are to be considered as a moral, rather than juridical matters. As he puts it in his message to the 2006 International Day for the Eradication of Poverty:

The campaign to make poverty history, a central moral challenge of our age-cannot remain a task for the few, it must become a calling for the many. On this International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, I urge everyone to join this struggle. Together, we can make real and sufficient progress towards the end of poverty (Annan, 2006)

From a public policy perspective, it is usually possible to come out with indices to measure good governance. These indices are then used to judge leaders and governments. From this point of view, two methods are usually adopted. First, the relevant legal documents, policy statements by the leaders or Governments and party manifestos are used to develop criteria for good governance. Second, analysts can also come up with their own, deductively, based on their review of the literature on good governance.

Whatever the approach, it is clear that issues such as eradication of poverty, satisfaction of basic needs, free press, protection of human rights, provision of basic infrastructures, creation of conducive environment for economic activities, rule of law and laws on social development and so forth, are usually included. Also, income indicators, levels of unemployment, gender issues, and youth development tend to be included. The tendency usually is to include on the list general economic indicators such as income per capita, gross domestic product, capital utilization and foreign exchange stability.

Since national security is very important, law and order, security of lives and property and freedom from external aggression etc. are also usually included. Thus, we can say that indices of good-governance must have political, economic, social, institutional, security, rule of law, and international dimensions.

To the extent that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policies, there is always the need to include a foreign dimension in the assessment of good governance. It is indeed a combination of some of these indices of good governance, using both the juridical, moral and policy analysis criteria that we hope to apply to our case study, Nigeria, in the next section. Before that, however, we need to first settle the theoretical issues regarding the concept of nation building in a democracy.

(VII) CONCEPT OF NATION BUILDING IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Democracy is also of various kinds: liberal democracy; social democracy, consociational democracy and so forth. The model of nation building differs in each of them. Most of what is operational on the African continent is multi-party liberal democracy. This is also the model of democracy that is practiced in Nigeria. Consequently, the discussion that follows focuses mainly on multi party liberal democracy.

In common parlance, democracy is seen following Abraham Lincoln, as "government of the people, for the people and by the people". It is also seen generally by the public as the best form of political organisation that would promote good governance and national security. It is mainly associated with more than one political party and periodic elections. It is also believed that democracy involves the participation of more citizens in politics. This participation of more citizens promotes nation building. This is not just for the purpose of electing their leaders and representatives. It is even in the area of citizen participation in the formulation and making of public policies. This is very critical to nation building as we shall see below. As Watson states,

democracy involves not only the process for making public policies but also the results of the process. Democratic government by definition produces policies that foster certain basic democratic values, such as liberty, equality, and justice (Watson, 1973, p.7).

These values of liberal democracy, such as liberty, equality and justice are necessary in any democracy that hoped to promote nation building (Mou, 2015).

The word democracy itself comes from two Greek words: *demos* which means people and *kratia*, which refers to the English word, rule. It is in this sense that democracy means "rule by the people". Whether in its current practice, especially in Africa, the people are actually ruling, is a different matter, as we shall see in the case of Nigeria later. Watson articulates clearly, what must be in place, before a society can be seen as democratic, at least in a liberal sense. It also must be in place to promote nation building. He states:

For a society to be democratic, then, a large number of its people must enjoy the right to have some say over important decisions that seriously affect their lives. To express it another way, democratic government is based on the consent of the governed (Watson, 1973, p.7).

The greatest attraction of democracy then, is citizen or political participation, understood as the involvement of citizens in the affairs of their society. This enables them to be involved and have a say on issues that affect their lives. We must understand that nation building is basically the "constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the State. It is thus narrower than nation formation, the broader process through which nations come into being.

From the perspective of international organisations, such as the United Nations, nation building is seen essentially, as Carolyn Stephenson puts it, those nation-building programmes in which "dysfunctional or unstable or 'failed states' or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructures, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance in order to increase stability. Nation-building generally assumes that someone or something is doing the building internationally" (Stephenson, 2005, p.1).

Even though political participation as a mechanism for nation building has for long been a subject of analysis by students of politics and public policy, the literature, as will be demonstrated below, exhibits some gaps. In short, the general tendency on the part of most researchers and policy makers, has been to assume that political participation in a democracy is somehow positively related to national development, nation building and self-reliance. This study, drawing from the Nigerian experience, suggests that this is not necessarily and always the case.

It argues instead that the question of citizen participation in public policy making process is a highly problematic one. While certain forms of political participation do in fact promote development, nation building and self-reliance; a majority of other forms are notable for producing the opposite effects. They do foster mass conformity and acceptance of established inequalities, underdevelopment and material dependency of the citizenry on the state and the dominant classes (Edelman, 1980).

Political participation is understood, as noted above, to be the ability of citizens or some collectivities of citizens to influence governmental policies in favour of what they stand for. It is one of the major ways by which liberal democracies attempt to convince their citizens that "the success of some groups was facilitated by the "apathy" of others with opposing interests" in the context where all had "equal opportunities" to "make themselves heard". But promoting the concept of "equal opportunities", nation building is greatly increased.

One of the myths of public policy in a democracy, viewed as what the government chooses to do or not to do, is that it is usually made in the “public interests.”³⁵ It is also erroneously assumed by the public that all individuals, groups and classes would benefit equally. The differential inequalities from the benefits of the policy stemming only from the differential involvement of citizens or some collectivities of citizens at the time the policy was being made and implemented. This is clearly a myth since rarely do public policies have equal impacts on all groups and classes in society. As Lorwin points out, there is always the possibility that “some individuals, groups, or classes benefit unjustly or unfairly from the labour of, or at the expense of, others” (Lorwin, 1963, p.16).

It is not that all students of democratic politics favour citizen – participation as an instrument of nation building. There are those who argue that citizen - participation is not necessary in the context of “responsible government”. The critical thing is to be careful at the electoral (or appointment) stage and choose “responsible” state managers. For one thing, they argue, it tends to hinder the efficient running of government, causes “political decay” and delays policy-making. For another, not all citizens are politically informed; especially since policymaking has become more complex and requires some measures of expertise to understand. In general, however, as Gormley observes, citizen-participation “is thought to improve the fairness of the decision-making process, the quality of decisions, and the legitimacy of political authorities” (Gormley, 1983).

There is also a growing debate as to whether the type of public policy, the issues involved (whether complex or not, highly technical or not, very salient or not) affect the nature of citizen involvement and nation building. Beginning perhaps with Lowi, there has been a tendency to view public policies as different in several aspects, depending on the policy arena one chooses to consider. The differences over policy arena also calls for different types of citizen participation and nature of nation building (Lowi, 1984).

Of recent, it is argued that even within a particular policy area, say rural development - there are still variations in political participation and the effects on nation building, depending on the particular policy proposal one looks at or the issue area in question. Wilson tell us, for instance, that whether costs and benefits appear concentrated and/or diffused in a policy proposal has different implications for the nature of political participation and nation building effects that will evolve (Wilson, 1973).

Democracy, as we discussed above, is a form of government that allows the citizens to participate in how the affairs of their country are run. This helps to promote nation building. Before the Military handed over power to Civilians in 1999, they had worked on the constitution that guides democratic practice in Nigeria till date. This was the Constitution the Military promulgated into law before handing over to Civilians in 1999.

There are analysts who feel that any post-1999 Government in Nigeria, therefore, cannot be democratic because it runs a Constitution that was imposed by the Military. This is, for instance, the view of the “Patriot Organisation” in Nigeria. While I am not against the moves by the National Assembly to review the Constitution, we hold the view that even the present one is democratic. As Ibrahim A. Gambari points out, correctly in our view, and we quote:

nations just don't happen by historical accident, rather they are built by men and women, with vision and resolve. Nation building is therefore the product of conscious statecraft, not happenstance. Nation building is always a work-in-constant; a dynamic process in constant need of nurturing and re-invention. Nation building never stops and true nation builders never rest because all nations are constantly facing up to new challenges (Gambari, 2008).

Thus, we should expect that the Nigerian Government, our institutions and the Nigerian citizens would continue to take actions that bear on building our nation, Nigeria. It is a continuous process.

VIII NATION BUILDING, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEWS AND RESTRUCTURING

As Managers of the State, holders of State power, whether at the Executive, Legislative or Judicial Arms, have the wanton responsibility of ensuring that the National Security and nation building that is long-term interests of the nation over which they preside are not allowed to be undermined or even sacrificed at the altar of any Constitutional Review or Restructuring. This section analysis the various ethnic, regional and other sectional agenda that are being advocated for inclusion for consideration in the constitutional review and socio-political restructuring, that are the hottest issues in Nigeria at the moment. It also discusses what should constitute the Government's stand vis-à-vis the various sectional interests so that nation building and National Security are not compromised.

For ease of analytical convenience, the Nigerian political, social, economic and security conditions which will invariably affect nation building and Constitutional Restructuring, will be discussed here under the following headings:

- (i) The Political Autonomy Dimension;
- (ii) The Economic Autonomy Dimension;
- (iii) The Social Autonomy Dimension;
- (iv) The Institutional/Legal Autonomy Dimension; and
- (v) The Security Autonomy Dimension.

(i) The Political Autonomy Dimension

The debate over political power in Nigeria recently, has elevated the issue of power sharing into what has popularly become known as the "National Question". National Question deals with the forms and patterns of power sharing within a nation-state among the social cleavages that exist in that society. By social cleavages here we mean, as stated twice above, those divisions in a society that are based on class, gender, ethnicity, regionalism, language, religion, caste, race, and even statism. These are clearly the pillars on which nation building is constructed.

Another way of ensuring that the Constitutional Restructuring does not compromise nation building and degenerate into an avenue for precipitating the disintegration of Nigeria is by insisting, as the Government has already done, that the unity of Nigeria is **NOT** contestable. This is very important because, already, certain radical, regional and ethnic groups or even eminent personalities, are advocating for a National restructuring through a Sovereign Conference. Basically, a Constitutional Conference is one in which selected and/or elected eminent citizens meet to debate and suggest revisions to an existing Constitution of their country, which they forward to the regime in power and the existing legislature for consideration and passing them into law, if agreed by the regime, or the National Assembly accordingly (Mou, 2017). In this case, Constitutional Conferences are by nature advisory.

A Sovereign National Conference on the other hand, is one in which eminent citizens are elected and/or chosen and assembled to debate the state of the Nation, including, of course, its Constitution; the outcome of which will not be referred to the Government in power or even the National Assembly for approval, before their implementations become obligatory on the regime in power. The outcomes are sometimes not even subjected to a National Referendum, before they become law and subject to implementation at all cost by the Government in power (Mou, 2017).

It is our suggestion, on this that the sovereignty of these debates and conclusions should be limited. Whatever decisions they arrive at should be subjected to the approval of the National

Assembly. In this way, Government would be able to forestall the promulgation into law of certain decisions that may be arrived at out of these deliberations which might be antithetical to our national interest, good governance and nation building. There is even no need for any Constitutional Conference. The National Assembly should be allowed to handle it.

(ii) The Economic Autonomy Dimension

It is true that structural inequalities exist, both in resources endowment and location of industries, in Nigeria. Some of these uneven-development date back to the pre-colonial days. Others are as a result of nature. But there are some that could be regarded as man-made, that is, the quality of the leadership Nigeria has had at the various levels of government. Whatever the sources of such uneven development or economic inequalities in Nigeria, the truth is that it would affect the form and manner of contributions that the different regions, states, or even ethnic groups would make regarding the Constitutional review or restructuring. Some of these are already manifested in the various paid publications that have appeared in Magazines and Newspapers since the Government made public its intention to consider a Constitutional review or restructuring. Not all of these seem to promote nation-building.

There is abundant historical evidence in Nigeria to suggest that under severe economic hardships, as have now been occasioned, it becomes difficult for social cleavages to appreciate Nigeria's unity and the benefits of a united country. This is because deepening economic crises tend to generate more societal conflicts and anxieties, based on social cleavages that are quite detrimental to national unity and cohesion (Ake, 1985; Mou, 2015). The fact is that as the economic fortunes of the society shrink as a result of the deepening economic hardships, these classes and cultural pluralist conflicts tend to increase. The struggle for resources or as Nigerians love to put it, the "National Cake", becomes more intense.

All social cleavages or factions thereof, attempt to hijack the national cake for their exclusive use, particularly if it is located within their territorial area or soil. Such moves are clearly against nation building. Corruption also increases as office holders engage in favouritism and primitive accumulation of capital for their personal, ethnic, or regional benefits. These developments make it very difficult for those who would want to continue to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the whole nation-state (Ake, 1985; Mou, 2015). Sub-national agitations by ethnic or regional groups from those areas from which the central and subordinate governments are getting most of their resources or revenue, tend to want to secede from the nation with the selfish motive of commandeering these resources for their exclusive benefits. These normally require careful handling so that national security and nation building are not undermined.

One must carefully note the fact that, when these oil producing States, for instance, are not threatening secession; they are still calling for a re-negotiation of the minimum new terms that will favour them mostly, if Nigeria must continue to exist as one entity with them as an integral part. The clarion call by them now is for some form of Confederation, if not for their total independence. Oil has really become an instrument for regional and ethnic chauvinism and agitations of disunity for Nigeria today, when in fact, natural resources are supposed to promote economic development and nation building efforts.

It is now a matter for history - that has to be quickly redressed - to note that Nigeria oil reserve are not concentrated only on the soils of the Southern minorities. Records show clearly that, in the early days of independence when Nigeria was busy prospecting for oil, large quantities were also found in the Benue Valley, the Niger Valley and stretching all the way through Katsina and Borno States to the Lake Chat Valley. It is now a matter for mere regret that no national resources were committed, to the same degree as was done within the lands of the Southern minorities, to

exploit these oil reserves in the North. It is again the uneven-development in the oil industry across the country, even though oil reserves were discovered in commercial quantities also in the North, that has now become a weapon of blackmail of the rest of Nigeria by the Southern minorities (Mou, 2017).

The importance of the forgoing discussion is that no reasonable regime can allow selfish agitations, based on the contemporary economic conditions in the country, to destroy the unity of this great nation for which a lot of blood was spilt to keep as one and undermine nation building. While individual regions, states, and even ethnic groups may fail to see the long-term benefits of remaining together because of their myopic economic considerations; it is the responsibility of the central Government to look ahead and prevent the disintegration of Nigeria under the current threats of oil politics by the Southern minorities. This, we believe, can be done in two ways: First, the Federal Government must insist that the unity of this country is not open to debate and therefore, completely disregard the agitations by the oil producing or other States that are targeted at dismembering the country. While they should be allowed to table their case for fair treatment; they should be prevented from raising extra-territorial matters that border on separatist ambitions. Second, the Federal Government must quickly institute action to develop oil industries in the North where petroleum resources have already been discovered. This will bring a new twist to oil politics in Nigeria thereby promoting our national unity and cohesion.

(iii) The Social Autonomy Dimension

Within the social problems, a few will be discussed simply as illustrations of the kinds of problems they pose for the Constitutional review and restructuring, in particular, and Nigerian unity in general. Those to be discussed here are ethnic chauvinism and religious bigotry.

(a) Ethnic Chauvinism

In the on-going debate on efforts at organizing a Constitutional review or restructuring, some ethnic and regional leaders have started to advocate strongly for a Confederal System. Confederalism is an arrangement which calls for the down-grading of the powers of the centre and re-enforcing those of the sub-national units. These sub-national units could be ethnic groups, Regions, States, or Local Governments. The aim here is to create for themselves very powerful regions over which they hope to preside. It is in this light that we have seen the emergence of regional leaders and associations, such as the Northern Elders Forum, the Yoruba Forum, the Ibo Forum, the Middle Belt Forum, Committee for the Defence of the Southern Minority Rights, etc.

As it is to be expected, four types of autonomy are currently being agitated for by some of these regional groupings. First, is the economic or financial autonomy of the sub-national units. Here, it is argued that the resources of a particular region, state or even ethnic group should be left primarily for the exclusive benefits of the region, state or ethnic group from which they are derived.

Second, the security or monopoly of force autonomy. Here, regions, such as the South-South and the West, are now advocating for a separate Police Force and a regional Army. But we do know that such demands, even when they occur under the guise of Confederalism, are nothing but steps towards separatism.

The third category of autonomy such regional and ethnic champions are looking for is the institutional or administrative autonomy. Here, they argue, perhaps erroneously, that the membership of their ethnic groups in the Federal Civil Service is less than what it should have been. It is, therefore, better for them to seek to establish their powerful regional governments where their educated youths would also get greater opportunities to actualize themselves rather than be bugged down under the “yoke” of Federal Character as enshrined in the Constitution of

the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thus, the Federal Character principle, which was supposed to be a mechanism for promoting unity, fairness and equal representation throughout the Federation is now misunderstood and misrepresented as a “regional tool” for the Northern part of Nigeria to “dominate” the Federal Civil Service.

The fourth kind of autonomy some of these regional leaders are seeking for is legal autonomy. Here, they believe strongly that if allowed the autonomy to operate in their regions without too much control from the central government, they would be able to formulate those laws that will better cater for their interests. But, we do know that regionalization, which prompted such disintegrative policies, such as “Northernisation Policy” for the North, “the East for the Easterners Policy” in the then Eastern Region, and “the West is Yoruba and Yoruba is West Policy” for the Western Region, served to perpetuate disunity which invariably led to the civil war, beginning 1967.

Part of the reasons for the resurgence of interests in Confederalism and regional autonomy, perhaps, relate to the fact that the intervention of the military in our polity, reinforced unitary tendencies. These, in turn, undermined the federalism principles which allowed for the sharing of power and responsibilities between the Federal, States and Local Governments, with the Federal Government having more powers and responsibilities than the rest, thereby acting as a senior partner in a mutual relationship.

In fact, we believe that the principle of Federal Character should be more closely enforced, not just in the Public Service, but also in political appointments, the mass media, admission to Government schools, the economy, and in the nomination of Ambassadors to foreign countries.

(b) Religious Bigotry and Fundamentalism

Since the end of the civil war, religious conflicts appear to be the greatest threat to the internal peace and harmony in Nigeria. Many well-meaning Nigerians now earnestly fear that the ghost of religious bigotry, if not prevented by government, will rear its ugly head again beyond the current war with Boko Haram in the North East.

Three basic propositions characterize the relationship between the State (Government) and Religion. It is important for us to briefly discuss these options so as to conclude on which one the Nigerian Government should continue to adopt towards its major religious groups. These are:-

- (i) The atheistic option;
- (ii) The totalitarian or assimilationist option; and
- (i) The State neutrality option.

The atheistic option requires that secularly based ideology be adopted by the State. The important point is that under this arrangement, the State does not recognize religion as a basic unit for sharing power, wealth or social amenities.

In the case of totalitarian or assimilationist option, there is usually one particular religion taken and elevated over and above others. In the totalitarian case, other religions are then prevented by force. This, we do not recommend for Nigeria. In the assimilationist case, however, followers of other religions are persuaded or co-opted, through incentives, to join the preferred religion.

The third option – the State neutrality option, is where all religions are allowed to prosper and are considered as equals by the State. The State tries to stay out of religious matters, acting simply as a neutral agent. In this case, State’s secularity and impartiality to religions are the norm. This is the model we will recommend to continue to exist in Nigeria. This is because we strongly believe that it is more suited for a multi-religious society such as ours. In this case, our opinion is that religion too should be considered as a “no go area” for the delegates to any Constitutional review

or restructuring fora. In Nigeria, religious secularity and impartiality are already sufficiently enshrined in our 1999 Constitution.

IX PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL SERVICES

There is no question that public enterprises such as NITEL, NIPOST, PHCN, Ports Authority, General Hospitals, and so forth, are clearly performing below expectation. This is particularly worrisome when seen against the background that the costs of their services have continuously gone up; whereas the services themselves have either remained stagnant or have significantly degenerated. There is need to, instead, ensure their penetration even to rural areas for even “the poor” to benefit from them.

On the question of public corruption, the general public is already very excited that a sense of discipline and accountability appeared to have returned back to Nigeria, with the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under Olusegun Obasanjo regime. In fact, the numerous probes that have been inaugurated since the A.P.C. Government took over power under President Buhari, already have served to illustrate to the public that corruption would be truly and comprehensively tackled.

Newspapers and Magazines are also full of paid advertisements indicating that some ethnic groups, regions or even religious groups are, usually, favoured in appointments as Chief Executives or Chairmen and members of these parastatals. The view here is that the Federal Character as enshrined in our Constitution, be fully applied.

X THE INSTITUTIONAL/LEGAL AUTONOMY DIMENSION

A lot of public discourse now also relates to the type of Government, or for that matter the form, government should take in the restructured or revised Constitution to be arrived at. Two areas will be specifically addressed here. The first relates to the form or type of government to be adopted; while the second has to do with the party system.

Whatever it is, it is clear now that Nigerians have experimented with the Presidential System in the two party arrangement and the parliamentary system with a multi-party arrangement (1960-1966). In the recent debate regarding the Constitutional review or restructuring, public opinion clearly differs on this matter. On the one hand, there are those who feel that there has been no problem with the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions. The problem had been with the operators. In which case, it is simply a waste of time and resources to engage in another Constitutional review, in the first place. On the other hand, there are those who feel that our experience with the Presidential system had already proved it to be too expensive and are already calling for a return to the parliamentary model.

We beg to disagree with those who say that calling for a Constitutional review or restructuring now is a waste of time. However, we would like to side with those who have expressed the view that having tried the Parliamentary and Presidential Systems, as well as the multi-party and two party systems, we are now better placed to make a decision on which one could be best for Nigeria.

XI THE SECURITY (MILITARY/POLICE) AUTONOMY

The role of the military in Nigerian society has increasingly come under devastating attack recently. In fact, there are those who think that Nigeria’s current economic, political and social problems were caused by repeated military interventions in our polity. The call for a constitutional review or restructuring are also blamed on the military who clearly, because of their command style of Government, introduced unitary elements in our Federalism.

There are some agitations for constitutional review or restructuring that are seeking to temper even with the position of the military in the Nigerian society. They are seeking to be allowed to have their Military and Police Force in their States or Regions/Zones. As we have stated above, why the possibility for creating State Police should be considered and even allowed for States who can afford it; no State should be given the autonomy to the level of setting up their own military. This will give birth ultimately to struggle by such States or Zones for separatism. It should not be allowed under any guise.

In this Section, we have attempted to deal **with the role the Government should play** regarding the calls for Constitutional review and restructuring. It focused specifically on the limitations and modalities that the Government must inevitably place on it. It explains how this is to be done and provides the necessary rationale for such actions.

We then discussed the various political, economic, social, legal and even security reasons that are being presented by different social cleavages in Nigeria calling for constitutional review or restructuring. We made our pertinent recommendations in each case. On the whole, we agreed that there is need to proceed with the constitutional review or restructuring in Nigeria. However, there is no need to inaugurate any new body, be it a sovereign or non sovereign Constitutional Conference or Constituent Assembly. This should be the task to be conducted or at least midwived by the National Assembly. All previous Reports by previous Constitutional Conferences should, accordingly, be passed over to the National Assembly for further necessary action. No need to waste more revenues setting up a new body to do it.

XII POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

(i) The Government must ensure that the Federal Character Clause in the Constitution is strictly followed in making appointments into the Public Service. This is particularly more so in the Military and other Security Agencies. It creates a sense of justice and equality thereby promoting nation building and patriotism in the citizens.

(ii) Just like in building an upstairs, the type of security architecture is very important. When security challenges are at their highest, only an Integral National Security System (INSS) or Architecture can be appropriate in dealing with them. This does require the restructuring of the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) to more ably handle this task of operating an Integrated National Security System or Architecture in Nigeria. It may even require a new legislation to make this stable and permanent.

(iii) The nature of the economic, political, social and other policies – in short good governance, is critical to facilitating the Military and other Security Agencies in doing their work. Nigerians must know that the foundations for effective and efficient policing begins with the national security system, good governance and the level of nation building the Government is undertaking.

(iv) Government must ensure that the Armed Forces and other National Security Agencies carry out their mandates and assignments or operations in a professional manner. They must not be “captured” by a particular social cleavage or a set of social cleavages be they of ethnic, regional, religious, language, gender, class or even caste. A situation where they are “captured” and “hijacked” by any of these cleavages to serve their parochial interest is too dangerous. It damages nation building and precipitates more problems than solving them.

(v) Subordinate groups, classes and other social cleavages hitherto very docile when Nigeria was under military rule, have suddenly sprang up, with agitations for participation in the affairs of their nations and societies. There is clearly a “participation revolution” going on throughout the world, Nigeria inclusive. These agitations are mostly for poverty eradication, socio-political justice and inclusive growth. If avenues are not quickly created by the Nigerian Government to allow them

opportunities to participate in the developmental process, it could be grounds for political, social and economic instability that will further threaten our corporate existence and development.

(vi) It is regrettable that ever since the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was scrapped against the advise of the Orasanye Committee a few years ago, there is still no Federal Government or Agency that is dealing, on a massive scale, with the challenges of poverty and social exclusion in Nigeria. The Social Investment Programme in the Presidency is rather too small in scope, coverage and the number of employees, to make a serious impact on these conditions in the Nation. There is therefore, the great need for the Federal Government to create a Federal Ministry of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion or at least a National Poverty Eradication and Equal Opportunity Commission or Agency to deal with these matters. With seventy-one per cent (71%) of the population of Nigeria in poverty and unemployment, such a federal Ministry or Commission is not just desirable, but even an imperative.

This is the model or vehicle being used to deal with such issues in Asia and Latin American countries. In Latin American countries, they all have full National Ministries of Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion for dealing with such matters. For example, in Ecuador, it is also called the Ministry for Poverty Eradication and Social Inclusion. Thus, whether the security, economic, political and social problems challenging national security, good governance and nation building currently in Nigeria, would get better or worse, depends on what happens to this 71% of Nigerian's population still living below the poverty line of one dollar a day.

(vii) There is need to also promote the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of Government policies and programmes in Nigeria to promote good governance. It is not enough to make budgets and allocate money to the Ministries, Departments and Agencies of Government. They must be closely coordinated, monitored and evaluated. Appropriate monitoring structures must be put in place.

The Office of the Director-General in the Presidency for Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation that was recommended by the **Vision 20:2020 Document** and set up by the Jonathan Administration, seems to have been closed when the present regime under President Buhari came to power. That office is very important and needs to be reopened. Without accurate data, and analysis and evaluation of Government policies, programmes and projects and reports submitted directly to the Presidency and other approved stakeholders, they may not know how the various MDAs are performing and what changes need to be made to the policies they are trying to implement. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), even collects such M&E reports to compile their data.

(viii) As was suggested by the Vice-President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, GCON, SAN, recently and approved by the National Assembly, there is urgent need to review the Federal Constitution of Nigeria, and permit States to have their own Police Force, in addition to Federal Police Force. This will help States to address more speedily their internal security challenges. We also support the calls for Constitutional Review or Restructuring in our polity. However, we recommend that this should be the task to be conducted or at least mid-wifed by the National Assembly.

(ix) Every nation must strive to reward hard work and merit as they promote development and nation building. This is certainly not incompatible with the Federal Character Clause. In every social cleavages, qualified individuals (men and women) exist. Security Agencies must fish them out for appointment, reward and national honours. When mediocrity, nepotism, sectionalism and favouritism, become the accepted norm of governmental behaviour or public policy action, such a nation is doomed. It can never develop, neither can it enjoy good governance, national security or continuous nation building. The resultant crises from such an unfavourable and unjust system will

generate sustainable crises, conflicts and other security challenges that will make effective nation building and policing difficult, if not in fact impossible.

(x) The Nigerian Police Force is clearly understaff, under paid, under nourished, under equipped, under trained and so forth. These issues must all be looked into. No one can ever say they are not important. The recommendation being made here is that these are all supplementary to a good national security architecture, good governance and effective nation building. When a good national security architecture is in place, good, governance exists, nation building and effective and inclusive policing become easier to accomplish.

(xi) To have a truly “inclusive approach” to policing, and national security matters, the Nigerian Police Force and the other Security Agencies, must mobilise the citizens as part of their strategy, especially under policy of community policing and inclusive security. It is especially important that the Traditional Rulers must be coopted into it. The Traditional Institutions in Nigeria, have a fundamental role to play, not just in community policing; but also in other security matters and nation building. They can effectively be involved in building a united, peaceful and prosperous country.

The British Colonialists used them under the “Indirect Rule Policy”. The Nigerian Police and other Security Agencies, can do the same at this time by giving them a key role in community policing security watch. They will help improve the peace, security as well as law and order in their localities tremendously.

XIII CONCLUSION

This paper has tried to examine closely national security, good governance and nation building in Nigeria. The study shows that there are growing pressures from the citizens world-wide, including those in Nigeria to have not just the form of democracy, but also the real substance of it. These pressures, when not fully tackled, can lead any Nation to becoming “failed State”.

However, the paper argues that regardless of how one defines or conceives national security, good governance and nation building, policies dealing with these issues must cater for the welfare of the majority of the citizens if they are to stand the test of time and be sustained. This, the paper shows, is what States or Governments, especially democratic ones, are all about.

The paper shows that in Nigeria, because of the multiplicity of security challenges, this is not happening fast enough for the citizens of Nigeria to appreciate. Some may even say, they are not happening at all. For instance, while the general national economic growth indices, such as GDP and Income per Capita, are going up, the reverse is the case with those indices relating to the issues that mean the most to the public – poverty eradication, job creation, security, human rights protection and peace. These ones are still moving very fast in the negative direction.

Nigerians are beginning to wonder why the whole country is engulfed in one military and other security Agencies internal security interventions or the other. They cannot understand why effective policing has not been happening and herdsmen/farmers clashes, hijacking, ritual killings and so on cannot be stopped despite these numerous security operations. The number of farmers being killed and property destroyed on daily basis by herdsmen and Boko Haram, especially since January, 2018, have clearly shown that Nigeria has started showing signs of a “failed State”. The incapacity of the Police and other Security Agencies to put a stop to it, has further confirmed these fears of Nigeria being on the verge of becoming a “failed State”. This should not be allowed to happen.

Thus, nation building is suffering in the process and others are now calling for constitutional amendments and restructuring. They are looking for ways out of these current dilemmas in Nigeria. Still others, especially the youths, have become impatient with the government and leaders. They

are engaging in self-help efforts, which include militancy and violence. Others are seeking illegal means and moving to other continents and nations, especially to Western Europe.

The paper consequently suggests policy options or recommendations for the government attention, consideration and implementation. We believe strongly that when accepted and implemented, things will start to get better in Nigeria and the possibility of her becoming a totally "failed State" prevented. It is only then that Nigeria will be restored to her manifest destiny of becoming truly the Giant of Africa, which most Nigerians and non-Nigerians expect the Nation to be.

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